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INTRODUCTION 
A market may be thought to be an institution where agents get together 
to buy and sell goods and services and more generally, to negotiate courses of 
action. In the perfect competitive version of it, there are atomestic economic 
agents who, as consumers maximize their utilities, while producers, acting as 
price takers, are engaged in maximizing profits. It is well known that under 
certain conditions governing preferences and technology of production, a 
competitive equilibrium of the system exists, which means that there exists a 
balancing price vector at which the demand and the supply of each coinmodity 
is matched. Any exogenous change from this position of equilibrium brings 
about the needed comparative static changes all of, which operate through the 
market system. If, for example, there is an excess demand for some commodity 
at a given price, then its price moves up, or if there is an excess supply of 
loanable funds at a particular rate of interest then the interest rate falls. Both 
these operate as part of the inexorable laws that govern the market system. It is 
also known that a perfectly competitive market system ensures efficiency in the 
sense of parrot. It also answers the questions as to what ought to be produced in 
how much quantity and in what manner and for whom. 
It would not be incorrect to say that the overwhelming bulk of the 
market system paradigm is anchored in the private ownership economy. In such 
an economy, the initial distribution of resources is treated as given and is 
virtually regarded as sacrosanct. Any tampering with the initial distribution of 
resources is looked upon as a violation of a certain basic right, viz., the right to 
private property. Now, if the initial distribution of resources is iniquitous, in 
tenns of certain ethical criteria, there is no presumption that the operation of the 
market system, left to itself, may bring about equity. Indeed, in a system with 
unequal bargaining power amongst agents, the operation of market forces may 
bring about an accentuation of iniquity. 
If it were the case that the only difficulty, though, this is a serious one, 
with the market system is its insensitivity to income distribution issues, but that 
on the other hand its invariably ensures efficiency then the latter would be a 
major point in its favour. However, as it turns out, and is well known, the 
market system's efficiency properly break down in the presence of monopoly 
elements, incomplete or asymmetric infonnation, externalities and public 
goods, or when we are confronted with decreasing cost industries. Given the 
pervasiveness of the above features, surely the incidence of market failure and 
consequent break down of efficiency must be equally pervasive '. 
Since in the market system of economy, the main goal is profit 
maximization, the factors are exploited on a large scale. Thus, in the presence 
of public goods or externalities and more exploitation of factors, it is clear that 
it would be necessary to have governmental intervention in order to ensure 
efficiency of resource use. However, Government is also thought to be failure 
on the ground that the most Goveniment activities that have to do with 
regulatory, legislative or administrative functions end up with 'rent seeking' 
behaviour on the part of Government functionaries. Such behaviour reduces the 
impact of the intended policy intervention and sometime may even eliminate it 
altogether. 
The real question, therefore, is one of finding the right balance in trying 
to avoid the twin evils of market failure and Government failure. There are 
several instances of economies where Government action has not been 
beneficial, but by the same token there are several cases where the reverse is 
the case. 
Thinking on development has shifted repeatedly during the past forty 
years. Progress has not moved along a straight line from darkness to light. 
Instead, there has been.success and failures, and a gradual accumulation of 
knowledge and insight on some matters, a fairly clear understanding has 
emerged, but many questions still remain contentious and unanswered. 
Climate, culture and natural resources were once thought to be the keys 
to economic development. Rapid industrialization, using explicit and implicit 
taxes on agriculture to fund industrial investment, was for many years a much-
favoured strategy. After the 'Great Depression' and through the 1960s, most 
policy makers favoured import substitution combined with fostering infant 
industries. In its day, this view was endorsed, and the strategy supported by 
external aid and finance agencies. 
These views have not stood the test of time. Now, there is clear 
evidence, from both developing and industrial countries, that it is better not to 
ask Govermnents to manage development in detail. Discriminatory taxes on 
agriculture have almost always turned out to be taxes on growth. Economic 
isolation behind trade barriers has proved costly. Retarding competition and 
interfering with prices, deliberately or accidentally. 
As the importance of openness and competition has been realized, the 
conviction has grown that they are insufficient by themselves. Investing in 
people, if done right, provides the firmest foundation for lasting development. 
And the proper economic role of Government is larger than merely standing for 
markets if they fail to work well. In defining and protecting property rights, 
providing effective legal, judicial, and regulatory systems, improving the 
efficiency of the civil services, and protecting environment, the state fornis the 
very core of development. Political and civil liberties are not, contrary to a 
once-popular view, inconsistent with economic growth. 
A range of evidence suggests what can be gained by reducing 
interventions in the market. For instance, various degrees of refonns in Chile, 
China, Ghana, Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Morocco and Turkey 
during the 1980s were generally followed by improvements in economic 
performance. 
In several respects, Government intervention is essential for 
development. What then are the conditions under which Government 
intervention is likely to help, rather than hinder? Economic theory and practical 
experience suggest that interventions are likely to help provided they are 
market-friendly .^ The market-friendly shows the extent/degree of Government 
intervention. In market-fiiendly approach. Government must allow the markets 
to function well and should concentrate their intervention on areas in which 
markets prove inadequate. The approach to development that seems to have 
worked most reliably and which seems to offer most promise, suggests a re-
appraisal of the respective roles for the market and the state. Put simply, 
Ciovermnents need to do less in those areas where market work, or can be made 
to work, reasonably well. In many countries, it would help to privatize many of 
the state-owned enterprises. Governments need to let domestic and 
i itemational competition flourished. At the same time Governments need to do 
more in those areas where markets alone can not be relied upon. Above all, this 
means investing in education, health, nutrition, family plamiing, and poverty 
alleviation, building social, physical, administrative, regulatory, and legal 
infrastructure of better quality; mobilizing the resources to finance public 
expenditure; and providing a stable macro-economic foundation, without which 
little can be achieved. Government intervention to protect the environment is 
also necessary for sustainable development. The experience of many countries 
suggests that market reform can also help to protect the environment. 
The refonn must look at institutions. The establishment of a well 
functioning legal system and judiciary, and of secure property rights, is an 
essential complement to economic refonns. The refomis of the public sector are 
a priority in many countries. That incudes civil service refonn, rationalizing 
public expenditures, reforming state owned enterprises, and privatization. 
Related economic refonns include better delivery of public goods, supervision 
of banks, and legislation for financial development. Strengthening these 
institutions will increase the quality of governance and the capacity of the state 
to implement development policy and enable society to establish checks and 
balances. 
The priorities and constraints, however, vary widely across coutnries at 
different stages of development. Yet the opportunity for rapid development is 
greater today than at anytime in history. International links, in the fonn of trade 
and flows of infonnation, investment and technology, are stronger now than 
forty years ago. Medicine, Science and Engineering have all made great strides, 
the benefits are availaole worldwide. And policy makers have a better 
understanding than before of the options for development. 
To seize this opportunity, industrial countries, developing countries and 
external aid and lending agencies need to do act. The industrial countries need 
to roll back restriction on trade, refonn macroeconomic policy, increase 
financial support to developing countries, support policy refonn of developing 
countries and encourage sustainable growth while the developing need to invest 
in people, improve the climate for enterprise, open economies to international 
trade and investment, get macroeconomic policy right. In each of these areas, 
the challenge to policy makers is to exploit the complementarities between state 
and market .^ However, it would be wrong to think intemis of applying the 
same policy package to all countries. The appropriate prescription undoubtedly 
has to be based on the history, institutions and ideology prevalent in a country. 
The main challenge of development today is to improve the quality of life. 
Structural adjustments and economic refonns are, tlierefore, being undertaken 
to achieve this goal "*. 
The structural adjustment programme is an integral part of IMF-World 
Bank conditionality which are market-friendly. Conditionality in general ternis 
means the tenns and conditions imposed by the international financial 
institutions (particularly IMF) while granting short-tenn or long-tenn loans to 
the borrowing countries. The conditions which are being imposed by the IMF 
while granting a loan can be distinguished in the following two ways: (a) 
C(mditions on the utilization of the loan, viz., utilization and promptness in the 
execution of projects; and (b) the conditions for the change in the 
macroeconomic policies of the Government, i.e., introduction of supply 
management measures and structural refonns .^ 
One of the major functions of the IMF is to provide its member countries 
with financial aid to cover short-tenn gaps in their balance of payments. The 
chief means by which it has provided assistance in the past is stand-by 
arrangements. A member country requiring an IMF loan more than 50 per cent 
of its quota (use of Upper Credit Tranches) has to agree to a stabilization 
programme with the IMF and sign a stand-by arrangement. Thus, the 
Government of the country concerned commits itself to undertake wide ranging 
changes in the policies which the IMF believes will restore a healthy balance of 
payments. In 1974, the IMF created the Extended Fund Facihty (EFF) to 
advance (2-3 years) medium-tenn loans (up to 140 per cent of the quota) to a 
member country facing chronic balance of payments problems. To get EFF 
funds, a member country has to conclude an extended arrangement with the 
IMF which imposes many stringent conditions on the country's economic 
policies designed to remedy the 'structural' problems of balance of payments 
deficits. 
As for the World Bank, it has never made unconditional loans. Even 
when virtually all of its loans were for development projects, these loans 
carried conditions to which the borrower had to agree and some of these 
conditions required policy changes. Since March 1990, the World Bank in 
close co-operation with the IMF has been advancing loans to finance structural 
adjustment programmes in the countries facing serious balance of payment 
deficits. These structural adjustment loans (SALs) last from tliree to five years 
while the IMF stabilization programmes designed to produce 'structural change' 
last for three years. The majority of the World Bank tenns do not differ much 
from those of the IMF. 
The conditionality has been a major point of contention in the activities 
of the IMF/World Bank. There can be identified four layers of conditionality: 
(a) Demand conditionality which focuses on cutting the Government 
spending, currency devaluation, raising interest rates and trade 
liberalization. This demand conditionality has been "pioneered by the 
IMF through their monetary approach to the balance of payments". 
(b) Supply conditionality, pioneered by the World Bank. Initially the World 
Bank conditionality focussed on project fonnulation and 
implementation. With the introduction of SALs, it has been extended to 
the whole economy. Its centre of attention "is the investment 
programme, system of incentives, pricing, financial liberalisation and 
trade liberalisation." 
(c) 'Growth' conditionality focused on giving a free hand and incentives to 
the private sector of the economy, including privatization of 
Govermnent-owned enterprises as much as possible, promotion of 
foreign direct investment and also trade liberalization. 
(d) 'Cross conditionality' can be said to exist where acceptance by the 
borrowing country of the conditionality of one financial agency is made 
a pre-condition for financial support by the others. Infonnal cross-
conditionality exists between the two Bretton Woods institutions. It is 
the convention that for a country to obtain the World Bank SAL, it must 
have undertaken the high conditionalities of the IMF upper credit tranche 
loans. In many cases, the negotiations for a SAL fi-om the World Bank 
have collapsed as a result of the country's failure to reach agreement 
with the IMF. The cross-conditionality also exists between the Bretton 
Woods twins and other funding agencies ^ . 
According to the IMF, the basic reason behind the balance of payments 
deficit of a country is a high rate of inflation. So the IMF stabilisation policy 
aim at fighting inflation. Excessive public expenditure not covered by revenue 
(budget deficit) is taken as the major cause of inflation. So a reduction in the 
budget deficit is one of the stabilization objectives in 86 out of 94 IMF 
supported programmes during 1980-81 ''. To achieve this, the IMF often calls 
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for reducing (or eliminating) food subsidies and expenditures on different 
social welfare schemes. To reduce the budgetary burden of the Government, 
state enterprises are expected to cover their costs by raising the prices of their 
goods and services. Public utility services are not exempted from this 
conditionality. 
Besides all these, the IMF asks for limiting domestic credit expansion 
and raising interest rates to curb the demand for credit. Thus, domestic money 
supply and demand are sought to be controlled by reduction of budget deficit 
and domestic credit. Another instrument of controlling demand is strict 
limitation of wage increase by curbing the power of trade unions. This is also 
e>:pected to improve competitive efficiency of domestic firms and also to 
encourage foreign investment. 
Substantial devaluation of national currency is as a rule one of the 
central demands of the IMF as the high rate of inflation leads to an over-valued 
real exchange rate which in turn encourages imports and discourages exports. 
During 1980-84, about 55 per cent of IMF conditionality included devaluation 
in the name of "liberalisation and refonn of exchange rate arrangement" .^ 
Devaluation often goes hand-in-hand with abolition of exchange controls and 
restrictions on profit transfers. These are designed to create favourable 
conditions for foreign investment in order to restore confidence among foreign 
capital investors and to guarantee a long-tenn inflow of capital. 
For growth of the economy suffering from balance of payments deficits, 
the IMF believes in the efficiency of the market and relies on growth of the 
private sector. So the IMF insists on privatisation of the state sector and 
suggests different measures for the private sector to flourish Hberal entry of 
foreign capital is also in the menue of IMF growth policies. 
As noted earlier, the majority of the World Bank tenns do not differ 
greately from that of the IMF. Like the IMF, the World Bank also insists on 
trade liberalisation, devaluation for export expansion, price increase for public 
goods and services. Both the IMF and the World Bank call for privatization and 
reduction of state intervention. 
Debtor nations that believe on funds, financial assistance have to agree 
to IMF adjustment conditionality and adopt economic refonns programme in an 
attempt to prevent a balance of payments crisis '". India, like many other 
countris, approached IMF-World Bank to avail this facility of loans on the 
condition of adopting the Structural Adjustment Prograinme in the wake of 
severe economic crisis of 1990-91 when foreign exchange reserves dwindled to 
$1.1 billion and defauh on debt servicing appeared imminent. Though the year 
1990-91 has been among the crudest in India's post independence economic 
history, the roots of the crisis are traceable to the early 1980s when serious 
macroeconomic imbalances began rearing their head resulting in ever 
increasing fiscal deficit and a strident rise in Government of India's 
indebtedness - internal as well as external. A new Govermnent took ovsr in 
December 1989, at a time when the fiscal deficit was high and the foreign 
exchange reserves were low (covering only about six weeks of imports). The 
budget introduced in March 1990, made an attempt to reduce the fiscal deficit 
and begin the process of correction in the balance of payments position. For a 
while the economic situation seemed to show some improvement. The fiscal 
deficit was, by the end of August 1990, significantly lower than in the previous 
year, and foreign exchange reserves were slightly higher (in contrast to a sharp 
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decline in the reserves in the corresponding period of the previous year). 
However, there was a dramatic reversal of this situation in the next few months 
consequent upon the annexation of Kuwait by Iraq on 2 August, 1990, crude oil 
prices rose sharply within a period of six weeks, these prices doubled. Even 
though the Gulf war did not last long. India's fragile economy was badly 
shaken. 
The direct economic impact of the conflict in the Gulf was exacerbated 
by domestic social and political developments. The series of events during that 
period, in tandem with the conflict in the Gulf, was sufficient to shake 
international confidence in India's economic viability. The country found it 
more and more difficult to borrow internationally, and there was also an 
adverse impact on the inflow of funds from non-resident Indians . In short, 
the crisis manifested in 1990-91, were as follows: 
domestic inflation reached the peak level of 17 per cent in 1991. 
foreign exchange reserves plummeted to $1.2 billion, barely sufficient to 
pay for two weeks. 
the central Govermnent's fiscal deficit as a per cent of GDP touched the all 
time high of 8.4 per cent; and 
the current account deficit widened to almost 8 billion US dollars (2.6 per 
cent of the GDP) ^\ 
The country came perilously close to defaulting on interest and 
repayment obligation on foreign debt. India's credit rating in foreign money 
markets had become so low that it was practically impossible to secure short-
terni commercial borrowing ^^. Thus, to overcome the balance of payments 
difficulties and increase credit worthiness, it became necessary for India to 
approach IMF and World Bank to get loans under structural adjustment loans 
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facility. India, therefore, started series of economic refonns using market-
friendly approach to fulfil the conditions laid down by IMF/World Bank. The 
proposed IMF-World Bank refonns in the context of structural adjustment 
policy in India fall in the following categories: 
(i) Further opening of the Indian economy to international competition by 
reducing custom duties and by attracting multinational companies and 
foreign investors by offering them various incentives at concessional 
ternis. 
(ii) Restructuring public sector which will involve closing down of loss 
making units, putting a stop to its further expansion and introduction of 
some degree of privatisation in profit earning units, 
(iii) Reducing role of planning and changing priorities, 
(iv) Introducing fiscal refonns by broadening the tax base, raising the excise 
duty as v/ell as introduction of value added principles, further reduction in 
subsidies on food, fertilizer and export, 
(iv) Reduction in defence expenditure '^ . 
Though the process of economic refonns in India started during eighties 
under the leadership of late Rajiv Gandhi, the real tlirust were given in 1991 
under the pressure of IMF and World Bank. The new Congress (I) Government 
headed by P.V. Narsimha Rao and then finance Minister, Mamnohan Singh, 
undertook a package of policy refonns for the Indian economy with the 
declared objectives of bringing about macro stabilisation and structural 
adjustments which came accompanied by the 'Catch-Words' of liberalisation 
and globalisation '*'. Stabilisation measures represent demand-side adjustments 
and aim at reducing the level of aggregate demand while the structural 
adjustment programme (SAP) represents supply-side adjustments so that 
institutional and market-impediments in the way of fast output growth are 
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neutralised '^ . They have short-term time horizon and medium run time horizon 
respectively. It is possible to postpone structural refonns during stabilisation, 
but the converse is rarely true. Structural refonns are unlikely to succeed unless 
they are proceeded or accompanied by stabilization. Similarly, stabilization is 
unlikely to be sustainable without structural reforms 
The Indian economy has been undergoing much change especially since 
1991. These changes have affected almost all sectors of the economy. An 
economy which has been highly regulated since 1951 is 'fast' dismantling the 
various controls and is on the road to become a full-fledged market economy in 
the very near future '. The Government has gone about to implement a broad 
package of reforni measures to give the right signals to the IMF and initiate a 
process of liberalising and globalising the Indian economy. On July 1 and 3, the 
rupee was devalued by about 20 per cent in two discrete steps. This was 
followed by major refonns in trade policy so that Indian trade and industry may 
"soar in the high skies of trade", and the rupee may become fully convertible in 
thiree to five years. Twenty days later the industrial policy was drastically 
liberahsed as the asset limit for NRTP firnis and industrial licensing for most 
projects were abolished and the limit of foreign equity increased to 51 per cent 
ir^  several 'high priority' areas. The industrial policy was amiounced the same 
day as the union budget was presented in the parliament. The budget itself 
incorporated several pointers of change in economic thinking ^°. 
The Government set up different committees to review the policy and 
make recommendations for further refonns. Some of these important 
committees are as under: 
For the financial sector refonns, the Government of India set up a high 
level committee with Mr. M. Narasimham as chainnan to examine all 
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aspects relating to the structure, organisations, functions, and procedures 
of the financial system ^\ The committee submitted its first report in 
November 1991 and second in 1998 with some important 
recommendations. 
RBI constituted a committee under the chainnanship of Sri M.N. 
Goiporia in September 1990 on making recommendations for consumer 
service improvements in banks. The committee submitted its report on 
Decembers, 1991. 
The Central Government set up a high powered committee on tax refomis 
in 1991, under the chairmanship of Prof Raja J. Chelliah to make 
recommendations on a comprehensive reform of the system of central 
taxes. An interim report was submitted by the committee in December 
1991 and the final report (part I and II) by June 1993. 
The Government of India constituted a committee for recommending 
improvements in insurance sector under the chairmanship of Dr. R.N. 
Malhotra in April 1993. On January 7, 1994, the committee submitted its 
recommendations to the Finance Minister. 
In order to examine the bottlenecks in industrial and corporate 
restructuring and to suggest suitable measures for early closure of 
unviable units and quick revival of viable units, the Government 
appointed a committee on industrial sickness and corporate restructuring 
in May 1993 under the chainnanship of Onkar Goswami. The committee 
submitted its report in July 1993. 
For correcting balance of payments. Dr. C. Rangarajan headed the high 
level committee on balance of payments and submitted its report on June 
4, 1993. 
In October 1994, a cominittee under the chainnanship of Sri Rakesh 
Mohan was constituted by the Government for the recommendations on 
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infrastructure. The committee handed over its report to the Finance 
Ministry on June 22, 1996 with some important recommendations. 
The Disinvestment Commission was set up in August 1996 for suggesting 
the modalities for undertaking disinvestment of equities of select PSUs 
under the chairmanship of Mr. G.V. Ramkrishna. Disinvestment in Public 
Sector enterprises is one of the major policies adopted by the Government 
under the economic reforms. 
SEBI constituted a coiTunittee under the chainnanship of Mr. 
Chandrashekhar for improving the process of share transfer. The 
committee submitted its report in April 1997. 
The Government constituted a committee on February 8, 1997, under the 
chainnanship of Mr. S.S. Tarapore for providing suggestions to make 
Indian rupee fully convertible on capital account. 
A working group was constituted in December 1997, under the 
chainnanship of Dr. Y.B. Reddy to suggest major changes in money stock 
measures (Mj, M2, M3. etc.). The working group submitted its report with 
some recommendations to RBI on June 23, 1998. 
The said committees made important recommendations pertaining to 
different sectors of the economy and many of these recommendations were 
accepted and implemented by the Goveniinent. The usefulness of these 
recommendations and their impact on the economy is a matter of unending 
debate in which large number of economists participated and are likely to 
participate in future, as we will see many more steps towards refonning the 
economy in years to come. 
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Review of Literature 
A large number of studies have been carried in India regarding the 
impact of economic refonns. The usual difference of opinion among the 
researchers can easily be noticed as one go through these studies. However, 
very few researchers have tried to cover all aspects of the refonns. Most of 
researchers have tried to study the impact of economic refonns on some sectors 
of the economy. Anyhow the literature available on different aspects of 
economic refonns in India is immense and it is not possible to review all the 
studies. 
Moreover, the results of many studies are same or similar we, therefore, 
would like to review some important studies which cover main aspects of 
economic refonns in India. 
Bhagavati and Srinivasan (1993) expected good perfonnance of 
economic refonns in India. They advocated structural adjustment programmes 
for higher economic growth. 
Kumar^ ^ (1993) is of the view that the picture is indeed complex. The 
facade of success of NEP hides the problem facing the economy with opening 
up, the economy has become far more unstable than earlier and the impact of 
this will fall, on the already marginalised in society, 
Patibandla "^* (1994) ascertained that a market economy is viable only 
when there are certain minimum efficiently functioning social, economic and 
legal institutions. Most of the less developed countries including India do not 
satisfy the condition ;^. 
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Sau^ ^ (1994) argued that equilibrium is most likely to be stable if the 
interest elasticity of foreign direct investment is high and that of foreign 
portfolio investment is low. The experience of India indicates the reverse 
situation which implied the possibility of instability. 
Bajpai^ ^ (1995) argued that structural refonn programme accompanying 
stabilisation measures may neither help to achieve macro-stability nor the 
restoration of sustainable growth. He argued tliat the assumption of refonns are 
guided by rules of thumb and underlying general equilibrium model for the 
economy for which these standard rules apply is an unrealistic portrayal of 
most of the developing countries. The model holds good only under very 
restrictive assumptions, perhaps only for small economies. Besides, while it is 
important to attain and maintain fiscal discipline, the IMF's approach has 
prolonged the process and invariably fail to yield the desired results. 
Datt (1995) argued that new economic refonns have not succeeded so 
far in achieving the objectives laid down in the 1991 industrial pohcy 
statement. They have opened the international window too wide and have 
pennitted multinationals in all areas, irrespective of the prioritization of hitech 
area. Secondly multinationals have started the process of swallowing Indian 
concerns and there is a strong fears that the multinationals will subvert Indian 
capital and establish their supremacy in the corporate sector. In this context, 
instead of enabling the Indian industries to improve their efficiency and 
productivity, the multinationals will displace Indian industries. This runs 
counter to our goal of self-reliance. 
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Bhatt^ ^ (1996) observed that during the post economic refomis (1991-
9:5), India has made some significant achievement in economic growth, 
irdustrial production especially capital goods industries, export sector, foreign 
investment, reduction in fiscal deficit, etc. But there are adveise effects such as 
increase of poverty ratio, increase of unemployment in urban infonnal sector, 
rural sector, fall in domestic savings and capital fomiation, fall in investment in 
agriculture and increase in inflation. 
Pande^^ (1996) argue that Indian economy had a cherished longing for 
being self-reliant and in new circumstances of liberalisation, it has to allow 
imports free for Indian domestic market. There seems to be no danger of 
sudden foreign capture of domestic market in India because the labour costs as 
well as handling margins are any way greater in west. Foreign goods at open 
competition with domestic goods and services are likely to improve quality of 
Indian goods and create a healthy atmosphere of consumer orientation. 
Prakash^^ (1996) found that the globalisation and liberalisation of the 
Indian economy has deepened the inflationary pressures and the prices of 
manufactures have increased more rapidly than all other prices under the 
impact of new economic policy. However, the globalisation and liberalisation 
of the trade regime had led to an improvement in gross, net and income ternis 
of trade of India inspite of double devaluation in 1991. 
Sinha^' (1996) found that recently adopted policy of opening up the 
economy by reducing trade barriers is contributing to economic growth. 
Zaidi^ ^ (1996) argued that FDI is the most desirable form of external 
capital inflows in India as it is in other developing countries while so many 
Asian countries have been successful in bringing structural changes in capital 
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inflows depending upon FDI up to the extent of 40 per cent of capital inflows, 
in India the contribution has hardly reached 8.8 per cent in 1994-95. Further, 
economies may not grow mainly on the strength of FDI only. Despite large 
inflows of external capital, there is no substitute to high level of domestic 
savings to maintain high level of growth. This factor, apart from larger FDI 
flows, has mainly contributed in the fast growing economies like China, South 
Korea and Malaysia, etc. 
Datt^ ^ (1997) argued that with weighty evidence of the adverse 
consequences of the refonn process, is it not a cruel joke on the people of India 
to assert that the economy is in good shape, more so when the UF Government 
is adopting growth with social justice as its goal ? 
Mehta "* (1997) analysed that the hberalisation process during 1991-92 to 
1995-96 has enlianced the importance of international trade in our domestic 
economy. An analysis of India's trade by commodities' classification show that 
there has been no significant change in India's export basket during the last five 
years. The trade statistics for 1990-91 to 1995-96 reveal that the direction of 
India's export has shown a significant departure. There has been substantial 
increase in India's exports to Asian markets. In fact, his result show that most 
of the increase in India's exports is due to a shift in our markets and also show 
that there is insignificant effort of other variables like, price, exchange rate, 
trade policy changes, etc., on our exports. 
Mohanty^^ (1997) ascertained that the macroeconomic refonn process 
during the past five years has achieved a great deal of integration between the 
domestic and international financial markets and strengthened the role of price 
mechanism, viz. interest rate and exchange rate in the detennination of trade 
19 
flows and balance of payments. In this evolving system, fiscal deficit assumes a 
great deal of importance as a policy instrument of maintaining the viability of 
external sector. 
Kumar, Mr. Rajat"'^ ' (1998) argued that many empiiical studies have 
shov^ n^ that the benefits of FDI have not been commensurate with the 
experience. In this era of growing globalisation, economic rationality suggests 
that FDI must be encouraged not only for the capital but also for the knowledge 
it brings. In addition, they bring in competition which is essential for the 
healthy growth of the economy. 
Kumar, Nagesh (1998) found that while the magnitudes of inflows 
have recorded impressive growth, they are still at a small level as compared to 
the country's potential. The policy refonns have enabled the country to widen 
the sectoral as well as the source country composition of FDI. 
Shome"** (1998) analysed that India's economic refonns of the 1990s 
while having achieved a distinct beginning, have not demonstrated 
sustainability. In economic terms, industrial activity slumped, export grov^h 
deteriorated significantly, expenditure of general Govermnent as a proportion 
of GDP remained intact, the tax revenue to GDP ratio worsened in the face of 
insufficient policy and administrative measures, financial sector refonn was 
suspended by short-tenn responses, and the foreign exchange market witnessed 
periodic volatility leading, in turn, to uncertainty and postponement of decision 
making by industry. 
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Objectives of the Study 
Our review of the literature shows that there is large volume of work on 
the theme of Privatization, Liberalization and Globalization. But there are very 
few studies trying to capture the whole gamut of the debate about privatization, 
liberalization and globalization and none on the exact topic that we intend to 
study. Most of the said studies pertains to specific sectors of the economy. 
Moreover, large number of these studies were conducted in the early part of the 
nineties when the current economic refonns in India were in their infancy. The 
process of economic refonns is not yet complete but now a decade has gone 
since the current economic refonns were started in India and therefore, we are 
in a better position to study the issue as the impact of the new economic policy 
on various sectors of the economy is more visible and the trends may be 
examined in a more meaningful way. Our study is being conducted at a time 
when we are at an intennediate stage. Such studies are very useful as they may 
provide guidelines for future refonns. 
In our study an attempt has been made to capture the whole gamut of the 
debate about privatization, liberalization, stabilization and globalization. More 
specifically, as to how far the current economic refonns in India are market-
friendly that is whether India is using a true market-friendly model in carrying 
out her current economic refonns. Further, an attempt has also been made to 
asses the impact of the economic refonns in India so as to be able to say 
something about the success of the market-friendly model in India. 
Economic refonns are unavoidable. At the same time, they do not or 
need not follow the same pattern. Economic refonn is rightly categories not as 
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an event but a process, constantly evolving some variation in its mode and at 
times even the content is to be expected. With all these, an attempt has also 
been made in the present study to examine the pace and timings of economic 
refonns in India. 
Plan of the Study 
The present work entitled, "Relevance of Market-Friendly Economy 
Model for India", has been divided into six chapters. Chapter first concerns 
mainly with the Introduction of the present study; chapter second deals with 
the Macroeconomic Foundation; chapter third examines the Climate For 
Enterprise; chapter fourth dwells upon the Integration With The Global 
Economy; the fifth chapter gives an analysis of Investing In People; and the 
final one, sixth chapter, as usual, gives Summary And Findings of the work. 
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MACROECONOMIC FOUNDATION 
Countries often experience external or internal macroeconomic shocks. 
Flexibility in adjusting quickly to the fiscal and monetary problems that these 
shocks cause is crucial if growth is to be sustained. Lack of adjustment may 
result in high inflation, an over valued exchange rates and a balance of payment 
crisis. These lead in turn to low investment and slow growth. For a country 
experiencing significant domestic and external imbalances, a credible reduction 
in the fiscal deficit is almost always necessary to reduce inflation and 
appropriate exchange rate is needed to reduce the balance of payment deficit. 
In many developing countries, long tenri growth requires a high level of 
investment. Countries that lack access to adequate supplies of foreign savings 
will find this difficult to finance. They must do all they can to encourage 
domestic saving. A stable macroeconomy can help greatly. Good 
macroeconomic policies will also make it easier to attract foreign savings. 
Therefore, 'Macroeconomic Stability' must be given a top priority. 
A prudent fiscal policy is the foundation of a stable macroeconomy. 
Taxes and public spending affect resource allocation and fiscal deficits affect 
both the balance of payments and depending on how they are financed, the rate 
of inflation. When budget deficits are financed by excessive domestic 
borrowings, they can lead to higher interest rates that crowed our the private 
sector. There are limits to a rapid accumulation of domestic debt, at some point, 
the public will be unwilling to hold more debt or will do so only at higher 
interest rates, further increasing the cost of debt service. Eventually deficits 
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must be brought down with cuts in spending, or through higher tax revenue. 
Otherwise inflationary financing of the deficit is inevitable. Low inflation is 
vital not just because it makes the refonn programme credible, but also because 
without it other elements of the programme will be directly undemiined . 
Thus, a stable macroeconomic foundation is one of the most important 
goods that Government can provide. Experience shows that when Government 
spending has expanded too far, the result has often been large deficits, 
excessive borrowing or monetary expansion and problems in the financial 
sector, which have been quickly followed by inflation, chronic overvaluation of 
the currency and loss of export competitiveness. Excessive borrowing can also 
lead to domestic and external debt problems and to the crowding out oi' private 
investment. Therefore, by reappraising her spending priorities and 
implementing tax refonns, the Government can meet the goals of 
macroeconomic stability. 
Fiscal Policy Reform 
The need for thoroughgoing fiscal refonns in India has been apparent 
from even the late seventies. Until the beginning of the eighties, however, 
while a good deal of irrationality had been incorporated into the tax structure, 
and subsidies were growing in a somewhat unplanned way, the overall fiscal 
situation was under control with very low revenue deficits and manageable 
overall fiscal deficits. During the eighties, the fiscal situation steadily 
deteriorated, revenue deficits began to constitute a significant proportion of 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
The response of the central Government, in general, was not to control 
the growth of unproductive expenditure and the inushrooming of subsidies, but 
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to raise additional resources through increasing rates of taxes whose basic 
structure were in need of refonn and to use increases in import tariff as an easy 
way of limiting the growth of the fiscal deficits. However, raising tax resources 
even in the more undesirable ways is subject to limits. Hence, the deficits and 
the borrowing requirements of the Government continued to grow. The rising 
fiscal deficits and the monetization of a substantial proportion of it led to 
inflationary pressures and deficit in the current account of balance of payments. 
It took the grave balance of payment crisis towards the end of 1990 for the 
Government, its leaders and advisers to recognize the need for swift and radical 
changes in the fiscal system, not merely to bring about macroeconomic 
equilibrium, but also to lay the foundation for a long-tenn structural refonns 
programme. 
Fiscal sector reform in India had to be carried out in two major 
interrelated areas. The first consisted of the restoration of fiscal balance, 
meaning thereby a drastic reduction in the fiscal deficits, elimination of the 
revenue deficit within a short period and limiting the monetized deficit to a size 
warranted by the additional demand for money in the economy under non-
inflationary conditions. All this required a reduction in the growth of 
Govermnent expenditure, especially subsidies, interest payments and defence 
expenditure and steps to raise the growth of revenues. Since the tax rates were 
already high and the structure of indirect taxes highly irrational (high import 
duties, multiple levy of cascading type of taxes, etc.), it was not possible or 
desirable to raise revenues merely by raising tax rates. On the other hand, 
cutting down Government's revenue expenditure met opposition from the 
beneficiaries even tlirough subsidies to large fanners and to loss-making public 
enterprises were clearly unjustifiable. It is to the credit of the present 
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Govemment that undeterred by these major obstacles, proceeded to prune 
expenditure and at the same time to initiate a comprehensive tax refonn effort. 
While stabilization effort is vital to the success of the structural reform 
programme, the importance of tax refonn in relation to both stabilisation and 
structural refonn should not be underestimated. Stabilisation in the ultimate 
analysis can be achieved only through a buoyant revenue system. Increase in 
productive efficiency and lowering of costs, the central objectives of the 
structural refonn programme, hinge on the characteristics of the tax structure to 
a significant extent. In relation to the tax refonn, the Govemment set up a high 
powered committee on Tax Refonns to make recommendations for a 
comprehensive refonn of the system of central taxes'. 
The tax refonn exercise coupled with the compression of the 
Government expenditure have been the most important and technically the 
most exacting component of the refonn programme in the fiscal sector. It was 
realized that fiscal consolidation to restore and maintain fiscal balance was an 
essential part of sound macroeconomic policy. 
Tax Policy Reform 
In the recent years, the Govemment has undertaken major refonns of 
the tax-system of the country. The several changes in the taxes, direct and 
indirect, subserve important goals of the Government as envisaged in its new 
economic policy. These changes follow, to a large extent, the recommendations 
of the Tax Refonns Committee under the chainnanship of Dr. Raja J. Chelliah. 
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Chelliah Committee on Tax Reform 
The Tax Refonns Committee was constituted under the chainnanship of 
Dr. Raja J. Chelliah in 1991 to examine the existing tax structure in the country 
and make appropriate recommendations to refomi it with the following temis 
of reference. 
Suggest ways to improve the elasticity of tax revenues. 
Increasing the share of direct taxes by removing anomalies. 
Examine and recommend measure to improve MODVAT. 
Identify new areas of taxation. 
The committee submitted its interim report in February 1992 and final 
report in two parts in August 1992 and January 1993. The important 
recommendations of the committee are as under: 
Income tax regime must be made simpler with lower rates of 
taxation; with narrower spread between the entry rate and 
maximum marginal rate; and the minimum of incentives. 
Wealth tax to be abolished on all items except unproductive 
assets. 
A system of indexation of long-tenn capital gains to take care of 
inflation. 
Agricultural income exceeding Rs. 25,000 to be clubbed with 
non-agricultural income while computing total income tax. 
Tariff on finished goods should be higher than on components and 
machinery, which should be higher than on raw materials. 
Levy of import duty on agricultural imports. 
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A three-rate MOD VAT regime at the manufacturing level (10, 15 
and 20 per cent) and selective excise on non-essential 
commodities at 30, 40 and 50 per cent. 
Introduction of a genuine VAT in place of the present blend 
between MODVAT and excise levies. Also conversion of state 
sales tax into a state VAT .^ 
Thus, in its report the committee has recommended far reaching changes 
in the tax system to remove loopholes besides making it more efficient from 
revenue raising. It stressed the need of rationality and stability in the tax 
structure. The committee has favoured scaling down of the general level of 
tariffs, reduction in the dispension of tariff rates and a rationalisation of the 
system with abolition of numerous end-use exemptions and concession in a 
gradual phase manner so as to moderate the impact of adjustment, both in tenns 
of possible revenue loss and the pace of which domestic industry is exposed to 
competition\ 
Major Changes in Tax Policy : 1991-92 to 1998-99. 
Over the past several years, a number of structural changes covering 
both direct and indirect taxes were undertaken. These changes were part of a 
medium tenu programme of tax refonn. The strategy has aimed at moving 
towards a simpler system of taxation with moderate rates, few exemptions and 
a wider tax base. 
(i) Direct Taxes 
A number of steps were taken to rationalise the structure of direct 
taxes and to widen the tax base since 1990-91. Some of these important 
steps are as under: 
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Initial exemption limit for levy of income tax was raised from Rs. 
22,000 in 1991 to Rs. 50,000 in 1998-99 budget. The number of slabs 
were reduced from 4 to 3, but a new slab or incomes between Rs. 60,001 
to Rs. 1,50,000 was inserted and the tax rate for this has been fixed at 20 
per cent in 1997-98 budget. The maximum marginal rate of personal 
income tax was reduced from 56 per cent, inclusive of surcharge, to 30 
per cent and lowest to 10 per cent in 1997-98. In order to simplify and 
rationalise the tax structure, the distinction between specified HUF and 
unspecified HUF has been abolished in 1996-97 budget. 
Corporate tax rates have been reduced and simplified over the past 
few years and the policy of moderation of tax rates has been continued. 
The rate of corporate income tax which was 51.75 per cent for a closely 
held company have been unified and reduced to 46 per cent. All these 
rates were inclusive of 15 per cent surcharge. This surcharge rate was 
reduced to 7.5 per cent in 1996-97 budget and finally abolished in 1997-
98 budget and tax rate has been reduced to 35 per cent. 
Long-temi capital gain tax on domestic companies was reduced 
from 40 to 30 per cent and fiirther to 20 per cent in 1996-97. 
Tax rate on foreign companies (branches) was reduced from 65 to 
55 per cent and to 48 per cent in 1997-98 budget. 
Introduction of 'Minimum Alternative Tax' (MAT) is one of the 
unique features of the union budget 1996-97. An effort has been made to 
tackle the phenomenon of Zero Tax companies having substantial book 
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profits by bringing such companies under MAT .^ Under this provision, 
companies are required to pay 12 per cent of book profit even when 
there is no taxable income . However, the companies in power and 
infi-astructure sector, a sick industrial company, companies located in 
backward areas and the exporters have been kept out of the purview of 
MAT. 
All the gifts made on or after 1.10.98 are exempted fi^om payment 
oftax^ 
For widening the tax base, more people were brought under the 
tax net through presumptive taxation and estimated income scheme. The 
presumptive taxation was introduced in 1992-93 for shopkeepers and 
retail traders. An estimated scheme for truck owners, traders, brokers 
and commission agents was introduced in 1994-95. This scheme was 
modified in respect of traders and applied to retail traders. Another 
important measure for widening tax base is that the residents of large 
metropolitant cities who satisfy any of the two following criteria should 
voluntarily file their returns: ownership of a fourwheel vehicle, 
occupation of immovable property meeting certain prescribed creteria, 
ownership of a telephone, foreign travel in the previous year. The 
Income Tax Department will serve a notice if the return is not 
voluntarily filed .^ The presumptive taxation scheme, introduced in 
1997-98 budget in 12 cities, extended to 23 more cities in 1998-99, 
taking the total coverage to 35 cities'^. A new Voluntary Disclosure of 
Income Scheme or tax amnesty to report undeclared assets held abroad 
or in India that is to bring black money into the tax net was introduced in 
1997-98 budget. 
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As an administrative measure to improve reporting and widening 
tax base, a simple one page tax payer-friendly return called 'SARAL' 
applicable to all non-corporate tax payers introduced in 1998-99 budget. 
It has been made obligatory to assesses to quote their PAN or GIR 
number in respect of certain high value transactions. A new scheme 
called 'KAR VIVAD SAMADHAN SCHEME' was also introduced to 
recover the money locked in litigation both in direct and indirect 
taxation. 
(ii) Indirect Taxes 
The principal indirect taxes levied in India are custom duties, 
excise duties and sales tax. Under the constitution, the central 
Government has exclusive power to levy custom duties and excise duties 
on commodities other than alcoholic liquor and narcotics. The structure 
of indirect taxes has undergone major changes following the 
recommendations of the Chelliah Committee. We would like to outline 
some of the important changes introduced during nineties. 
(a) Custom Duties: 
Prior to refonn, the import duties were inordinately high 
and in several cases more than 300 per cent. A phase reduction in 
the peak rate of custom duty was undertaken since 1991. It was 
reduced to 110 per cent in 1992, 85 per cent in 1993, 65 per cent 
in 1994, 50 per cent in 1995 '^ and 40 per cent advalorem in 1997, 
except for passenger baggage, alcoholic beverages, dried grapes, 
etc. and fiirther to 30 per cent in respect of raw materials . The 
number of duty rates have been brought down to 7. 
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The import duty on capital goods for general projects and 
machinery which was 85 per cent prior to refonn was brought 
down and unified for nearly 80 per cent of machinery, at 25 per 
cent in 1995 and were reduced to 20 per cent in 1997-98. 
(b) Excise Duty: 
Switchover was effected from a system where excise duties 
were specific and numerous and varying in nature with a large 
number of exemptions to one largely based on advalorem basis, 
with fewer duty in revenue elasticity. A major reforni of domestic 
commodity taxation was undertaken with the objective of 
simplifying and rationalizing the excise-MODVAT system. This 
is expected to considerably reduce the transaction costs of 
administering the existing excise-MODVAT regime. The 
procedure for valuation of excise duty was simplified. The final 
objective of the domestic indirect tax refonn has been to convert 
the MODVAT system into a genuine central Value Added Tax 
(provides a generalised system of set-offs for taxation of inputs). 
Though a number of steps have been taken in this direction, there 
is still a gap between theory and practice. The MODVAT scheme, 
credit of duty is allowed on inputs which are used either for 
producing excisable finished products or immediate products, was 
introduced in 1986 mainly for reducing industrial costs and prices 
by relieving taxes on inputs, thereby mitigating the cascading 
effect on final products'"\ Since IV86, the MODVAT scheme has 
undergone many changes especially after 1991. Overtime, the 
ambit of MODVAT has been extended to include more 
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commodities/sectors. However, the transfomiation of existing 
MOD VAT into a full fledge central VAT up to the manufacturing 
stage is not yet complete. 
The ambit of MOVDAT was extended to cover capital 
goods, petroleum products, spun yam made from fibers, specified 
quality control, testing, pollution control and R «& D equipment, 
POL and textiles sector. These changes in commodity taxation 
have brought MODVAT closer to VAT type system and will 
facilitate the eventual introduction of a full-fledged Value Added 
Tax. The number of duty rates have already been brought down to 
7. 
(c) Service Tax 
In line with the recommendations of the Tax Refonn 
Committee, a service tax was introduced. This measure is 
expected to broaden the base for domestic indirect taxes as the 
service sector account for about 50 per cent of our GDP and has 
shown robust growth. A modest beginning was made in the 
budget for 1994-95 by bringing select services under the ambit. A 
service tax on services of telephones, non-life insurance and stock 
brokers was introduced. The tax is charged at 5 per cent on the 
amount of telephone bills, the net premium charged by insurance 
companies and the brokerage or commission charged by stock 
brokers in relation to their services'"*. In 1996-97 budget, the 
scope of service tax has been expanded by bringing advertising 
services, courier services and radio paging services under the 
service tax net . In 1997-98 budget, ten more services under the 
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tax net were brought such as transportation of goods by road, 
consulting engineers, customs house, steamer and clearing and 
forwarding agents, air travel agents, tour operators and car rental 
agencies, outdoor caterers, pandal contractors and mandap 
keepers and manpower recruitment agencies'^. This was further 
carried forward and extended to 12 more services in 1998-99 such 
as services rendered by architects, interior decorators, 
management consultants, chartered accountants, cost accountants, 
company secretaries, credit rating agencies, market research 
agencies, under writers, private security/detective agencies, real 
estate agents and consultants and mechanized slaughter houses. 
The Government has taken all these steps to rationalize the 
structure of direct taxes by reducing the number of deduction and 
exemption. Direct tax rates were reduced to increase tax 
compliance. In the case of indirect taxes, a similar process was 
started to simplify the tax structure. 
Fiscal Imbalances 
The fiscal imbalances are the outcome of a number of factors. These 
have bearing on expenditure, revenue and borrowings of the Government. The 
expenditure of the Government has been very large, in fact, much beyond its 
means. The finances of the central Government have been in a bad shape over 
the last few years beginning with the early 1980s. While increase in 
expenditure has been the major cause of fiscal imbalances, inadequate rise in 
revenue receipts has also been a contributing factor. As a result, things came to 
such a pass that the fiscal situation became unviable by the early 1990s. The 
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worsening of the fiscal situation is obvious from the fact that throughout the 
1980s, all the important indicators of fiscal imbalances were on the rise. 
As reflected by table 2.1, all the important indicators of fiscal 
imbalances were generally on the rise since 1980-81. The fiscal situation 
which has been under strain throughout the 1980s assumed critical situation in 
1990-91. The gross fiscal deficit, which reflects the total resource gap in terais 
of excess of total Government expenditure over revenue receipts and grants and 
is also a measures of the indebtedness of the Government, fluctuated between 
6.1 per cent of GDP at current market prices in 1980-81 to 8.3 per cent in 
1990-91. In absolute ternis the gross fiscal deficit was Rs. 8,299 crore in 
1980-81 and it shot up to Rs. 44,632 crore in 1990-91. All other indicators, 
primary deficit, revenue deficit and conventional deficit (budget deficit) were 
also following the same tendency of rise. The primary deficit introduced for the 
first time in 1993-94, indicates the real position of the Government finances, as 
it excludes the burden (or interest) in respect of the loans taken in the past, 
fluctuated between 4.3 per cent of GDP to 4.4 per cent from 1980-81 to 
1990-91. The revenue deficit which refers to the excess of revenue expenditure 
over revenue receipts rose to 3.5 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 from 1.5 per cent 
in 1980 81. In nominal ternis, the revenue deficit increased from Rs. 2,037 
crore to Rs. 18,562 crore from 1980-81 to 1990-91, whereas budget deficit 
from RS. 2,477 crore to Rs. 11,347 crore. As percentage of GDP, budget deficit 
which was 1.8 per cent in 1980-81 increased to 2.1 per cent in 1990-91. Thus, it 
is clear from the trend that tliroughout the 1980s, all important indicators of 
fiscal imbalances were on the rise. However, after the process of fiscal 
consolidation programme initiated from the union budget of 1991-92, all the 
important indicators started showing different trends. 
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Decisive action to limit the fiscal deficit reduced the central 
Government's fiscal deficit from 8.3 per cent of GDP (Rs. 44,632 crore in 
absolute value) in 1990-91 to 5.9 per cent (Rs. 40,173 crore) in 1992-93and 
from 6.9 per cent (Rs. 60,257 crore) in 1993-94 to 5.1 per cent (Rs. 91,025 
crore) in 1998-99. The GDP figures up to 1992-93 pertains to the old series 
(base 1980-81), while those from 1993-94 are part of the new series (base 
1993-94). This depresses later ratios to an extent. Primary deficit was reduced 
from 4.4 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 1.3 per cent in 1992-93 and from 2.7 
per cent in 1993-94 to 0.9 per cent in 1998-99. Whereas revenue deficit was 
reduced to 2.7 per cent in 1992-93 from 3.5 per cent in 1990-91 and from 3.7 
per cent in 1993-94 to 2.7 per cent in 1998-99. In absolute ternis, the revenue 
deficit which was Rs. 18,562 crore in 1990-91 increased to Rs. 48,068 crore 
(2.6 times) in 1998-99. In the same way, the budget deficit also came down to 
1.1 per cent in 1992-93 from 2.1 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 and from 1.2 per 
cent in 1993-94 to 0.1 per cent in 1997-98. The budget deficit (difference 
between total expenditure and total receipts - revenue as well as capital) 
emerges when the Government becomes unable to manage the expenditure 
even through the internal and external borrowings. In this case, the Government 
try to fill this gap resorting to deficit financing. The tenn 'deficit financing' in 
India referred to 'budget deficit'. The central Government meet its overall 
budgetary deficit by (i) net sale of Treasury bills to the RBI and (ii) reduction 
of its cash balances. This concept of deficit financing is restrictive and it can 
just indicate the extent of monetary deficit. It is important to emphasise the fact 
that the deficit financing can not create real resources, which do not exist in the 
economy. It is only a device, which help in the transfer of resources to the 
Government. The real resources required for economic development must exist 
in the fonn of material, equipment, skill and labour. These things can not be 
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created by printing money or issuing bank credit. The monetised deficit 
indicates the increase in the net RBI credit to the Government, which is the smn 
of net increase in the holdings of 91-day Treasury bills of the RBI and its 
contribution to the market borrowings of the central Government and it is an 
important means of increasing money supply. The monetary effects of the 
deteriorating fiscal situation are reflected in the monetised deficit. The total 
monetised deficit was Rs. 3,551 crore in 1980-81. It shot up to Rs. 14,745 crore 
(4.2 times) in 1990-91. However, as a proportion of GDP, 0.2 per cent point 
increase was recorded during the same period. For effecting stabilization 
programme, the Government in 1991-92 reduced its monetisation of deficit to 
Rs. 5,508 crore which was 0.9 per cent of GDP. It gradually came down to O.I 
per cent in 1996-97. This shows substantial reduction in the monetisation of the 
deficits of the central Government. As per the supplemental agreement between 
the Reserve Bank and the Government of India, with effect from April \^\ 
1997, issuance of ad-hoc Treasury bills has been discontinued and a system of 
Ways and Means Advances (WMA) has been introduced to meat the temporary 
mismatch in receipts and expenditures of the central Govermnent. During the 
major part of the fiscal year 1997-98, the centre did not resort to WMA because 
of strong money market support to the Government's borrowing programme. 
The centre had availed of WMA in the initial weeks and in the last quarters of 
the fiscal year and the amounts availed were within the stipulated limits. This 
method of financing limits the monetisation of the deficits of the central 
Government. However, all these developments just after initiating fiscal 
consolidation was due to the Government's control over the total expenditure 
(revenue expenditure as well as capital disbursement) and rise in total revenue 
receipts (both tax and non-tax revenue). 
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Though in absolute ternis, the total expenditure rose from Rs. 1,07,994 
crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 1,26,063 crore in 1992-93, to Rs. 1,46,050 crore in 
1993-94 and Rs. 2,76,233 crore in 1998-99. As a proportion of GDP the total 
expenditure shows 2.3 percentage point decline (20.2 per cent to 17.9 per cent) 
from 1990-91 to 1992-93 and 1.1 percentage point decline (16.7 per cent to 
15.6 per cent) from 1993-94 to 1998-99 (Table 2.3). During the same period, 
the total revenue receipts (both tax and non-tax revenue) as percentage of GDP 
increased by 0.2 percentage point (10.8 per cent to 11.0 per cent) from 1990-91 
to 1992-93 and 0.5 percantage point (9.1 per cent to 9.6 per cent) from 1993-94 
to 1998-99 (Table 2.8 (B)). In nominal ternis, it rose from Rs. 57,650 crore in 
1990-91 to Rs. 77,573 crore and from Rs. 79,650 crore in 1993-94 to Rs. 
1,70,300 crore in 1998-99 (Table 2.8 (A)). 
Table 2.2 shows the financing pattern of gross fiscal deficit of the central 
Govermnent. In the year of 1980-81, the major portion of fiscal deficit was 
financed by the internal market loans, which accounted for 32.3 per cent of 
total financing of fiscal deficit. It came down to 17.9 per cent in 1990-91. The 
second highest position was occupied by budget deficit, which was 29.9 per 
cent in 1980-81. It came down to 25.5 per cent in 1990-91. External loan's 
contribution declined to 7.1 per cent in 1990-91 from 15.4 per cent in 1980-81. 
But the share of other liabilities shot up to 49.5 per cent in 1990-91 from 22.4 
per cent in 1980-81. However, during 1990s, the financing pattern of gross 
fiscal deficit has been quite different. The internal market loans which v/as only 
17.9 per cent shot up to 49.2 per cent in 1997-98 and further to 53.1 per cent in 
1998-99 occupying the highest share. This is a marked change in central 
Government financing pattern of gross fiscal deficit. The share of external 
loans came down to 2.6 per cent in 1998-99 from 7.1 per cent in 1990-91. The 
share of other liabilities declined from 49.5 per cent in 1990-91 to 44.3 per cent 
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in 1998-99. As far budget deficit, it was brought down to 19.8 per cent in 
1996-97 and 2.7 per cent in 1997-98 from 25.5 per cent in 1990-91. In 1998-99 
budget, the budget deficit lost its relevance due to the discontinuation of the ad-
hoc Treasury bills and 91-day tap Treasury bills. 
Trends in Expenditure 
Public expenditure in a developing economy has certain notable trends 
and Indian public expenditure has shown those trends in a marked way. The 
most important cause of the fiscal problem has been the rising expenditure 
more than the rise in revenues of the Government leading to the continuous 
widening of the gap between the revenues and the expenditure. Both intensive 
and extensive expansion in the activities of the Government during 1980s and 
90s resulted in spectacular rise in the public expenditure. This is clear from the 
trends of the central Government's expenditures. 
The total expenditure (revenue and capital) was Rs. 23,194 crore in 
1980-81, it rose to Rs. 1,07,994 crore in 1990-91 and stood at Rs. 2,76,233 
crore in 1998-99. The increase in total expenditure has been 4.1 times from 
1980-81 to 1990-91 and 2.6 times from 1990-91 to 1998-99. The absolute 
figures do not depict the real position and the expenditure as a proportion of 
GDP is considered a better measure of the trends. The expenditure as 
percentage of GDP rose from 17.1 per cent to 20.2 per cent from 1980-81 to 
1990-91. It declined to 17.9 per cent in 1992-93. In the year 1993-94, it was 
16.7 per cent (according to new series base 1993-94). It further came down to 
15.6 per cent in 1998-99 (Table 2.3). The rise in total expenditure both in 
absolute ternis and as percentage of GDP from 1980-81 to 1990-91 was due to 
higher increase in revenue expenditure. The total capital expenditure also 
increased but at a slow rate compared to revenue expenditure. 
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Table 2.4 (A) and 2.4 (B) provide a picture of recent trends in revenue 
expenditure of the central Government. The revenue expenditure increased 
from Rs 14,836 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. 76,212 crore in 1990-91 and to Rs. 
2,18,368 crore in 1998-99, which are 5.1 and 2.9 times respectively. As 
percentage of GDP, it went up from 10.9 per cent to 14.2 per cent from 1980-
81 to 1990-91 and came down to 13.6 per cent in 1992-93. It stood at 12.8 per 
cent in 1993-94 and went down to 12.3 per cent in 1998-99. Though the 
revenue expenditure as a proportion of GDP during 1980s registered an 
increasing trend, it turned towards decline during 1990s. But as a percentage 
share in total expenditure (revenue and capital), it has shown continuous 
increase from 1980-81 to 1998-99. It was 64 per cent in 1980-81, rose to 70.6 
per cent in 1990-91 and shot up to 79.1 per cent in 1998-99 (Table 2.5 (E)). 
This rise of percentage share has been at the cost of capital fonnation, which is 
not a healthy trend, because it affects the development of a country. As such, it 
has been major expenditure of the central Government. This spectacular rise in 
revenue expenditure has been due to rise in developmental as well as non-
developmental expenditure in revenue account. 
Development expenditure was Rs. 5,882 crore in 1980-81, rose to Rs. 
32,239 crore in 1990-91 and Rs. 82,679 crore in 1998-99. It increased by 5.5 
times between 1980-81 and 1990-91 and ftirther to 2.6 times during 1990-91 to 
1998-99. The percentage share of developmental expenditure in revenue 
expenditure was 25.4 per cent in 1980-81, rose to 29.9 per cent in 1990-91 and 
32.9 per cent in 1992-93. It went down to 29.9 per cent in 1998-99 (Table 2.5 
(E)). The developmental expenditure as percentage of GDP increased from 
1980-81 to 1990-91. But it declined after 1990-91. It was 4.3 per cent in 1980-
81, rose to 6 per cent in 1990-91 and gradually came down to 4.7 per cent in 
1998-99. The major item of developmental expenditure which caused the rise 
51 
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in revenue expenditure during the decade of 1980s and having large proportion 
of GDP during the years of 1990s was heavy extension of subsidies on different 
heads, viz, food, fertilizers and export promotion. Thus, it became a major 
cause of concern of Government's total revenue expenditure. In the decade of 
eighties, large volumes of subsidies were given to the fann sector. The two 
biggest facets of the same were food and fertilizer. These two items amounted 
to Rs. 1,155 crore which was 57 per cent of India's total subsidy bill in 
1980-81. The total volume of subsidies increased from 1980-81 to 1990-91 by 
6 times (Table 2.5 (A)). It was 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1980-81 and shot up to 
2.3 per cent in 1990-91 (Table 2.5 (B)). It accounted for 8.7 per cent of total 
expenditure and 13.7 per cent of revenue expenditure in 1980-81, which went 
up to 11.2 per cent and 16 per cent respectively in 1990-91 (Table 2.5 (D) and 
2.5 (E)). Much of the rise in total subsidy bill in 1990-91 was contributed by 
major subsidies on food, fertilizer and export promotion, i.e., 78 per cent of 
total subsidy bill. The total volume of subsidies increased from 1990-91 to 
1998-99 by 1.8 times. But as percentage of GDP, it went down from 2.3 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 1.2 per cent in 1998-99. The share of subsidies in total 
expenditure also declined from 11.2 per cent in 1990-91 to 8 per cent in 1998-
99. Its share in total revenue expenditure too came down from 16 per cent in 
1990-91 to 10.1 per cent in 1998-99. 
The share of economic services in revenue expenditure increased from 2 
per cent in 1980-81 to 3.3 per cent in 1990-91. But it came down to 2.5 per cent 
in 1998-99. The rise in revenue expenditure on economic services from 1980-
81 to 1990-91 was due to rise in expenditure on Industries and Minerals, 
Transport and Communications, Energy, Science and Technology, etc.. During 
this period, the expenditure on industries and minerals increased from 0.5 per 
cent of GDP to 0.9 per cent of GDP. The revenue expenditure on transport and 
64 
communications increased from 0.1 per cent of GDP in 1980-81 to 0.3 per cent 
of GDP in 1990-91. In absolute terms, it increased by 7.7 times. Other 
economic services also registered an increase in revenue expenditure. 
Consequently, revenue expenditure on economic services increased 
considerably. However, the revenue expenditure on economic services declined 
after 1990-91. This is because of the decline in revenue expenditure on 
industries and minerals, transport and communications and social and 
community services. 
The revenue expenditure on Grants-in-aid to state and union territories 
for development purposes registered a modest rise from 1.7 per cent of GDP in 
1980-81 to 1.8 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. After 1990-91, it increased to 2.4 
per cent of GDP in 1992-93, but later on declined to 1.3 per cent of GDP in 
1998-99. 
Non-developmental revenue expenditure as percentage of total 
expenditure increased from 38.6 per cent in 1980-81 to 40.7 per cent in 1990-
91 and further to 49.1 per cent in 1998-99 (Table 2.5 (E)). As a proportion of 
GDP, it was 6.6 per cent in 1980-81, rose to 8.2 per cent in 1990-91 and came 
down to 7.7 per cent in 1998-99. In absolute figure, it increased by 4.9 times 
from 1980-81 to 1990-91 and by 3.1 times from 1990-91 to 1998-99. The 
major items which caused the rise in non-developmental expenditure were 
interest payments, defence expenditure, administrative services, i.e. police 
service, pension and Grants-in-aid to states and union territories for non-
developmental purposes. 
Interest payments, which was only 1.9 per cent of GDP in 1980-81, 
increased to 4.0 per cent in 1990-91. This expenditure further increased to 4.4 
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per cent in 1992-93. In 1993-94, it stood at 4.2 per cent (according to new 
series base 1993-94) and remained at the same level (i.e. 4.2 per cent) in 1998-
99 (Table 2.5 (B)). In absolute terms, the interest payment increased by 8.3 
times from 1980-81 to 1990-91 and by 3.5 times from 1990-91 to 1998-99 
(Table 2.5 (A)). It occupied 11.2 per cent share of total central Government 
expenditure in 1980-81, rose to 19.9 per cent in 1990-91 and further to 27.2 per 
cent in 1998-99. Its share in revenue expenditure alone increased from !8.5 per 
cent in 1980-81 to 28.2 per cent in 1990-91 and frirther to 34.3 per cent in 
1998-99 (Table 2.5(D)). The increasing burden of interest payments 
continuously increased the total revenue expenditure and occupied the first 
place in total revenue expenditure. This much rise in interest payments burden 
on total Government expenditure was due to increase in total outstanding 
liabilities of the central Government from Rs. 59,749 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. 
3,14,558 crore in 1990-91 and fiirther to Rs. 8,68,206 crore in 1998-99 (Table 
2.6 (A)). It recorded 426.5 per cent growth in total outstanding liabilities in 
1990-91 from 1980-81 of which only internal liabilities were 81.1 per cent of 
total outstanding liabilities in 1980-81. It rose to 90 per cent in 1990-91 and 
93.4 per cent in 1998-99. The interest paid on internal liabilities alone was Rs. 
2,373 crore in 1980-81, climbed to Rs. 19,664 crore (728 per cent) in 1990-91. 
In 1998-99, it was Rs. 70,808 crore and showed 260 per cent rise from 1990-
91. From 1980-81 to 1998-99, it increased by 29.8 times (Table 2.6 (B)). As a 
proportion of GDP, the total outstanding liabilities rose from 43.9 per cent to 
58.7 per cent from 1980-81 to 1990-91. During the same period, internal 
liabilities climbed just from 35.6 per cent of GDP to 52.9 per cent. However, 
from 1991-92, the total outstanding liabilities as percentage of GDP has shown 
declining trend and came down to 49.1 per cent in 1998-99, except in 1993-94 
when it accounted for 59 per cent of GDP. From 1980-81 to 1998-99, in 
absolute ternis, it increased by 14.5 times. These huge outstanding liabilities of 
72 
the central Government caused the total expenditure to rise to a great extent via 
interest payments and repayments of debt. 
As far defence expenditure, it also has shown increasing trend in 
absolute temi. It increased by 3.1 times from 1980-81 to 1990-91 and by 2.8 
times from 1990-91 to 1998-99. Its share in total revenue expenditure was 23.9 
per cent in 1980-81, went dovm to 14.3 per cent in 1990-91 and again to 14.1 
per cent in 1998-99 (Table 2.5 (D)). Defence expenditure, as percentage of 
GDP was 2.6 per cent in 1980-81. It declined to 2.0 per cent in 1990-91 and 
fiirther to 1.7 per cent in 1998-99. Defence expenditure as a whole (revenue as 
well as capital) rose by 4.3 times from 1980-81 to 1990-91 and by 2.7 times 
from 1990-91 to 1998-99 (Table 2.5 (A)). But its share in total expenditure 
declined from 15.5 per cent in 1980-81 to 14.3 per cent in 1990-91 and later on 
rose marginally by 0.6 percentage point from 1990-91 to 1998-99 (Table 2.5 
(E)). Similar trend was also observed in the defence expenditure as percentage 
of GDP during the said period. 
The expenditure on collection of taxes and duties rose by 4.1 times from 
1980-81 to 1990-91 and by 3.3 times from 1990-91 to 1998-99. But as a 
percentage of GDP, it remained around 0.1 per cent from 1980-81 to 1998-99. 
Revenue expenditure on administrative services has also registered an 
increasing trend in absolute figure. The major part of the expenditure on 
administrative services has been on police service. The expenditure on 
administrative services increased from Rs. 557 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. 2,509 
crore in 1990-91 and to Rs. 8,173 crore in 1998-99. The expenditure on police 
service alone amounted to Rs. 299 crore in 1980-81, rose to Rs. 1,563 crore 
(5.2 times) in 1990-91 and to Rs. 5,394 crore (3.5 times) in 1998-99. 
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Grants-in-aid to states and union territories for non-development 
purposes also increased from Rs. 518 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. 3,446 crore (6.7 
times) and further to Rs. 5,153 crore (1.5 times) in 1998-99. As a proportion of 
GDP, it was 0.4 per cent in 1980-81 and went up to 0.6 per cent in 1990-91. 
But in 1992-93, it came down to 0.2 per cent. In the next year 1993-94, it 
increased to 0.4 per cent, but declined to 0.3 per cent in 1998-^.^*'^ / f ^ t ^ 
1 ' J •"• '^^  ' .'; 
Similarly, the capital disbursement of the central Goy^envnent consist of ,' ,' 
\ • " " • • ^ ' ' ' ' 
expenditure on different kinds of payments for acquisition orassets^ikor^kii^'' 
buildings, machinery, equipment, as also investment in share, etc. ^ d loans 
and advances granted by the central Government to state and union territory 
Governments, Government companies, corporations and other parties. The total 
capital disbursement of the centre in 1980-81 was Rs. 8,358 crore which 
increased to Rs. 31,800 crore (3.8 times) in 1990-91 and Rs. 57,865 crore (1.8 
times) in 1998-99 (Table 2.7 (A)). As a proportion of GDP, it was 6.1 per cent 
in 1980-81, declined to 5.9 per cent in 1990-91 and further to 4.2 per cent in 
1992-93. In 1993-94, it accounted for 3.9 per cent (according to new series base 
1993-94) and came down to 3.3 per cent in 1998-99 (Table 2.7 (B)). The fall in 
capital expenditure has been due to fall in capital outlay for development 
purposes. The developmental capital expenditure which was 2.2 per cent of 
GDP (Rs. 3,021 crore) in 1980-81 came down to 1.4 per cent (Rs. 7,404 crore) 
in 1990-91 and further to 1.1 per cent (Rs. 7,831 crore) in 1992-93. In 1993-94, 
it was 0.7 per cent (according to new series base 1993-94) and remained same 
(Rs. 12,507 crore) in 1998-99. 
The share of non-development expenditure in Capital Account increased 
fi-om 0.7 per cent of GDP in 1980-81 to 0.9 per cent in 1990-91. But it came 
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down to 0.6 per cent in 1998-99. However, in absolute ternis, it increased by 
more than 10 times from 1980-81 to 1998-99. A siziable proportion of non-
development expenditure has gone to defence. 
Trends in Receipts 
The receipts of the central Government are broadly categorised into 
revenue receipts and capital receipts. The revenue receipts (tax revenue net of 
state's share and non-tax revenue) which create no liabilities are very important 
source of financing expenditure of the central Government. These revenue are 
drawn from such sources as taxes, direct and indirect, as also from non-tax 
sources like profits of the public sector enterprises, interest and dividend on 
investment made by the Government, fees and other receipts for services 
rendered by the Government. Among the different sources of Government 
revenue, taxes are most important. For these not only bring large revenue into 
the Public Treasury but also influence economic activity in a number of ways. 
The total receipts (revenue and capital) of the central Govermnent was 
Rs. 20,717 crore in 1980-81. It increased to Rs. 96,665 crore (4.7 times) in 
1990-91 and to Rs. 2,76,233 crore (2.9 times) in 1998-99. As a proportion of 
GDP total receipts was 15.2 per cent in 1980-81, 18.1 per cent in 1990-91and 
15.6 per cent in 1998-99 (Table 2.3). The share of revenue receipts in total 
receipts was 61.8 per cent in 1980-81. It came down to 59.6 per cent in 1990-91 
and increased to 61.7 per cent in 1998-99. This is in spite of the fact that 
revenue receipts increased by 4.5 times from 1980-81 to 1990-91 and by 3 
times from 1990-91 to 1998-99. The total revenue receipts financed 55.3 per 
cent of the total Government expenditure in 1980-81, 53.4 per cent in 1990-91 
and 61.7 per cent in 1998-99. The major portion of revenue receipts was tax 
revenue, which was Rs. 93,58 crore in 1980-81. It rose to Rs. 42,978 crore in 
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1990-91 (4.6 times) and further to Rs. 1,16,857 crore (2.7 times) in 1998-99 
(Table 2.8 (A)). Its share in total revenue receipts was 73.1 per cent in 1980-81, 
increased to 74.5 per cent in 1990-91 and gradually came down to 68.6 per cent 
in 1998-99 (Table 2.8 (C)). As percentage of GDP, it was 6.9 per cent in 1980-
81 touched up to 8 per cent in 1990-91, but went down to 7.7 per cent in 1992-
93. In the year 1993-94, it remained 6.1 per cent, but increased to 6.6 per cent 
in 1998-99 (Table 2.8 (B)). Excise duty was major contributor to tax revenue in 
1980-81 (39.8 per cent), but its share in total tax revenue came down 
substantially in 1998-99 (26.3 per cent). Contrary to this, the share of custom 
duties in total tax revenue increased from 36.4 per cent in 1980-81 to 41.2 per 
cent in 1998-99. The same was the case with corporation tax whose share also 
increased from 14.7 per cent in 1980-81 to 22.7 per cent in 1998-99. Personal 
income tax also showed the same trend. Its contribution in total tax revenue 
went up from 4.7 per cent in 1980-81 to 6 per cent in 1998-99. 
The share of non-tax revenue in total revenue declined from 26.9 per 
cent in 1980-81 to 25.5 per cent in 1990-91. Though in absolute tenus it 
increased by 4.3 times during the said period. From 1990-91 to 1998-99, it 
increased by 3.6 times which is lower than the increase in earlier decade, but its 
share in total revenue increased substantially, that is, from 25.5 per cent in 
1990-91 to 31.4 per cent in 1998-99 (Table 2.8 (C)). The above trend was due 
to fluctuation in the non-tax revenue. Interest receipts, an important source of 
revenue in the non-tax revenue, increased by 4.9 times from 1980-81 to 
1990-91 and by 3.2 times from 1990-91 to 1998-99. But its share in non-tax 
revenue increased from 52.1 per cent in 1980-81 to 59.5 per cent in 1990-91 
and later on declined to 52.3 per cent in 1998-99. While the share of dividends 
and profits increased from 1980-81 to 1998-99, the same was not the case with 
social and Community Services, Fiscal Services and General Service. 
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Economic services registered substantial growth. Its share in non-tax revenue 
increased from 9.6 per cent in 1980-81 to 19.2 per cent in 1998-99. 
After analysing the trend of revenue receipts, we turn to the other part of 
the Government receipts that is capital receipts. The capital receipts are those 
raised through borrowing involving creation of labilities or sales/disposal of 
Government assets. These include recovery of loans, market borrowings, 
disinvestment of public sector equity share, public provident funds, small 
savings, etc.. The total capital receipts in the year 1980-81 was Rs. 7,918 crore 
which rose to Rs. 39,015 crore (4.9 times) in 1990-91 and further to Rs. 
1,05,933 crore (2.7 times) in 1998-99 (Table 2.9 (A) & Table 2.9 (B)). As 
percentage of GDP, it increased from 6.2 per cent in 1980-81 to 7.3 per cent in 
1990-91 but went down to 6 per cent in 1998-99. 
The share of internal market loans in total capital receipts was 33.8 per 
cent in 1980-81, it came down to 20.5 per cent in 1990-91, but increased 
substantially in 1998-99 providing almost half of the total capital receipts. In 
absolute tenns it increased by 3 times from 1980-81 to 1990-91 and by 6 times 
from 1990-91 to 1998-99. So, the internal market borrowings have gone up 
significantly during nineties. In contrast, the total share of external market 
loans came down from 16.2 per cent in 1980-81 to 8.2 per cent in 1990-91 and 
ftirther to 2.2 per cent in 1998-99. In absolute tenns, it increased from Rs. 
1,281 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. 3,181 crore in 1990-91 but came down to Rs. 
2,337 crore in 1998-99. The above trend reveals that the dependence on 
external loans has gone down quite significantly during nineties and the 
resource mobilisation through internal borrowing has gone up during the said 
period. 
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The share of public provident fund and state provident fiind in total 
capital receipt show an increasing trend from 1980-81 to 1998-99. But the same 
is not the case with small savings whose share in total capital receipts increased 
from 12.8 per cent in 1980-81 to 21.3 per cent in 1990-91 (Table 2.9 (C)). But, 
it kept on fluctuating during nineties basically because of the steps taken to 
refomi the financial sector. On an average, its share came down during nineties, 
perhaps due to substantial cuts in the interest rates. In absolute tenns, it 
increased by 7.4 times from 1980-81 to 1990-91 and by only 2.1 times from 
1990-91 to 1998-99. This explains as to why its share in total receipts increased 
during eighties and went down during nineties. An area of concern is recoveries 
of loans and advances whose share in total capital receipts came down from 
26.5 per cent in 1980-81 to 14.6 per cent in 1990-91 and fiirther to 9.4 per cent 
in 1998-99. Its share should have gone up keeping in mind the large amount of 
bad debts accumulated by the banks and other financial institutions. 
The Government also received some non-debt revenue from the source 
of disinvestment of public sector equity holding during 1990s. But the receipts 
were not very significant due to slow process of disinvestment programme and 
under realization of value of the share disinvested. The total amount received 
from disinvestment in 1991-92 was Rs. 3,038 crore which was 0.5 per cent of 
GDP and expected to receive Rs. 5,000 crore in 1998-99, 0.3 per cent of GDP. 
During other years of 1990s, the amount realized was meager. 
In a nut shell, the Government has been successful in checking the 
mounting pressure of deteriorating fiscal situation in 1990-91 which was the 
result of the past Government's cavalier management of expenditure more than 
the revenue during eighties. All the indicators of fiscal imbalances namely 
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fiscal deficit, primary deficit, revenue deficit and budgetary deficit, have shown 
a dechning trend during nineties. This has been made possible by controlling 
the growth of total expenditure. Though both revenue and capital expenditure 
were responsible for checking the growth of total expenditure, but the 
contribution of capital expenditure had been more than revenue expenditure 
whose share in total expenditure had been rising. 
On the other hand, the revenue receipts of the central Government could 
not improve. The revenue receipts of the central Government registered a 
declining trend during nineties. It was 11.2 per cent of GDP in 1991-92, which 
declined to 9.6 per cent of GDP in 1998-99. The decline in total receipt was 
due to the tax revenue which declined fi-om a level of 8.1 per cent of GDP in 
1991-92 to 6.6 per cent of GDP in 1998-99. The tax revenue declined due to 
the fall in revenue fi"om customs and excise duties. 
The capital account receipts has also been fluctuating during nineties. 
But one marked change was found that the Government relied more on internal 
market borrowing than external sources. From 1991-92, the Government 
started disinvestment of public sector undertakings, which yielded non-debt 
receipts on capital account. But it has not been very helpfiil in reducing the debt 
burden. 
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THE CLIMATE FOR ENTERPRISE 
The strong association between industrial (or more narrowly, 
manufacturing) growth and overall economic growth has long been recognised 
and was given a solid empirical grounding by Chenery and Robinson (1986), 
who, on the basis of detail quantitative analysis of the growth pattern of both 
developed and less developed countries, asserted that grov/th in manufacturing 
was virtually a necessary condition for economic growth. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that Government has continued to 
emphasise the industrial sector, even as many of them, from time to time, have 
changed their approach towards promoting this sector'. India, having adopted a 
'mixed economy' where the public and private sector could co-exist with the 
former dominating the core sectors of the economy, has articulated its industrial 
policy through various Industrial Policy Resolutions. The key features of all 
these resolutions included a dominant role for the public sector (where the 
Government has a majority shareholding), demarcation of priority and non-
priority sectors by the Govermnent, encouragement to the small scale sector 
industries with a specified maximum investment in plant and machinery, 
prevention of concentration of economic power, control of foreign investment 
in India, encouragement of domestic entrepreneurship and balanced regional 
growth^. 
With the initiation of the Second Five Year Plan in 1956, India put its 
industrial sector at the core of its growth strategy. The broad outlines of the 
industrialization strategy adhered closely to the Import-Substituting 
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Industrialization (ISI) approach that was in vogue at the time. The emphasis 
was on Capital-Intensive Projects in the basic metals, heavy engineering and 
petrochemicals sectors, which were set up predominantly in the public sector. 
Consumer goods were considered to be of secondary importance and relegated 
to the realm of the small-scale manufacturing sector. This sector received 
several types of fiscal subsidies in addition to exclusive production rights to 
several products. The strategy was sought to be implemented through an 
elaborate system of licensing, which regulated entry, tecimology choice, 
capacity and production. A system of price and distribution controls was put 
into place to handle allocation. 
The regime set up in the late 1950s and early 1960s stayed virtually 
intact until the early 1980s. Within this span, there were periodic changes, 
many of them being aimed at bringing more resources under state control (such 
as the nationalization wave of the late 1960s). Overall, the growth perfonnance 
of the industrial sector during this period left much to be desired. Partly 
because of this, during the early 1980s, a market-oriented refonn process was 
set in motion in some industries. Essentially, price and distribution controls 
were lifted, entry into several tightly regulated sectors was eased and there was 
freer access to foreign collaborations, both financial and technical. There 
appeared a positive response to this partial liberalization which in some ways 
paved the way for the more widespread and comprehensive refonn that were 
initiated in mid-199l'. The refonn process in India has many dimensions and, 
in the short run, is affecting different sectors of the Indian economy in different 
ways. One critical sector whose perfonnance is being keenly watched is the 
industrial sector. 
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New Industrial Policy -1991 
The Indian economy has been undergoing much change, especially since 
1991. These changes have affected almost all sectors of the economy. An 
economy, which has been highly regulated since 1951, is 'fast' dismantling the 
various controls and is on the road to become a full-fledged market economy in 
the very near future. 
The basic rational behind economic liberalisation has been to reduce the 
discretionary role of the Government with respect to economic matters and 
thereby increase the pace for market forces to operate. It is believed that 
tlirough this process of deregulation, the economy will become an efficient 
producer leading to a higher rate of growth of output. Refomiing the industrial 
sector in general and manufacturing in particular was central to this process of 
change"*. As a part of this, a sweeping change in the forni of 'New Industrial 
Policy' was announced by Indian Government on July 24, 1991, which 
envisaged a radical departure from the earlier regime of 'Command and 
Control'. The crux of the policy was to "unshackle the Indian Industrial 
economy from the cobwebs of unnecessary bureaucratic control" thus making 
the economy more efficient by shifting decision making powers from the 
bureaucrat to the entrepreneur. According to the policy statement "these 
measures complement the other series of measures being taken by Government 
in the areas of trade policy, exchange rate management, fiscal policy, financial 
sector refonn and overall macro-economic management". This policy is 
sunmiarized as ' Continuity with change'. 
The Objectives of the Industrial Policy 
The major objectives of the new industrial policy package has been to 
build on the gains already made, correct the distortions or weaknesses that may 
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have crept in, maintain a sustained growth in productively and gainful 
employment and attain international competitiveness. The pursuit of these 
objectives will be tempered by the need to preserve the environment and ensure 
the efficient use of available resources. All sectors of industry whether small, 
medium or large belonging to the public, private or corporative sector will be 
encouraged to grow and improve on their past perfonnance. 
Policy Measures 
In pursuit of the above objectives, Government have decided to take a 
series of initiatives in respect of the policies relating to the following areas. 
(A) Industrial licensing 
(B) Foreign Investment 
(C) Foreign Technology Agreements 
(D) Public Sector Pohcy 
(E) MRTP Act. 
(A) Industrial Licensing Policy 
In order to achieve the objectives of the strategy for the industrial sector 
for the 1990s and beyond it is necessary to make a number of changes in the 
system of industrial approvals. Major policy initiatives and procedural refomis 
are called for in order to actively encourage and assist Indian entrepreneurs to 
exploit and meet the emerging domestic and global opportunities and 
challenges. The industrial licensing system has been gradually moving away 
from the concept of capacity licensing. The system of reservations for public 
sector undertakings has been evolving towards on ethos of greater flexibility 
and private sector enterprise has been gradually allowed to enter into many of 
these areas on a case by case basis. Further impetus must be provided to these 
112 
changes which alone can push this country towards the attainment of its 
entrepreneurial industrial potential. 
(i) Industrial licensing will be abolished for all projects except for a 
short list of industries related to security and strategic concerns, social 
reasons, hazardous chemicals and overriding environmental reasons and 
items of elitist consumption (list attached as Annex II). Industries 
reserved for the small-scale sector will continue to be so. 
List of Industries for which Industrial licensing will be compulsory. 
i. Coals and Lignite 
2. Petroleum (other than crude) and its Distillation Products. 
3. Distillation and Brewing of Alcoholic Drinks. 
4. Sugar 
5. Animals Fats and Oils 
6. Cigars and Cigarettes of Tobacco and Manufactured 
Tobacco Substitutes. 
7. Asbestos and Asbestos-based Products 
8. Plywood, Decorative Veneers and other Wood Based 
Products such as Particle Board, Medium Density Fibre 
Board, Black Board 
9. Raw Hides an Skins, Leather, Chamois Lather and Patent 
Leather. 
10. Tamied or Dressed Fureskins 
U. Motor Cars 
12. Paper and Newsprint except Bagasse-based Units 
13. Electronic Aerospace and Defence Equipment; All Types 
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14. Industrial Explosive, Including Detonating Fuse, Safety 
Fuse, Gunpowder, Nitro-cellulose and Matches. 
15. Hazardous Chemicals 
16. Drugs and Pharmaceuticals (according to Drug Policy) 
17. Entertainment Electronics (VCRs, Colour TVs, CD. 
Players, Tape Recorders) 
18. White Goods (Domestic Refrigerators, Domestic Dish 
Washing Machines, Programmable Domestic Washing 
Machines, Microwave Ovens, Air-conditioners). 
The compulsory licensing provisions would not apply in respect of the 
small-scale units taking up the manufacture of any of the above items reserved 
for exclusive manufacture in small-scale sector. 
The Government continued with industrial reforni during other years too. 
At present, the licensing is compulsory for only 6 industries, namely 
1. Distillation and Brewing of Alcoholic Drinks 
2. Cigars and Cigarettes of Tobacco and Manufactured Tobacco 
Substitutes 
3. Electronic Aerospace and Defence Equipment; All Types 
4. Industrial Explosives Including Detonating Fuses, Safety Fuses, 
Gunpowder, Nitro-cellulose and Matches 
5. Hazardous Chemicals 
6. Drugs and Phannaceuticals (according to modified Drug Policy 
Issued in September 1994), but Bulk Drugs Industry has been de-
licensed. 
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(ii) Areas where security and strategic concerns predominate, will 
continue to be reserved for the public sector (list as in Annex 1). 
List of Industries Reserved for the Public Sector. 
1. Arms and Ammunition and allied items of Defence 
Equipment, Defence Aircraft and Warships 
2. Atomic Energy 
3. Coal and lignite 
4. Mineral Oils 
5. Mining of Iron Ore, Manganese Ore, Chrome Ore, 
Gypsum, Sulphur, Gold and Diamond. 
6. Mining of Copper, Lead, Zinc, Tin, Molybdenum and 
Wolfi'am 
7. Minerals specified in the schedule to the Atomic Energ>' 
(control of production and use) order, 1953. 
8. Railway Transport. 
Now, at present, only 4 industries are reserved for the public 
sector and these are 
1. Arms and Ammunition and allied items of Defence 
Equipment, Defence Aircraft and Warships 
2. Atomic Energy 
3. The substances specification in the schedule to the 
Notification Number S.o.212 (E), dated 15"' March, 1995 
of the Government of India in the Department of Atomic 
Energy. 
4. Railway Transport 
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(iii) In projects where imported capital goods are required, automatic 
clearance will be given. 
(a) In cases where foreign exchange availability is ensured 
through foreign equity 
(b) If the CIF value of imported capital goods required is less 
than 25% of total value (net of taxes) of plant and 
equipment, up to maximum value of Rs. 2 crore. 
In other cases, imports of capital goods will require clearance 
from the Secretariat of Industrial Approvals (SIA) in the Department of 
Industrial Development according to availability of foreign exchange 
resources. 
(iv) In location other than cities of more than 1 million populations, 
there will be no requirement of obtaining industrial approval fiom the 
central Government except for industries subject to compulsory 
licensing. In respect of cities with population greater than 1 million, 
industries other than those of a non-polluting nature such as electronics, 
computer software and printing will be located outside 25 kms., of the 
periphei^, except in prior designated industrial areas. 
In tune with the liberalised licensing policy, the locational policy 
has also been significantly amended. There is no requirement of 
obtaining industrial approvals from the Central Government (except for 
the industries under compulsory licensing) for location not falling within 
25 kms., of cities having a population of more than 1 million. Notified 
industries of non-polluting nature such as electronics, computer software 
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and printing may be located within 25 kms., of the periphery of cities 
with more than 1 million populations. Other industries are peraiitted 
only if they are located in industrial areas designated prior to 25.7.1991. 
(v) Existing units will be provided a new broad banding facility to 
enable them to produce any article without additional investment. 
(vi) The exemption from licensing will apply to all substantial 
expansion of existing units. 
(vii) The mandatory convertibility clause will no longer be applicable 
for term loans from the financial institutions for new projects. 
(B) & (C) Foreign Investment and Foreign Technology Agreements 
We will discuss these in Chapter - IV. 
(D) Public Sector Policy 
The public sector has been central to our philosophy of development. In 
the pursuit of our development objectives, public ownership and control in 
critical sectors of the economy has played an important role in preventing the 
concentration of economic power, reducing regional disparities and ensuring 
that planned development serves the common goods. But, the public enterprises 
have shown a very low rate of return on the capital investment. This has 
inhibited their ability to regenerate themselves in temis of new investments as 
well as technology development. The result is that many of the public 
enterprises have become a burden rather than being an asset to the Government. 
The original concept of the public sector has also undergone considerable 
dilution. The most striking example is the take over of sick units from the 
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private sector. This category of public sector units accounts for almost one third 
of the total losses of central public enterprises. Another category of public 
enterprises, which does not fit into the original idea of the public sector being at 
the commanding heights of the economy, is the plethora of public enterprises 
which are in the consumer goods and services sectors. 
The Industrial Policy 1991 has adopted a new approach to the public 
sector. The priority areas for growth of public enterprises in the future will be 
the following: 
(a) Essential infrastructure goods and services. 
(b) Exploration and exploitation of oil and mineral resources. 
(c) Technology development and building of manufacturing 
capabilities in areas which are crucial in the long-temi 
development of the economy and where private sector investment 
is inadequate. 
(d) Manufacture of products where strategic considarations 
predominate such as defence equipment. 
At the same time the public sector will not be barred from entering areas 
not specifically reserved for it. 
Government will strengthen those public enterprises which fall in the 
reserved areas of operation or are in high priority areas or are generating good 
or reasonable profits. Such enterprises will be provided a much greater degree 
of management autonomy through the system of Memoranda Of 
Understanding. Competition will also be induced in these areas by inviting 
private sector participation. In the case of selected enterprises, part of 
Government holdings in the equity share capital of these enterprises will be 
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disinvested in order to provide further market discipline to the performance of 
public enterprises. There are a large number of chronically sick public 
enterprises incurring heavy losses, operating in a competitive market and serve 
little or no public purpose. The following measures are being taken regarding 
these public enterprises. 
(i) Portfolio of public sector investments will be reviewed with a 
view to focus the public sectors on strategic, high-tech and 
essential infrastructure. Whereas some reservation for the public 
sector is being retained there would be no bar for area of 
exclusivity to be opened up to the private sector selectively. 
Similarly the public sector will also be allowed entry in areas not 
reserved for it. 
(ii) Public enterprises which are chronically sick and which are 
unlikely to be turned around will, for the fonnulation of 
revival/rehabilitation schemes, be referred to the Board for 
Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), or other similar 
high level institutions created for the purpose. A social security 
mechanism will be created to protect the interests of workers 
likely to be affected by such rehabilitation packages. 
(iii) In order to raise resources and encourage wider public 
participation, a part of the Government's share holding in the 
public sector would be offered to mutual funds, financial 
institutions, general public and workers. 
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(iv) Boards of public sector companies would be made more 
professional and given greater powers. 
(v) There will be a greater thrust on performance improvement 
through the Memoranda Of Understanding (MOU) system 
through which management's would be granted greater autonomy 
and will be held accountable. Technical expertise on the part of 
the Government would be upgraded to made the MOU 
negotiations and implementation more effective. 
(vi) To facilitate a further discussion on performance, the MOU signed 
between Government and the public enterprises would be placed 
in parliament. While focussing on major management issues, this 
would also help place matters on day to day operations of public 
enterprises in their correct perspective. 
(E) MRTP Act 
The principal objectives sought to be achieved through the MRTP Act 
are as follows: 
(i) Prevention of concentration of economic power to the common 
detriment, control of monopolies, and 
(ii) Prohibition of monopolistic and restrictive and unfair trade 
practices. 
With the growing complexity of industrial structure and the need for 
achieving economies of scale for ensuring higher productivity and competitive 
advantage in the international market, the interference of the Government 
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through the MRTP Act in investment decisions of large companies has become 
deleterious in its effects on Indian industrial growth. The pre-entry scrutiny of 
investment decisions by so called MRTP companies will no longer be required. 
Instead, emphasis will be on controlling and regulating monopolistic, restrictive 
and unfair trade practices rather than making it necessary for the monopoly 
houses to obtain prior approval of central Govemment for expansion, 
establishment of new undertakings, merger, amalgamation and take-over and 
appointment of certain directors. The thrust of policy will be more on 
controlling unfair or restrictive business practices. 
Privatisation of the Public Sector Undertakings 
The terni 'Privatisation' implies the transfer of total or partial ownership 
of a public sector undertaking to private sector or to private management 
control, including leasing arrangement or management contracts. The process 
of privatisation in India was started by the Late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 
the Year 1985. He declared that the public sector has spread into "too many 
areas where it should not be. We will be developing our public sector to 
undertake jobs that the private sector can not do. But we will be opening up 
more to the private sector so that it can expand and the economy can grow 
more freely". Drawing inspiration from the Late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi 
and keeping in view the globalisation of the Indian economy as well as the 
acceptance of the guidelines of IMF and World Bank, the new Govemment in 
1991 started the programme of privatisation more vigorously and vibrantly for 
restructuring Indian economy^. The privatisation in India has been started in the 
fonn of disinvesting the share holdings of the public sector enterprises. 
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Disinvestment of PSEs 
There are two major reasons adduced for disinvestment - one is to 
provide fiscal support and the other is to improve the efficiency of the 
enterprise^. The Ministry of Finance, Department of Economic Affairs had 
appointed a disinvestment committee with Mr. V. Krishnamurty, ex-member, 
planning commission as its chaimian. The Government reconstituted the 
committee in November 1992 with Dr. C. Rangarajan, ex-member, planning 
commission as chairman^. The Rangarajan committee on disinvestment of 
shares in Public Sector Enterprises (PSEs) has made the following 
recommendations: 
1. The target levels of disinvestment for the medium terai should be 
consistent with the industrial policy. In general, the percentage of equity 
to be disinvested should be 49 per cent in industries reserved for the 
public sector and 74 per cent in other cases. 
2. Instead of year wise targets of disinvestments, a clear cut action plan 
should be evolved. 
3. A number of steps need to be undertaken which may include 
corporatisation of the PSUs, re-structuring of finances with a proper 
debt-equity gearing and an independent regulatory commission for the 
concerned sector, if necessary. 
4. The choice of method of valuation of shares of a PSUs needs to take into 
account the special circumstances affecting PSUs operations such as the 
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past focus on social responsibilities rather than pure coinmercial 
considerations. 
5. A scheme of preferential offer of shares to workers and employees in 
PSEs may be devised. 
6. 10 per cent of the proceeds of disinvestment may be set apart by the 
Government for lending to the PSUs on concessional tenns to meet their 
expansion and rationalisation needs. 
As a consequence of the sharp criticism of the Government regarding the 
process of disinvestment by the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) and in view 
o 
of the report of the Rangarajan Committee , the Government set up the dis-
investment commission under the chairmanship of Mr. G.V. Ramkrishna, ex-
member of planning commission, in August i996, to advise on the extent, 
strategy, methodology and timing for disinvestment in each PS (J. As on 
31.3.1998, the Government has referred 50 PSUs in two phases to the 
commission for its advice. The commission till March, 1998 has submitted 
seven reports. In these seven reports, commission has given its 
recommendations on 41 PSUs. The disinvestment commission has so far 
submitted eight reports covering 43 PSUs. In its report submitted in August 
1998, the commission has made specific recommendations for Air India Ltd. 
and Central Electronic Ltd. suggesting strategic sale for the fornier and 
defemient of disinvestment in the latter. Ten more PSUs have been referred to 
the commission in November 1998. 
123 
Disinvestment Programme Since 1991 to 1998 
Since the beginning of disinvestment in 1991-92, in pursuance of 
industrial policy statement of 24.7.91, 11 rounds of disinvestment of 
Government equity share holdings have been completed till March, 1998 and 
total amount of Rs. 11,440 crores has been realised from these tranches by 
disinvesting Government equity in 39 PSUs and the range of disinvestment has 
been between 1 per cent to 49 per cent of share holding. 
The Industrial Policy statement of 24.7.91 envisaged the disinvestment 
of a part of the Government share holding in selected public sector undertaking 
to provide financial discipline and improve the perfonnance of public 
enterprises subsequently as a part of the budget speech for 1991-92, the 
Govermnent also announced the intention of partial disinvestment in selected 
PSUs in order to raise resources, encourage wider public participation and 
greater accountability. Soon after the announcement, the process of selection of 
PSEs methodology of valuation, modusoperandi of disinvestment, etc., began. 
1991-92 
The disinvestment programme was started in 1991-92, soon after the 
announcement of industrial policy in 31 selected companies. The Government 
decided to disinvest shares up to 20 per cent of the share capital held by the 
Government. The level of disinvestment varied from 5 per cent to 20 ])er cent 
keeping in view the share holding of different Government holding companies 
and ensuring that Government holding would not fall below 51 per cent in any 
case. Of the 31 PSEs, 8 were categorised as 'very good', 12 as 'good' and 11 as 
'average'. Shares of the 31 PSEs were offered in the fonn of bundles consisting 
of 9 PSEs. These bundles were generated in computer and they were offered for 
bidding to shortlisted financial institutions and mutual fijnds. 
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During the first phase of disinvestment, bids were reahsed from 9 
parties. These bids were evaluated against the referial price of each bundle 
worked on the basis of each PSE share price as per average of Net Asset Value 
(NAV) and Profit Earning Capacity Value (PECV) at 10 per cent industry-
capitalisation rate. Total number of shares of 51.62 crores were sold during first 
phase of disinvestment which consisted only 4.7 per cent of the total 
Government share holding in 30 PSEs. The average realisation per share (with 
a face value of Rs. 10) was Rs. 27.65. 
The second phase of the partial disinvestment was undertaken in 
February, 1992 and bids were received from 19 parties. Total number of shares 
sold during the second phase was 35.59 crores consisting only 3.3 per cent of 
total Government share holding in 31 PSEs. The average realisation per share 
was Rs. 45.25 
The total shares disinvested during 1991-92, thus, comprised 8 per cent 
of the total Government share holding in the 31 PSEs and the total amount 
realised was Rs. 30,38 crores. Whereas the target was only Rs. 2,500 crore in 
1991-92. 
1992-93 
Disinvestment during the financial year, 1992-93, was done in three 
rounds (i.e. October 1992, November 1992 and March 1993). As per the 
announcements made in the budget speech for 1992-93 Rs. 3,500 crore were 
required to be raised through disinvestment of shares in public sector 
companies. 
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In the first round, in accordance with the Government decision, tenders 
were invited for the sale of shares of 8 central PSUs. A total of 286 bids were 
received and the bids eligible for acceptance amounted to a total sale value of 
Rs. 681.95 crores for 12.87 crores shares in the 8 companies. 
In November 1992, the Govermnent again invited tenders for sale of 
46.27 crore shares in 14 central PSUs. A total of 22.5 bids were received. The 
criterion was the same as was adopted during the first tranch disinvestment of 
1992-93. In accordance with, the bids accepted for sale amounted to 
Rs. 1,183.83 crores for 31.06 crore shares in 12 companies as no shares in two 
PSUs could be sold. 
The third tranch of disinvestment during 1992-93 was effected in March 
1993. The shares of 15 companies were offered for sale through auction. A 
total amount of Rs. 46.64 crores was realised by sale of 100.86 lakh shares of 
nine public sector enterprises. No sale took place in 6 PSUs. 
The total amount realised during 1992-93 from three tranches was 
Rs. 1,912.42 crores. 
1993-94 
The Government had estimated to raise Rs. 2,500 crore through 
disinvestment during 1993-94. However, no disinvestment of PSl's shares 
could take place during 1993-94 due to adverse market conditions and other 
factors. With a view to encourage wider participation by the public, some 
important changes were made in the procedure for disinvestment. In this 
regard, bidding were lowerd from I lakh to 25,000 or the value of 100 shares 
which is higher, minimum bid amount was reduced in the disinvestment 
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procedure and the foreign institutional investors registered with SEBI were also 
pemiitted to participate in the auction of PSU shares. 
1994-95 
Union budget for 1994-95 targeted to mobilise Rs. 4,000 crores from 
disinvestment of PSUs shares. In October 1994, tenders were invited for the 
sales of shares of 7 PSUs and the percentage shares offered in these PSUs 
varied from 2 per cent to 20 per cent. In this round of disinvestment an 
important change was made in the disinvestment procedure. The Non-Resident 
Indians (NRIs) and Overseas Corporate Bodies (OCBs) were permitted for the 
first time to bid for shares of PUSs. 
In January 1995, tenders were invited in 6 PSUs and 556 bids were 
received for sale of these shares. Finally 209 bids for sale of share in 5 PSUs 
were accepted. 
In all, the disinvestment in 1994-95 was completed by the Government 
in 3 rounds and a total of 19.771 crores shares in 16 PSUs were sold and an 
amount of Rs.4,843.07 crores was realised. 
1995-96 
The Government had estimated to raise Rs. 7,000 crore through 
disinvestment during 1995-96. It was the biggest disinvestment of PSUs since 
the inception of disinvestment. Due to adverse market conditions, the 
disinvestment could only be undertaken in one round in October 1995. In 
October 1995, 27.14 crore shares in 4 PSUs were offered for sale. In all 927 
bids for purchase of 7.80 crore shares were received and a total of 1.53 crore 
shares in 4 PSUs were disinvested resulting in realisation of Rs 168.48 crores. 
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But the total mobilisation from selling the shares of 5 PSUs was Rs. 362 crores 
during 1995-96. 
1996-97 
In 1996-97 budget, proposals were made to mobilise Rs. 5,000 crore 
under disinvestment programme. In the first two tranch Indian Oil Corporation 
(IOC) and Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. (VSNL), were eannarked and 
preparatory work had been initiated for the GDR issue. But only VSNL could 
be taken up for disinvestment (in GDR) and IOC GDR could not be launched 
due to unfavourable market conditions. In the GDR, 39 lakh shares of VSNL 
were disinvested resulting in the realisation of Rs. 379 crore. 
1997-98 
An amount of Rs. 4,800 crores was proposed to be raised through 
disinvestment during 1997-98. This was proposed to be achieved through 
disinvestment in MTNL, GAIL, CONCOR and IOC. During 1997-98, an 
amount of Rs. 906 crore was realised by disinvestment of 40 million shares in 
MTNL. However, due to extremely unfavourable conditions in the international 
market, it was decided to defer the issues of GAIL, CONCOR and IOC. 
Since the beginning of disinvestment in 1991-92, a total amount of 
Rs. 1,1440 crores has been realised by disinvestment in 39 PSUs in 11 rounds 
till 1997-98. 
Thus, the privatization of PSUs came in the forni of disinvestment for 
the purpose of restructuring public sector enterprises. The Government started 
the process of disinvestment from 1991-92 and it is still going on. But the pace 
of disinvestment has been very slow due to unfavourable market conditions and 
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Table 3.1 
PSU-Wise percentage of Disinvestment and Present 
Government Share Holding 
s. 
No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Name of the PSE 
Andrew Yule 
Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. 
Bharat Electronic Ltd. 
Bharat Heaw Electricals Ltd. 
Bharat Petroleum Corp. Ltd. 
Bangaigaon Refineries & Petro Chem. Ltd. 
CMC Ltd 
Cochin Refineries Ltd. 
Containier Corp. Of India Ltd. 
Dredging Corp. Of India Ltd. 
Engineers India Ltd. 
Pert & Chem. (Travancore) Ltd. 
Gas Authority of India Ltd. 
HMT Ltd. 
Hindustan Cables Ltd. 
Hindustan Copper Ltd. 
Hindustan Organic Chemical Ltd. 
Hindustan Petroleum Ltd. 
Hindustan Photofilms Mfg. Co. Ltd. 
Hindustan Zinc Ltd. 
Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. 
Indian Petro Chemicals Corp. Ltd. 
IRCON International Ltd. 
Indian Telephone Industries Ltd. 
India Tourism &. Development Corp. 
As on 3L03.1998 
% of Dis-
investment 
9,60 
39.19* 
24.14 
32.28 
33.80 
25.54 
16.69 
6.12 
23.07 
1.44 
5.98 
1.70 
3.40 
8.44 
1.04 
1.24 
41.39* 
48.94 • 
9.87 
24.08 
8.74 
40.05 * 
0.27 
22.98 
10.03 
% of Govt. 
Holding 
62.84** 
60,81 
75.86 
67.72 
66.20 
74.46 
83.31 
55.04** 
76.93 
98.56 
94.02 
97.38** 
96.60 
91,56 
98.96 
98.76 
58.61 
51.06 
90.13 
75,92 
91.14** 
59.95 
99.73 
76.67 ** 
89.97 
(Contd...) 
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Table 3.1 
PSU-Wise percentage of Disinvestment and Present 
Government Share Holding 
s. 
No 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
Nam.eofthePSE 
Kundermukh Iron & Ore Comp. Ltd. 
Madras Refineries Ltd. 
Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd. 
Minerals & Metals Trading Corp. Ltd. 
National Aluminium Ltd. 
National Fertilizers Ltd. 
National Minerals Dev. Corp. Ltd. 
Neyveli Lignite Corp. 
Oil &Natuial Gas Corp. 
Rashtriya Chemicals & Pert. Ltd. 
Shipping Corp. Of India Ltd. 
State Trading Corp. 
Steel Authority Of India Ltd. 
Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. 
As on 31.03.1998 
% of Dis-
investment 
1.00 
18.92 
43.80 * 
0.67 
12.85 
2.35 
1.62 
6.01 
3.86 
7.50 
19.88 
8.97 
14.18* 
33.04 * 
% of Govt. 
Holding 
99.00 
53.80 ** 
56.20 
99.33 
87.15 
97.65 
96.36** 
93.99 
96.14 
92.50 
80.12 
91.03 
85.82 
66.96 
Note : * Including Dilution of Government Share Holding by 
Public Issue / GDR Issues. 
** The Balance Equity is Held by State Government / Other 
Collaborators. 
Source Public Enterprises Survey, Vol 1 , Ministry Of Industry, 
Government of India, New Delhi, 1997-98. 
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the shares of PUSs could be sold of only limited profit making enterprises. 
Frequently,! the Government has been criticised for under-realisation of the 
value of the shares disinvested due to selling the shares not at proper time. 
Most of the time, the Government has failed to achieve the disinvestment 
target. Moreover, the Government is criticised for disinvesting the shares of 
only top level profit making enterprises and using their proceeds for the fiscal 
requirements. The Government must try to disinvest even the shares of loss 
making enterprises making them profitable by using some part of dis-
investment proceeds and remaining amount must be used for retiring the old 
debt of the Government. 
Performance of Public sector Undertakings 
Public enterprises in India constitute a major national capability in tenns 
of their Scale of operations, coverage of the i-ational economy, technological 
capabilities and stock of human capital and work with multiple objectives. 
There are over a thousand public enterprises, about 800 of which are owned by 
the states. The rest are in the central sector^. We would mainly concentrate on 
the financial perfomiance of central public sectors. Though, as we know, only 
the profits are not the sole criterion for examining the perfomiance of public 
sector enterprises, their financial performance is of wide interest and concern as 
they are set up at a huge cost to the national exchequer. Profits are also 
necessary for generating internal surplus without which further investment will 
not be possible. Therefore, for measuring the efficiency of an enterprise, profit 
is one of the important indicators. The concept of gross profit before tax is 
generally recommended by economists as the basis of comparison with the 
private sector. It was also stated in various plan documents that PSUs should 
earn a rate of return (Gross profit before tax to capital employed) of 12 per cent 
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per annum'°. But the usual criterion for measuring the profitability is the ratio 
of net profit after tax to capital employed. 
Table 3.2 presents a comparative analysis of the collective perfomiance 
of the manufacturing and service group of enterprises fi^om 1980-81 to 1997-
98, measured in ternis of broad financial parameters. In absolute tenns, the 
gross profit (profit before tax plus interest charged) increased fi^om 
Rs. 1,417.83 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. 1,101.55 crore in 1990-91, an increase of 
683 per cent. In 1997-98 the gross profit reached at Rs. 36,092.62 crore which 
shows 225.1 per cent rise. The gross profit when viewed as percentage of 
capital employed also increased fi-om 7.79 in 1980-81 to 10.87 in 1990-91 and 
to 16.2 in 1997-98. This is after taking into account the increase in input costs 
and specially, salaries and wages which always tend to show an increase in 
profit before tax increased from Rs. 18.68 crore in 1980-81 to Rs. 3,501.45 
crores in 1990-91. It ftirther increased to Rs. 19,379.12 crores in 1997-98. The 
net profit increased from Rs. 2,272.15 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 13,725.23 crore 
in 1997-98 (54.1 percent). It was in negative, Rs. 202.97 crore in 1980-81. 
In tenns of net return on investment i.e. the ratio of net profit to capital 
employed, there is an increase from -1.11 in 1980-81 to 2.23 in 1990-91 and 
further to 6.15 in 1997-98. It is clear from the analysis that although, the 
enterprises earned the gross profit, they incurred net losses after paying taxes. 
The marginal improvement in profitability, specifically after 1990-91, has to be 
viewed against the background of multidimensional objectives of public 
enterprises and the divergent constraints faced by them. In order to be fair and 
objective, it would be necessary to take into account the obligations of public 
enterprises, which transcends the concepts of production and profits. Given 
that, the performance of public enterprises either at micro or at macro level, has 
to be evaluated keeping in view the contributions made by them in discharging 
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their socio-economic obligations, development of backward regions, provision 
of public utility, services, selling basic inputs or products at administered prices 
etc. There is no denying fact that all this has been possible despite several 
handicaps from which public enterprises suffer such as locational 
disadvantages in some cases, very high initial capital investment in others, 
having to do with technology which was not necessarily among ihe best 
available, cost of learning and development and presence of a large number of 
units taken over from the private sector etc. 
The Table 3.2 further bifurcates the enterjDrises in profit-making, loss-
making and neither profit nor loss-making. The total number of profit-making 
enterprises were 119 out of 211 enterprises (56.39 per cent) in 1985-86, 
increased to 123 out of 236 enterprises (52.11 per cent) in 1990-91 and ftirther 
increased to 134 out of 236 enterprises (56.77 per cent) in 1997-98. A detailed 
analysis of enterprise wise profitability reveals that during the year 1997-98, 
134 enterprises earned a net profit of Rs. 20,266.69 crores compared to 
Rs. 5,393.90 crore by 123 enterprises in 1990-91 and Rs. 3,856.80 crore by 119 
enterprises in 1985-86. On the other hand the total loss-making enterprises in 
1985-86 were 90 (42.65 per cent), rose to 111 (47.03 per cent) and came down 
to 100 (42.37 per cent) in 1997-98. The net loss of 90 loss-making enterprises 
was Rs. 1,684.14 crore in 1985-86 which increased to Rs. 3,121.75 crore of 111 
enterprises in 1990-91 and Rs. 6,541.46 crore of 100 enterprises in 1997-98. 
However, in the year of 1994-95 and 1995-96, the net loss of loss-making 
enterprises declined as compared to 1993-94. The net loss in the year of 1985-
86 was 43.66 per cent of total net profit of profit-making enterprises, which 
increased to 57.87 per cent in 1990-91, but declined, to 32.2 per cent in 
1997-98. 
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Table 3.3 presents data of various manufacturing sectors of PSUs from 
1980-81 to 1997-98. Manufacturing PSUs include those undertakings which 
engage themselves in manufacturing steel, minerals and metals, coal and 
lignite, power, petroleum, fertilizers, chemicals & phannaceuticals, heavy 
engineering, medium & light engineering, transportation equipment, consumer 
goods, agro-based industries and textiles. The gross profit of 116 
manufacturing sector was Rs. 803.86 crore in 1980-81, rose to Rs. 7,926.31 
crore of 165 manufacturing enterprises in 1990-91 and further increased to 
Rs. 24,841.29 crore of 161 manufacturing enterprises in 1997-98. Percentage of 
gross profit to capital employed was 6.64, 11.38 and 18.5 in 1980-81, 1990-91 
and 1997-98 respectively. In the year 1980-81, the net losses of manufacturing 
sector was Rs. -185.02 crore which turned into net profit of Rs. 1,967.65 crore 
in 1990-91 and increased to Rs. 9,958.60 crores in 1997-98. The total number 
of profit making manufacturing units were 77, 81 and 82 out of 153, 165 and 
161 in the year 1985-86, 1990-91 and 1997-98 respectively. They earned the 
net profit of Rs. 3,382 crore in 1985-86. It increased to Rs. 4,410.74 crore 
in 1990-91 and Rs. 15,749.46 crore in 1997-98. The total number of loss-
making manufacturing units were 49.01 per cent, 49.69 per cent and 48.44 per 
cent in 1985-86, 1990-91 and 1997-98 respectively. The net loss of loss-
making manufacturing units in 1985-86 was 41.39 per cent of the total net 
profit of profit-making manufacturing sector. In 1990-91, it became 55.38 per 
cent. But in 1997-98, it came down to 36.76 per cent. 
Table 3.4 present data regarding servicing sectors of PSUs from 1980-
81 to 1997-98. Servicing sectors include all those PSUs which engage 
themselves in rendering services such as trading & marketing services, 
transportation services, contract & construction services, industrial 
136 
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development & technical consultancy services, tourist services, financial 
services, telecommunication services and section 25 companies. It is clear from 
the table that the public enterprises rendering services incurred net loss of 
Rs. -17.95 crorc in 1980-81 and earned net profit equal to Rs. 304.50 crore in 
1990-91 which reached to Rs. 3,766.63 crore in 1997-98. The net profit of the 
profit-making concerned increased from Rs. 474.80 crore in 1985-86 to Rs. 
983.16 crore in 1990-91 and Rs. 4,517.23 crore in 1997-98. In 1985-86, the 
total enterprises under service group earning net profit were 42 out of 58 
enterprises ( 72.41 per cent). In 1990-91, there were again 42 but out of 71 
units (59.15 per cent) but in 1997-98 there were 52 out of 75 units (69.33 per 
cent). Similarly, the loss-making enterprises were 25.86 per cent of the total 
enterprises rendering services in 1985-86. It increased to 40.84 per cent in 
1990-91. But in 1997-98 it came down to 29.33 per cent. The net losses of loss-
making enterprises were 59.85 per cent of the total net profit of the profit 
earning enterprises in 1985-86 which increased to 69.02 per cent in 1990-91, 
but came down to 16.6 per cent in 1997-98. 
Thus, the various steps taken by the Government to reforni the public 
sectors after 1991 have started yielding good results. Our analysis reveals that 
overall returns from PSUs was negative during 1980s. In the 1990s, there has 
been improvement in temis of percentage of net profit to capital employed. The 
percentage of gross profit to capital employed improved from 10.87 per cent in 
1990-91 to 16.2 per cent in 1997-98 and the percentage of net profit to capital 
employed from 2.23 per cent to 6.15 per cent during the same period. The 
percentage of loss making enterprises which was 42.65 per cent in 1985-86 and 
47.03 per cent in 1990-91, came down to 42.37 per cent in 1997-98. The 
reduction in overall loss making enterprises was mainly due to improvement in 
service sector enterprises where they went down from 40.84 per cent in 
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1990-91 to 29.33 per cent in 1997-98. The reduction in the percentage of loss-
making units in manufacturing sectors was also responsible for the said 
improvement but not as much as in service sectors, hi 1990-91, out of 13 broad 
group of manufacturing sectors, only 4 were earning net profit. Their number 
became 7 m 1997-98. In the service sector, only 4 out of 18 broad group of 
industries were earning net profit in 1990-91. But in 1997-98, there was only 
one group earning losses. So, there has been remarkable improvement in the 
financial perfonnance of public sector during 1990s. 
Overall Industrial Growth 
Since July 1991, Indian industry has undergone a sea-change in tenns of 
the basic parameters governing its structure and functioning. The major reforms 
include wide-scale reduction in the scope of industrial licensing, simplification 
of procedural rules and regulations, reduction of areas reserved exclusively for 
the public sector, disinvestment of equity of selected public sector 
undertakings, enhancing the limits of foreign equity participation in domestic 
industrial undertakings, liberalisation of trade and exchange rate policies, 
rationalisation and reduction of customs and excise duties and personal and 
corporate income tax, extension of the scope of MODVAT etc. All these 
important measures have changed the scenario of industrial growth 
perfonnance. The perfonnance of industries in respect of their p'-oduction can 
be well depicted in tenns of the rate at which the industrial output has grown 
and the changes in the structural composition of industries that have marked the 
industrial scene. 
Although the economy perfonned better during 1980s than the previous 
two decades, the growing macroeconomic imbalances had l)ccomc 
unsustainable by the middle of 1990 and the economy found itself in deep crisis 
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by mid 1991. Since m(5Uit was understood that the crisis had been caused by the 
structural imbalances built up over time, a programme of structural refomis was 
under taken to strengthen the growth capability of the economy. Soon after the 
initiation of economic refonns that is in the year 1991-92, the perfonrance of 
the industrial sector was very poor and the overall industrial production almost 
remained stagnant. The overall growth of industrial production during this year 
was only 0.6 per cent with the manufacturing sector showing negative growth 
(-0.8 per cent) and mining sector recording a growth of 0.6 per cent. Only the 
electricity sector perfonned better with a growth rate of 8.5 per cent (Table 
3.6). In the manufacturing sector, out of 17 industry gi^oups, only 7 groups with 
a weight of 4'7.7 per cent have shown positive rates of growth. These were food 
products (4.9 per cent), beverages, tobacco & tobacco products (2.9 per cent), 
cotton textile (8.0 per cent), paper & paper products (2.6 per cent), chemicals & 
chemicals products (2.7 per cent), non-metallic mineral products (6.2 per cent) 
and basic metal & alloy industries (5.5 per cent). The worst affected was capital 
goods industry which registered -8.5 per cent growth followed by intermediate 
goods industry with -2.1 per cent growth (Table 3.7). 
The above trend was quickly reversed in the next year (1992-93) and the 
industrial sector started showing sign of recovery. The industrial production 
increased by 2.3 per cent in 1992-93, 6.0 per cent in 1993-94, 9.4 per cent in 
1994-95 and 12.1 per cent in 1995-96, the highest ever since 1981-82. The 
manufacturing sector with 77.11 per cent weight, played very important role in 
pushing up the industrial growth. It registered 2.2 per cent growth in 1992-93, 
6.1 per cent in 1993-94, 9.4 per cent in 1994-95 and 13.6 per cent growth in 
1995-96, the highest ever since 1981-82. Mining and electricity also improved, 
but not as much as manufacturing sector. 
145 
c u o 
a 
CL, 
0^  
o 
u 
c 
c 
s 
C 
O 
U 
o 
w o 
fe II 
30 
o 
00 
as 
0^ 
0 0 
1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
1 
0 0 
0\ 
0 £ 
o 
U 
1/3 
OS 
OS 
o 
0 0 
(^ 
ON 
0 0 
c 
•c 3 
• * - » O 
3 
C 
CO 
'^ ' 
0 0 
0 0 
0 0 
6 0 
C 
• > > 
t 
<0 
3 
a 
6 0 
C 
"S 
d 
i n 
0 0 
O 
r—1 
d 
*-• 
•c 
o 
u 
W 
o< 
0 0 
so 
0 0 
so 
0 \ ' 
o 
o 
d 
o 
13 
Ui 
c 
<u 
O 
c 
o 
••s 
VI 
c/> 
CO 
O 
(U </> 
q a 
1 
<u 
o< 
0 0 
so 
- . 
o 
sd 
o 
OS 
d 
OS 
m 
o 
8 
o 
'So 
m 
0 0 
so 
d 
o 
sd 
so 
O 
O 
o 
'S, 
U 
1 - ^ 
<n 
Os 
0 0 
OS 
o 
d 
T 3 
O 
O 
O 
•3 
a> 
u 
+-» c 
SO 
i n 
ri 
so 
SO 
1 
0 0 
so 
en 
•o 
O 
O 
O 
k> u 
e 
3 
a 
o U 
0 0 
so" 
OS 
ON 
d 
>n 
»n 
JO 
2 
3 
Q 
u 
<u 
e 
3 
to 
C 
o U 
so 
i n 
i n 
d 
1 
0 0 
1 
•<3-' 
O 
3 Q 
t c o 
Z 
e 
3 
C 
o U 
T3 
C 
o 
U 
146 
c 
o 
a 
OH 
3 
B 
^^ 
«^ 
O 
u 
o 
U 
\Q O 
03 
O 
o 
I o 
00 
« 
CQ 
o 
s 
B 
e 
<*> 
1 
1 
O ON 
S 00 
< 00 
ON 
1—< 
ON 
1 
o 
ON 
ON 
o 
ON 
1 
ON 
90 
ON 
ON 
00 
1 
00 
00 
ON 
00 
00 
1 
t-
00 
ON 
o 
w 
C/5 
00 
d 
1 
NO 
ON 
od 
NO 
00 
00 
ON 
60 
C 
•c 
3 
o 
3 
C 
NO 
d 
NO 
d 
00 
NO 
ON 
00 
c 
1 
3 
a 
00 
c 
"5 
o 
00 
o 
ON 
00 
ON 
d 
ON 
NO 
•4-* 
•c 
NO 
d 
oo 
00 
NO 
00 
00 
2 
c 
O 
> 
ON 
o< 
c 
O 
a 
O 
•o 
a> 
pa 
1 
<u 
NO 
NO 
ON 
ON 
NO 
r-' 
ON 
IT) 
-a 
o 
6 
o 
CO 
d 
1 
00 
1 
in 
o 
NO 
ON 
r--
"a 
o 
o O 
'S, 
en 
U 
iri 
1 
ON 
iri 
ON 
00 
ON 
t/i 
o 
o 
o 
•s 
00 
o 
NO 
00 
NO 
NO 
rn 
NO 
(/I 
13 
O 
O 
O 
i-i 
£ 
3 (/) 
C 
o 
O 
d 
1 
ON 
d 
1 
ON 
00 
d 
d 
d 
1 
u 
3 
Q 
w 
a 
c 
o U 
/~\ 
CQ 
O 
00 
iri 
in 
2 
3 
Q 
c 
o 
u 
S 
3 
c 
o U 
c 
o O 
147 
c 
o 
u V 
s 
s 
o 
•§ .s 
o 
o 
s 
s 
B 
fe 11 
00 I 
o 
00 
0^ 
P3 
00 
o\ 
S r^  
O OS 
. U 9 \ 
« - ^ ?« o 
a» 0\ 
o\ 1-1 
0 0 
o\ 1 
0\ 
o\ 
w^ 
r~ 
o\ 1 
»\ 
ON 
w* 
ve 
ON 
wt 
«n 
ON 
1 
OS 
w^ 
T f 
1 
ON 
0 \ 
r^ 
o 
<N 
vd 
vq 
r<S 
VO 
0 0 
VO 
I—^ 
0 0 
O N 
^^  
vd 
00 
c 
•c 
3 
O 
3 
C 
VO 
rn 
ON 
• t ' 
• ^ 
O 
• ^ 
r-' 
iTt 
r-' 
i n 
ro 
00 
c 
• & 
3 
a 
00 
c 
s 
Ov 
vd 
0 0 
vd 
ON 
fW 
^ 
00° 
«o 
0 0 
i n 
r-' 
•c 
o 
5 
o 
vd 
( S 
• * • 
• — ' 
r-' 
'-
tN 
TT 
ON 
o 
vd 
13 
c 
O 
c 
o 
U 
t 
0 0 
vd 
o 
K 
•—' 
0 0 
f ^ 
0 0 
>n 
i r ! 
r f 
ON 
o 
o 
a 
o 
"55 CQ 
VO 
• ^ ' 
' 
o 
rr 
ON 
>ri 
ON 
I--" 
0 0 
r—< 
1 
O 
O O 
la 
'B. 
U 
r-
vd 
ON 
vd 
0 0 
ON 
0 0 
'"' 
t~~ 
rn 
r~-; 
1^  
T 3 
O 
O 
O 
u 
c 
m 
»n 
VO 
" > * ' 
-" 
•^ ' 
ro 
• < ^ ' 
r-
0 0 
o 
•<^ ' 
CA 
O O 
O 
<U 
B 
3 
c o U 
• ^ 
ON 
ON 
O N 
•^  
>n 
^ 
vd 
( N 
O 
»—» 
vd 
(U 
3 
Q 
B 
3 C o 
u 
m 
•^ " 
O N 
CS 
r-
m' 
0 0 
0 0 
T T 
0 0 
m 
^ 
,£3 
ca 
u 
3 Q 1 
c 
o 
Z 
6 
3 
1/5 
c 
o U 
S" 
U H 
C) 
^ o 
o j j 
- r j 
oo" 
ON 
ON 
rt 
T 3 
C 
l—H 
«*-
o 
1) 
B 
f= 0) 
> o 
a 
t-
i>^ 
3 
•o 
1—H 
^ 
r) 
er 
1A 
c 
s 
(/I 
•t-i in 
to 
«J 
T ) 
c 
t * -
o 
c 
u 
B 
E (U 
> o O 
<L) 
O 
C 
CO 
c fc 
«<-( 
o 
^ 
••-» 
C 
s 
>; 
a> 
r^  
-t 
GO 
O 
o 
c 
o 
o 
•T3 
c 
CO 
0 0 
ON 
ON 
00 
I S 
rr 
o 
O H 
rt 
•c (/) 3 
V i 
o 
^ 
o 
o Z i 
-a 
c cd 
>i 
h 
o 
c 
o 
o 
w 
c CO 
c 
•"* 
c 
o 
tn 
O 
.4_t 
Cfl 
•ft CO 
0 0 
<u 
n tn 
c« 
c/> 
3 
O 
rrt 
> 
u 
3 O (.0 
148 
In the sub-sector of industry, the capital goods industry which showed 
negative growth from 1991-92 to 1993-94 registered 24.8 per cent growth in 
1994-95 and 17.9 per cent in 1995-96(Table 3.6). Intennediate goods industry 
recorded a growth rate of 5.4 per cent in 1992-93, which reached to 11.8 per 
cent in 1995-96. Likewise, consumer goods industry reached to 14.3 per cent in 
1995-96 from 1.0 per cent growth rate in 1991-92. Basic goods induf.try was 
also not behind and recovered from 2.6 per cent in 1992-93 to 8.3 per cent in 
1995-96. 
During the first three years of the post policy period, from 1991 -92 to 
1993-94, industrial growth remained moderate. The moderate growth has been 
due to the following broad factors: (a) exceptionally difficult balance of 
payment situation in 1991 necessitated an imports squeeze affecting availability 
of imported inputs and their costs (b) There was a fall in overall demand due to 
reduction in public expenditure and investment in real tenns (c) The tight 
monetary policy pursued to control inflation also affected the demand and 
raised the cost of borrowing for the industries. Containing inflation was an 
overriding priority as this was threatening long-term growth prospects and 
competitiveness of our exports. Most of these fiscal and monetary constraints 
which affected industrial production were later removed or relaxed in a phased 
manner. Moreover, the slow industrial growth in the first three years was also 
attributable to inherent adjustment lags in the process of industrial 
restructuring, early uncertainties about the commitments to the refonn policies, 
disturbances due to Ayodhya crisis in December 1992, Bombay riots in 
February-March 1993, the transport's strike during August-September 1993 and 
lack of supplementary refomns at the sectoral and local levels. 
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The process of adjustment, however, seems to have had a much shorter 
time span compared to international experience. Overall industrial growth, 
though moderate, has remained positive fonv April 1994, industrial recovery 
seems to be becoming apparent and spread to the sectors which have to far 
remained depressed. 
This broad based industrial recovery was due to a number of factors such 
as cumulative success of industrial restructuring, resurgence of exports in 
response to trade and payment policies, declining nominal and real interest 
rates, cumulative effects of tax refomis, growing public expenditure on poverty 
alleviation and employment generation programme, another agricultural 
bumper crop, a buoyant infrastructural sector and growing confidence and 
improvement in investment climate due to cumulative success of industrial, 
trade, financial and capital market refomis. 
However, industrial growth after being moderate in 1991-93 and 
attaining peak growth in 1995-96 started declining from 1996-97. From 12.1 
per cent in 1995-96, it fell to 7.1 per cent in 1996-97 and 4.2 per cent in 1997-
98. In 1996-97, the fall in industrial growth was because of manufacturing, 
mining and electricity which have shown decline in growth rate. Manufacturing 
sector growth rate fell to 8.6 per cent, mining 0.4 per cent and electricity 3.9 
per cent. The maximum fall in industrial production was recorded due to 
mining and manufacturing. Similarly, the decline in industrial growth in 1997-
98 was mainly due to manufacturing sector, which recorded only 3.6 per cent 
growth, whereas mining and electricity both maintained higher growth in 1997-
98 compared to 1996-97. 
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In manufacturing sector during 1996-97, wood & wood products group 
registered negative growth rate and all other, except Jute, heinp & mesta 
textiles, basic metal & alloy industries, have recorded decline in growth rate. 
Likewise, during 1997-98, food products, textiles products, wood & wood 
products, leather & fur products, non-electrical machinery and transport 
equipment experienced negative growth rate. 
The capital goods and consumer goods industries showed major fall in 
growth rate compared to basic goods and intennediate goods industries during 
1996-97. In 1997-98, capital goods industry recorded negative giowth rate of 
-4.0 per cent. The consumer goods industry recorded marginal increase, while 
the basic goods and intennediate goods once again experienced fall in growth 
rate. The slow down in industrial growth can be attributed to both the domestic 
and external factors. These includes factors such as: falling export growth from 
21.4 per cent in 1995-96 to 4 per cent in 1996-97 and just 2.6 per cent in 1997-
98, which constitutes 39.7 per cent of total manufacturing output, due to an 
overall slump in world trade compounded by an erosion in competitive 
advantage of Indian exports on account of steep depreciation in East Asian 
currencies; decline in rural demand owing to low agricultural output in 1997-
98; price competition from imports in certain key industries; and slow take-off 
of actual investment in infrastnicture sectors such as power, ports and 
transports and show down, in general, investment mainly due to subdued 
capital market conditions and partly due to corporate restructuring in some 
industries in order to become internationally competitive. 
However, the average annual growth rate of industrial output has been 6 
per cent with 6.2 per cent manufacturing, 3.6 per cent mining and 6.9 per cent 
electricity generation during the period 1991-92 to 1997-98. As compared to 
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the average annual growth rate during 1981-82 to 1990-91, this average growth 
rate is lower. The growth rate of manufacturing, mining and electricity 
generation are also lower than the growth rate during 1981-82 to 1990-91. 
Thus, after going through a period of transition and restructuring Indian 
industry has responded to the economic refonr.s with vigour and registered a 
robust growth rate of 12.1 per cent in 1995-96. However, the decline in growth 
rate during 1991-92, 1992-93 and 1994-95, were considered to be transitory 
phase. Although the industrial growth rate has decelerated in 1996-97 and 
1997-98, it is expected that under the new policy of promoting market, private 
sector and foreign direct investments, the industrial output would not only pick 
up its earlier high growth, but may remain much above it in future. 
The Banking Sector Reform 
As part of the process of liberalisation of the Indian economy, a number 
of refomis have also been introduced, since mid-1991, in the financial sector. A 
dominant feature of the Indian financial system is that most of the important 
financial institutions are state-owned, or in the nature of public enterprises. The 
major part of financial sector is constituted by public sector insfitutions. The 
public sector banks in India constitute 80% of the deposits and advances of the 
market in spite of breaking the entry barriers for the private banks both in India 
and abroad and deregulation of the interest rate''. 
The main emphasis on the financial sector reforni has been on the 
banking system, which constitutes a very valuable segment of the financial 
sector. The banking sector plays a crucial role in economic development of 
nation. A sound, efficient, effective, vibrant and innovative banking system 
156 
stimulates economic growth by mobilising savings on a massive scale and 
efficiently allocating resources for productive purposes. Thus, it plays very 
important role in creating good climate for enterprises. 
In spite of many efforts at restructuring and revitalising, Indian Banking 
remained inefficient and ineffective and over the years developed many ills and 
maladies'^. A substantial part of the agenda for refonn of the Indian Financial 
Sector since 1991 has related to the problems faced by the public sector banks 
in India for the last three decades or so. Despite impressive widening and 
deepening of the financial system, banks had not grown into sound, vibrant 
financial institutions, so much so that by 1990 there was serious concern about 
the poor financial condition of public sector banks most of which had become 
unprofitable, undercapitalised and burdened with unsustainable levels of non-
perfonning advances on their books. Against this background and as part of the 
structural adjustment programme initiated in 1991, the environment in which 
the banks operated, characterised by the following, had to be reconsidered: 
(i) insufficient attention to prudential accounting norms and capital 
adequacy; 
(ii) extraordinarily high level of pre-emption of bank resources 
through the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) and the Cash Reserve 
Ratio (CRR); 
(iii) excessive recourse to subsidised credit channelled through an 
unduly complex system of administered interest rates; 
(iv) Inadequate internal control and rigidities in personnel policies and 
management structure. 
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With a view to diagnosing the ills of financial and banking sector and 
making appropriate recommendations for initiating reforni measures 
'Narasimham Committee' was appointed in August 1991, which submitted its 
first report in 1991 itself and the second report in 1998. 
The Narasimham Committee pointed out certain major factors 
responsible for the declined in productivity, efficiency and profitability of 
Banks. These were directed investments and directed credit programme. In both 
these cases, rate of interest that were available to banks were less than the 
market related rates or what they could have secured from alternative 
deployment of funds. Under directed investment, the Statutory Liquidity Ratio 
(SLR), the proportion of net demand and time liabilities that commercial banks 
have to invest in low rated Government and other designated securities was 
gradually raised to 38.5 per cent of deposit habilities. This was because of the 
rising fiscal deficit and the desire of the Govermnent to hold down the interest 
burden on the budget as far as possible. Similarly, the Cash Reserve Ratio 
(CRR) stood at 15 per cent of net demand and time liabilities of commercial 
banks in 1991. Adding these two, we find 53.5 per cent of commercial bank 
funds were tied up in reserves with the RBI and investment in Govermnent 
(and other approved) securities. Where as, under the directed credit 
programme, the priority sector loans were typically given at concessional 
interest rates and some, times without adequate safeguards against default. This 
created strong incentives to cheat. A significant proportion of loans was 
upsured by those for whom it was never intended '^ . 
According to the Narasimham Committee, the squeeze on profitability 
has also come down from the rise in expenditure. One of the important causes 
for the rise in expenditure was the expansion of branch banking under which 
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the unit cost of administering loans tends to be high in smaller branches, 
particularly in rural areas. The banking system was finding it difficult to cope 
with the load of servicing more branches as the operational methods and 
procedures have remained largely unchanged. 
The Narasimham Committee also noted that rapid growth in the number 
of staff and accelerated promotion have diluted the quality of manpower; 
of course, the costs of operations were also increased by the rapid expansion of 
staff There has been considerable ovennanning at various levels '''. Even the 
trade union practices in the banking sector, as in other public sector 
organisation, have also affected discipline and work culture. 
According to the Narasimham Committee, the most serious damage to 
the banking system and the one which contributed most to the decline of 
portfolio quality has been political and administrative interference in credit 
decision making ' . 
However, as the Narasimham Committee has observed that the Indian 
banking and financial system has made, over the past two decades, 
commendable progress in extending its geographical spread and functional 
reach '^ . One of the major objectives of the developmental credit and banking 
policy enunciated at the time of bank nationalisation was to seek to expand the 
reach of bank credit, both geographically and functionally - geographically in 
the sense of covering the under banked regions of the country and functionally 
to extend credit to agriculture, small industry and the self employed - sectors 
which were deemed important in tenns of their contribution to income growth, 
employment generation and poverty ameleoration but which were regarded as 
having been relatively neglected by the banking system. The geographical 
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spread of banking was the result of an activist policy of branch expansion. 
More importantly, most of the new branches opened were in the rural and semi 
urban areas and in the under banked regions of the country in keeping with the 
objective of bringing about a more balanced spatial distribution of banking and 
to extend the reach of institutional credit to the rural hinterland '^ . 
The Content of the Committee on the Financial System (1991) Reform 
Package 
The recommendations of the Narasimham Committee pertaining to 
Banking sector fall into two broad areas, viz, those concerned with improving 
the efficiency, productivity and profitability of bank operations on one hand 
and those related to enhancing their operational flexibility and autonomy in 
decision making on the other. 
With regard to improving the operating income and profitability, the 
committee recommended a reconsideration of the policy of directed 
investments and direct credit programmes and the interest rate structure 
pertaining to these and indeed over a wide range. On directed investments, the 
committee recommended that over a period of time, the SLR should be phased 
down to revert to its original level and purpose of a prudential safeguard, while 
in a related recommendation, it suggested that interest rates on Government 
securities should be increasingly market related. More specifically, the 
committee recommended that SLR should be reduced fi-om its present level 
38.5 per cent to 25 per cent of the net demand and time liabilities of banks over 
the next five years. On the CRR, the committee recommended that while it was 
an important monetary instrument, it had, in practice, become the vehicle for 
pre-empting resources for the public sector and that it should be restored to its 
original function of a monetary policy instrument. A significant suggestion 
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made in this connection was that if reserves were impounded beyond a point, 
banks had to be compensated by interest being paid to them at a level 
commensurate with the costs to them of deposits. 
With regard to directed credit, the committee's recommendation was that 
while credit to the priority sector was indeed important, and had to be 
continued to be encouraged, both the impact on bank's earnings and 
deterioration in quality of portfolio suggested that priority sector credit as 
hitherto defined be phased out. It was also recommended that the concept of 
priority sector itself be redefined to target only the truly needy, viz, the small 
fanner and the tiny sector in industry and that the credit to this redefined 
priority sector should be 10 per cent - a figure that was about the actual 
proportion of priority sector credit to these subsector. 
On interest rates, the committee suggested that the complex system of 
administered interest rates should be dismantled in a phased manner and that 
there should be greater reliance on the market mechanism so that interest rates 
could be allowed to perfonn, in a greater manner, their allocative function. 
As the erosion of profitability was not only due to factors operating on 
the income side, but also on the side of expenditure of banks, the committee's 
recommendations covered these aspects as well. In the committee's view there 
was no further need for an activist policy of branch expansion and the 
judgement relating to future expansion should primarily be left to banks 
themselves and accordingly branch licensing by the Reserve Bank should be 
abolished. 
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In reviewing the cost structure of tlie banks, the committee's 
recommendation went into the question of organisational aspects and methods 
of operation in banks. Mechanisation and computerisation were accordingly 
suggested as methods of improving work technology especially in the 
competitive environment that banking was entering into in the light of the other 
set of recommendations with regard to a more liberal approach to opening of 
foreign bank branches as well as granting pennission for new banks in the 
private sector. 
The recommendations of the committee with regard to transparency of 
accounts and confomiing to internationally accepted standards, which was an 
important recommendation in any case, is particularly relevant in the context of 
assessing the extent of non-perfonning assets. The committee also suggested a 
four-way classification of bank assets and prescribed a set of objective criteria 
to detemiine what constituted a non-perfonning asset. Objective income 
recognition nornis were also prescribed. Dealing with the problem of existing 
bad and doubtful debts, the committee took the view that there should be a one 
time operation in the fonn of establishment of an Assets Reconstruction Fund 
which could take over the assets from the banks at a designated price and 
proceed to recover the dues for which purpose the committee strongly endorsed 
the recommendation of an earlier committee for setting up special recovery 
tribunals with adequate authority for expeditious recovery of dues from default 
borrowers. At the same time, there would be a need for some injection of 
capital to bank to finance the loss provisions arising from the sale of assets at a 
discount and in respect of other loss assets. Several banks were known to be 
undercapitalised. Some of them were in a position to access the capital markets 
on their own strength but many others - indeed, majority of ther.i - would have 
found this rout difficult, precisely because of their weak financial position. The 
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committee recommended that while the fonner should be encouraged to go to 
the maiket, the latter would have to depend on the Government for some 
further capitaUsation. These set of recommendations have to be viewed along 
with those suggesting the prescription of minimum capital adequacy 
requirements for different classes of banks within a given time ft-ame. 
The committee placed grater emphasis on the adoption of prudential 
nomis where adequate safeguards could be built in to prevent misuse of funds 
to the detriment of depositor's interest. 
The objective of the autonomy of the functioning of banks was central to 
the committee's recommendation - autonomy to cover aspects o: internal 
management including personnel recruitment, institution of a system of rewards 
and punishment, and most importantly of taking credit and investment 
decisions as well as branch expansion on merits and related to the objectives of 
productivity, efficiency and profitability of banks 
There was a Second Coming of the Narasimham Committee Report on 
the Banking sector refonns in April 1998. It was expected to review the 
progress of banking sector refonns to date and chart a programme on financial 
sector refonns necessary to strengthen India's financial system and make it 
internationally competitive. Of all its suggestions, the most striking was the 
emphasis on multiplier effect in the event of the merger of strong banks of 
global stature. It also envisaged stronger banking system in the context of 
capital account convertibility. Moreover, it was mooted that weak public sector 
banks with NPA equal to 20% of the total assets could be allowed to do only 
narrow banking, i.e. it could operate only in short tenn risk free assets. In the 
event of failure of that experiment, it should be allowed to close down. There 
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was a suggestion for encouraging the cluster of small banks which may have 
correspondence relationship with major banks. 
The Narasimham Committee II strongly felt that it is the combination of 
operational flexibility and outside competition that would improve the 
functioning of the public sector banks. The persisting oligapolistic nature of the 
functioning of the public sector banks should be dismantled and a level playing 
ground should be installed. 
It is criticised by certain sections that there is not much of a difference 
between the recommendations of both the reports but it should be remembered 
that Report II was reiterated that there is no soft option and complete autonomy 
is the watchword for the health of the banking sector. It has also made 
threadbare analysis of the problems with illiquidity and insolvency and how to 
tackle them in the context specific manner with long tenn perspective. 
Steps Taken to Reform Financial Sector: Banking Sector 
There has been considerable progress in the reform of the financial 
sector in India from 1991-92 to 1997-98. The reforni measures carried out by 
the Government largely through the RBI have been mainly on the lines 
recommended by the Narasimham Cimmittee. 
The Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) on incremental net Demand and 
Time Liabilities (DTL) has been reduced from 38.5 per cent to 25 per cent and 
SLR on outstanding net domestic demand and time liabilities was also reduced 
gradually from 38.5 per cent to 27 per cent in March 1997. 
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The Cash Reserve Ratio (CRR) was reduced from 15 per cent to 8 per 
cent in 1998. The Incremental Cash Reserve Ratio (ICRR) of 10 per cent was 
also abolished. 
The lending rate structure has been rationalised with effect from 8 April 
1993, only 3 categories of lending rates have been stipulated. The interest rate 
slabs were reduced from 20 to 3 in April 1992 and to 2 in 1994-95. The 
Minimum Lending Rate (MIR) for credit limit of over Rs. 2 lakhs was reduced 
from 20 per cent in February 1992 to 17 per cent in March, 1993, to 15 per cent 
in September 1993 and from this to 14 per cent in March 1994. The IVILR has 
been abolished for credit limit above Rs. 2 lakhs since October 18, 1994and 
banks were free to fix their own Prime Lending Rates (PLR) subject to the 
approval of their Board of Directors. With a view to giving banks more 
freedom to detennine the interest rates, banks were allowed in October 1997 to 
prescribe Separate Prime Tenn Lending Rates (PTLRs) with the approval of 
their Board, for tenn loans of 3 years and above. 
The deposit interest rates were subject to a single ceiling rate, namely 12 
per cent for deposit ranging from 46 days up to 3 years or over. With effect 
from October 1, 1995, banks were given freedom to fix their own interest rates 
on domestic tenri deposits with a maturity of over two years. The minimum 
period of tenn deposits was reduced from 46 days to 30 days with the 
maximum interest rate on tenn deposits lowered to 11 per cent per annum. On 
October 21, 1996, this maximum rate was reduced ftirther to 10 per cent for the 
maturity period between 30 days to one year. The ceiling on interest rate on 
domestic tenn deposits for maturity of 30 days and up to one year was linked to 
the Bank Rate and accordingly was reduced from then existing 10 per cent per 
annum to the 'Bank Rate' minus two percentage point per annum (i.e. 9 per 
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cent) with effect from April 16, 1997. On June 26, 1997, the ceiling on interest 
rate was reduced to 8 per cent per annum following the reduction in the Bank 
rate. On April 29, 1998, RBI reduced the minimum period of maturity of tenn 
deposits from 30 days to 15 days. 
In order to improve the financial health of the banking system, the RBI 
has introduced a risk-asset ratio system for banks in India as a capital adequacy 
measure. Accordingly, all Indian banks with international presence were asked 
to achieve a capital to risk asset ratio of 8 per cent by March 31, 1994. Foreign 
banks operating in India were asked to achieve this nonn of 8 per cent by 
March 31, 1993. Other banks were asked to achieve 4 per cent ratio by March 
31, 1993 and 8 per cent ratio by March 31, 1996. By the end of March 1996, all 
public sector banks had attained risk-asset ratio of 8 per cent. The frill norni of 
8 per cent was also attained by foreign banks in Indian and by same private 
Indian banks. 
The Government of India contributed to recapitalization of the 
nationalized banks by making available Rs. 8,700 crore through a budgetary 
provision in 1993-94. Recapitalization of 19 nationalized banks was made on 
January 1, 1994 subjecting the banks under time bound 'perfomiance 
obligations'. The budgetary provision towards recapitalization was Rs. 5,600 
crore in 1994-95, Rs. 850 crore in 1995-96, Rs. 1,509 crore in 1996-97 and 
Rs. 2,700 crore in 1997-98. With effect from July 15, 1994, the banks were 
pemiitted to raise capital up to 49 per cent from the public. 
Apart from capital adequacy norms, income recognition nonns and 
standards of adequate provisioning for Non-Perfonning Assets (NPAs) have 
also been introduced. A non-perfonning assets has been defined as a credit 
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facility in respect of which interest has remained ' Past due' for a period of four 
quarters ending March 31, 1993, three quarters ending March 31, 1994 and two 
quarters ending March 31, 1995 and onwards. Banks were instructed not to 
charge and take to income account any interest on NPAs. Banks were required 
to classify their advances into four broad groups: 
(a) standard assets 
(b) sub - standard assets 
(c) doubtfiil assets and 
(d) loss assets from the earlier system of eight health codes. 
Banks were advised in March 1993 to make 100 per cent provision in 
respect of loss assets and not less than 30 per cent of the total provisioning 
needed in respect of sub-standard and doubtful advances and advances with 
outstanding balance of Rs. 25,000 for the year ending March 31, 1993. The 
provisioning requirement for NPAs with balance less than Rs. 25,000 was 7.5 
per cent of the aggregate amount outstanding, for the year ending March 31, 
1995 and 10 per cent for the year ending March 31, 1996. From 1996-97 
onwards, banks were required to classify small loans below Rs. 25,000 into the 
specified four assets categories and make appropriate provisioning for NPAs. 
Banks which were not able to do so, in view of the large number of accounts 
involved, were granted extension of time up to end March 1998. The concerned 
banker were required to make provisions to the extent of 15 per cent of the 
aggregate amount of outstanding in this categoiy of advances for the year 
ending March 31, 1997. 
Several important steps have also been taken to refonn the capital 
market and to regulate the functioning of the non-banking finance companies. 
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The measures detailed above taken togather constitute a substantial degree of 
refonn of the financial sector, especially banking sector. 
The pace of refonns in banking sector in India is definitely encouraging 
and giving positive signals of structural changes in financial sector, although 
these refonns have been undertaken after trade and industrial policy reforms. 
The refonns will be successful if the banking sector can reduce drastically, year 
after year, the percentage of loans, which are becoming non-perfonning. In 
order to enable banks to tackle the problem of NPA, there is need for legal 
refonn. The attitude of the officials who are at the helm of affairs to implement 
the refonns and regulatory measures goes a long way to make the banking 
refonns operational and functional. The East Asia experience supports the need 
for a competitive financial sector, limited and unsubsidized policy, as far as 
priority sector is concerned and gradual elimination of interest controls. Unless 
the structure of banking, systems, methods and controls operated by the banks 
are refonned meticulously, the efficiency of the financial refonns can not be 
realised. 
Performance of Banks Since 1991 
Over the past nine years, banks have undertaken vigorous efforts at 
strengthening their operations to cope with the challenges of a competitive 
market environment being sought to be created by the financial sector refonns. 
The positive trends that have emerged in the process are reflected in the 
financial results of the banks. The banking sector in general and public sector 
banks in particular are showing improvement as a result of the wide ranging 
refonn measures. This is evident from their relatively clean balance sheets, 
reduction in non-perfonning assets, improvement in operating profit and 
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considerable progress in attaining capital adequacy ratio and other prudential 
nornis. 
Table 3.8 indicates the profitability of scheduled commercial banks and 
Table 3.9 presents that of public sector banks in India from 1990-91 to 1998-
99. As evident from the table that all scheduled commercial banks (excluding 
RRBs) have recorded substantial improvement in both operating and net profit 
in 1998-99 compared to 1990-91. The operating profit of all scheduled 
commercial banks increased from Rs. 3,840 crore in 1990-91 to Rs. 13,992 
crore (264 4 per cent) in 1998-99. During the same period the net profit rose to 
Rs. 4,660 crore from Rs. 743 crore (500.3 per cent). In case of public sector 
banks, the operating profit increased from Rs. 3,161 crore to Rs. 10,577.50 
crore (234.6 per cent) and net profit from Rs. 476 crore to Rs. 3,258.09 crore 
(584.5 percent) from 1990-91 to 1998-99. However, during 1992-93 aid 1993-
94, all scheduled commercial banks, especially public sector banks, have 
recorded fall in operating profit and negative net profit. The net profit of all 
scheduled commercial banks after taking into account provisions and 
contigencies of Rs. 8,043 crore showed a large loss of Rs. 4,150 crore in 1992-
93, as against a profit of Rs. 1,205 crore in 1991-92. As regard public sector 
banks, despite the operating profit of Rs. 3,069 crore, they recorded a large loss 
of Rs. 3,368 crore due to making provisions and contigencies of Rs. 
6,437 crore during 1992-93. In the year 1993-94, the scheduled commercial 
banks eamed Rs. 5,105 crore registering a substantial increase of Rs. 1,111 
crore (27.8 per cent) as compared to 1992-93. But the net profit again became 
negative (Rs. -3,700 crore) on account of Rs. 8,805 crore provisions and 
contigencies. However, this negative profit was less than that of in 1992-93. 
Similarly, the public sector banks showed a total operating profit of 
Rs. 3,754.88 crore during 1993-94 as against the previous year registering an 
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increase of Rs. 685.88 crore (22.3 per cent). But net losses showed further 
deterioration amounting to Rs. 4,348.97 crore in 1993-94 on account of large 
amount of Rs. 8,103.85 crore for provisioning and contingencies. So the main 
reason for deterioration of net profit of all scheduled commercial banks, 
especially public sector banks was the increase in provisioning and 
contigencies. As a part of the implementation of prudential accounting 
standards, the banks were permitted to phase the provisioning against their 
advances over a period of two years with atlea>t 30 per cent provisions during 
1992-93. Considering that the banks had to provide for balance provision, in 
addition to fresh provisioning for 1993-94, effectively the burden of 
provisioning during 1993-94 was high. However, during 1994-95, the operating 
profit of all scheduled commercial banks as a whole and public sector banks in 
particular improved considerably. The net profit became positive as a result of 
increase in operating profit and decline in provisioning and contigencies. But in 
1995-96, the situation again became adverse and all the scheduled commercial 
banks accounted for only Rs. 393 crore net profit as compared with the net 
profit of Rs. 2,154 crore in 1994-95. Though the operating profit increased to 
Rs. 10,150 crore in 1995-96 from Rs. 7,694 crore in 1994-95, the provisioning 
and contigencies also increased from Rs. 5,540 crore to Rs. 9,210 crore 
resulting in lower net profit. Public sector banks suffered net losses of 
Rs. 367.37 crore in 1995-96 as against net profit of Rs. 1,115.79 crore in 1994-
95. Because in 1995-96, the total provision and contigencies was Rs. 7,903.75 
crore as against only Rs. 7,536.38 crore operating profit. The principal reasons 
behind the general decline in net profitability in 1995-96 were (i) the 
impositioii of stricter disclosure norms by the RBI (ii) the higher capital losses 
on bank's investments in govemment securities due to the rising interest rates 
and, (iii) the increased cost of borrowed funds. Under (i), the provisioning 
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requirement for non-perfon-ning assets (NPAS) with balances of less than 
Rs. 25,000 was enhanced from 7.5 per cent of total outstanding during the year 
ending March 1995 to 10 per cent during the year ending March 1996. Hence, 
banks had to set aside a higher proportion of funds out of its gross profits as 
provisions and contigencies, with a consequent decline in net profits. Under 
(ii), the yield to maturity on investments in government securities was set at 14 
per cent instead of the expected 13.5 per cent which forced banks to make 
higher provisions for capital losses on older securities earning lower interest 
rates. The increased cost of borrowed funds under (iii) has been mainly due to 
an increased dependence of banks on call money market funds and certificates 
of deposits for meeting (on a short-term basis) their liquidity requirements 
arising out of asset-liability mismatches amidst high demand for credi: from the 
year of 1996-97, all the scheduled commercial banks and public sector banks 
showed marked improvement in operating as well as net profit. 
Apart from the magnitude of profit, the level of non-perfonning assets 
(NPAs) provides an important measure of the perfomiance of banks as it 
reflects on the quality of the loan portfolio. A distinction is often made between 
gross NPA and net NPA. In view of the time lag in recovery process and the 
detailed procedures and safeguards involved in regard to write-off, even after 
making provisions for advances considered as irrecoverable banks continue to 
hold such advances in their books. These are tenned gross NPAs while 
provision adjusted NPAs are termed as net NPAs, which is obtained by 
deducting from gross NPAs item like interest due but not received, part 
payment received and kept in suspense account, etc., is internationally accepted 
as the more relevant indicator of financial health of banks. The most critical 
area in the improvement of profit is reduction in non-performing assets (NPAs). 
The NPAs of all public sector banks aggregated Rs. 39,253 crore in 1992-93 
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when new nonns were implemented for the first time and they constituted 23.2 
per cent of the total loan assets (Table 3.10). Due to further tightening of the 
norais, the level of gross NPAs, declined to 19.8 per cent in 1994-95. It 
gradually came down to 14.6 per cent in 1998-99. Gross NPAs as percentage of 
total assets slide down to 6.2 per cent in 1998-99 from 11.8 per cent in 1992-
93. The net NPAs as percentage of total net advances declined from 10.7 per 
cent in 1994-95 to 7.5 per cent in 1998-99. While the net NPAs as percentage 
of total assets declined to 2.9 per cent in 1998-99 from 4.0 per cent in 1994-95. 
Table 3.10 
Gross and Net NPAs of Public Sector Banks 
(Amount in Rs. Crore) 
Year 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
Gross 
NPAs 
39253 
41041 
38385 
41661 
43577 
50815 
58554 
%to 
Gross 
Adv. 
23.2 
24.8 
19.5 
18.0 
17.8 
14.4 
14.6 
% to 
Total 
Assets 
11.8 
10.8 
8.7 
8.2 
7.8 
6.4 
6.2 
Net 
NPAs 
" 
~ 
17567 
18297 
20285 
23761 
27774 
%to 
Net 
Adv. 
— 
~ 
10.7 
8.9 
9.2 
7.3 
7.5 
%to 
Total 
Assets 
— 
— 
4.0 
3.6 
3.6 
3.0 
2.9 
Source :- Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 1997-98 
and 1998-99. 
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Out of the 27 public sector banks only one had net NPAs of more than 
20 per cent of its net advances in 1997-98 as compared to 1993-94, when there 
were 18 such banks, (Table 3.11). Similarly, there was only one bank having 10 
per cent net NPAs of its total assets in 1993-94. But in 1997-98, there were 17 
such banks. 
Table 3.11 
Frequency Distribution of Net NPAs : Public Sector Banks 
(No. of Banks) 
Net NPAs/Net Advances 
1. Up to 10 per cent 
2. Above 10 and up to 20 
per cent 
3. Above 20 per cent 
End-March 
1994 
1 
8 
18 
1995 
2 
15 
10 
1996 
19 
6 
2 
1997 
17 
9 
1 
1998 
17 
9 
1 
Source :- Report on Trend and Progress of Banking in India, 1995-96 
and 1997-98. 
Our analysis reveals that banks in general have responded favourably to 
refonn measures. The net profits of all groups of coirunercial banks as 
percentage of their total assets have increased by March 1998, almost all banks 
have achieved the capital adequacy norm of 8 per cent. There has been 
substantial fall in the gross as well as net non-perfonning assets of the public 
sector banks. In short, refonns have assuredly paved the way for building a 
banking system capable of meeting the requirements of a more open and 
competitive economy. This achievement is laudable especially in the backdrop 
of the happenings in the South-East Asian economies. 
177 
References 
1. Agrawal, pradeep and Others (Ed), "Economic Restmcturing in East 
Asia and India", Macmillan India Ltd. Delhi, 1996-97, P. 9. 
2. Fifty Years of Indian Parliamentary Democracy, Lok Sabha Secretariat, 
New Delhi, August 1997, P. 40. 
3. Agrawal, Pradeep and Others (Ed.), Op. Cit., P. 185. 
4. Mani, Sunil, "Economic Liberalisation and The Industria Sector", 
Economic and Political Weekly, May 27, 1995, P. M-38. 
5. Das, Debendra K., (Ed.), " Structural Adjustment in The Indian 
Economy", Deep & Deep Publication, New Delhi, 1993, Vol-2, P.l 19. 
6. Rangarajan C, "Indian Economy : Essays on money and finance," UBS 
Publishers, New Delhi, 1998, P. 299. 
7. Singh, shrawan Kumar, "Disinvestment of Public Sector Equity : An 
Analysis", Yojana, September 30, 1993, P. 7. 
8. Datt, Ruddar and sundharam, K.P.M., " Indian Economy", S. Chand & 
Company Ltd, New Delhi, 1999, P. 191. 
9. Misra, S.K. and Puri, V.K., "Indian Economy: Its Development 
Experience", Himalaya Publishing House, Delhi, 1998, P. 533. 
178 
10. Datt, Ruddar (Ed.), "Privatization : Bane or Panacea", Pragati 
Publications, Delhi 1993, P. 3. 
11. Parikh, Kirit S., "India Development Report - 1997", Indra Gandhi 
Institute of Development Research, Oxford University Press, Mumbai, 
1997, PR 193-214. 
12. Ammannaya, K.K., "Banking Refomis and New Challenges for Banks", 
Southern Economist, July 15, 1997, P. 3. 
13. Agrawal, Pradeep and Others (Ed.)", Op. Cit., P. 171. 
14. Chelliah, Raja J., "Towards Sustainable Growth: Essays in Fiscal and 
Financial Sector Refonn in India", Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1996, 
p.77. 
15. Datt. Ruddar and Sundhram, K.P.M. Op. Cit., P. 737. 
16. Babu, V. Vithal (Ed.), "India's Economic Refomis and Security 
Perceptions", Economy and Trade, New Delhi, 1993, P.256. 
17. Narasimham, M, "Banking Sector Reform : The CFS Report and After", 
Prajnan, 25(3-4), 1996-97, PP.221-222. 
18. Ibid, PP.225-227. 
179 

INTEGRATION WITH THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
When international flows of goods, services, capital, labour and 
technology have expanded quickly, the pace of economic advancement has 
been rapid. Openness to trade, investment and ideas has been critical in 
encouraging domestic producers to cut costs by introducing new technology 
and to develop new and better products. A high level of protection for domestic 
industry conversely has held development back by decades in many places. 
The international flow of technology has taken many fonns: foreign 
investment; foreign education; technical assistance; the licensing of patented 
process; the transmission of knowledge through labour flows and exposure to 
foreign goods market; and technology embodied in imports of capital, 
equipment, and intennediate inputs. Policies to promote these flows include 
greater openness to investment and to trade in goods and services. Nontariff 
barriers, which are especially distorting need to be phased out, and tariffs 
reduced, often substantially'. 
People, fimis and countries use technicd knowledge to improve their 
efficiency in the production of goods and services. Sometimes, they create that 
knowledge themselves; at other times they adopt knowledge created by others. 
The liberalization of trade and regulatory regimes in many countries and 
the falling costs of transportation and communications are making ths world 
economy more inter-connected-more global. Both trade in goods and services 
and foreign direct investment (FDI) have increased. 
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Trade can bring greater awareness of new and better ways of producing 
goods and services, export contribute to this awareness through the infonnation 
obtained from buyers and suppliers, imports through access to the knowledge 
embodied in goods and services produced elsewhere. And as trade becomes 
ever more driven by knowledge, the opportunities for acquiring technical 
knowledge v/ill expand. 
Exports expose fimis to global benchmarks of quality and design. They 
allow fimis to realize economies of scale by expanding production beyond 
what is possible in the domestic market. An export orientation also induces 
efficiency through pressures to compete in the global market place. And to 
compete with best-practice finns to other countries, exporters tend to invest 
more in knowledge than do finns that serve only the home market. 
Large multinational firms are global leaders in innovations and the 
worldwide spread of their productive activities is an important means of 
disseminating their knowledge to developing countries. The knowledge in 
multinationals spills over through learning by their workers and domestic 
suppliers and through technology sales (royalties, license and patent rights). 
The benefits to a developing country from FDI depend largely on its 
trade and investment policies. Countries with more open trade regimes are 
more likely to attract competitive, outward-oriented foreign investment, which 
brings more efficient technology and management. If developing countries are 
to get more global knowledge, they need to attract more FDI .^ 
The increasing interaction of domestic economies with the world 
economy is generally tenned as 'Globalization'. Globalization is reflected in 
the rising share of international trade in world output. The nineteen ninties are 
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marked by an extra ordinary trend towards globalization in the economic 
sphere. This movement owes much to the initiatives of the developed countries, 
particularly the United States of America, and international institutions 
functioning in the spheres of commerce and finance, namely the GATT and its 
successor, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank. 
Undoubtedly, there is not little idealism in the globalization compaign, if 
one may use that word, for promoting economic prosperity everywhere and 
especially in the developing countries. It is certainly great idealism to think of 
treating the entire world as a single unit for the free flow of goods, services, 
enterprise, finance and people, across national frontiers. What is more logical 
than desiring is that the various countries benefit mutually fi-om the giant 
strides technology is making in the developed countries and the vast market 
potential which the highly populated developing countries offer. The vast 
reserve of man power available in the developing countries may be largely 
'unskilled' now but with education and training can provide a massive 
productive force not only for their own benefit but that of the developed 
countries, many of which have experienced, from time to time, labour shortage. 
Experience, over the decades, has also confimied, to a substantial extent, 
the theoretical benefits of globalization-increase in the quantity, and even more 
important, the variety and quality of goods and services produced, decrease in 
output costs and prices and gradual convergence of wages, interest rates, profits 
and capital values. From this process, manufacturers, consumers and owners of 
capital in all fonns - land, buildings and financial assets-benefit progrsssively. 
Globalization is a long-term, process, if the economic benefits have to be 
reaped ftilly. In the short and medium tenn, globalization can be destabilizing 
especially in developing countries, the economies of most of which, have been 
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functioning, for many decades now, under a system of Government regulation 
of varying degree, with not a little of public enterprise, operating even more 
inefficiently than private enterprise. 
For the above reason, the majority of the developing countries have 
moved cautiously, in the matter of opening up of their economies for foreign 
capital and enterprise . 
One important element of liberalization in India is opening of the 
economy or globalization of the Indian production structure. This globalization 
has several features. First, it implies removal of protective methods for 
enabling foreign producers to freely compete in Indian market. Second, it 
allows foreign investment without much restriction along with the inflow of 
foreign exchange through foreign loans and NRI remittances. Third, it allows 
substantial reduction in customs duties both for increasing exports and imports. 
The Principal argument advances for opening up of the economy is that 
the Indian economy sheltered from market forces and denied competition has 
become inefficient. This has resulted not only in high cost and poor quality of 
products and services, which are not only unfair to the consumers, but have 
also restricted growth as well. Therefore, there is very justification to release 
the economy from over regulation both domestically as well as globally '*. 
Three Principal advantages are expected to be secured from this; first, 
global competition will help the local producers to improve their efficiency and 
reduce production costs. Now that they have sheltered markets, they do not 
give much importance to improve the quality or reduce the cost of their 
product. Second, if costs of India's products are reduced and quality improved, 
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Indian exports can be substantially increased along with free access to imports. 
Third, foreign investment will assist in the inflow of new technology and latest 
knowledge, which will help in modernizing the Indian economy ^ . 
With these expectations, a number of steps have been taken to open up 
the economy. India's commercial policy has been liberalized to a great extent. 
Import duties have been reduced and customs regulations softened. The 
Foreign Exchange Regulation Act is modified to reduce a number of controls 
on curtent exchange transactions. The rupee has been made fully convertible on 
current account. There is already a move to make the rupee fully convertible on 
capital account. Several policy measures have been initiated to attract NRI 
investments and investments by multinational corporations. Multinational can 
make direct investment in industries, hold equity in India, joint enterprises, 
import machinery and row materials, repatriate profit and so on. 
Trade Policy Reform 
A striking feature of India's trade policy in the last two decades has been 
the gradual but continuous shift away from the 'Inward-Looking' import-
substituting trade strategies adopted in the past towards policies that are more 
'Outward-Looking' and market oriented. 
As is well-known, following her independence, India opted for an 
Import-Substituting Industrialization (ISI) strategy. Guided by the export 
pessimism expressed in the writings of Nurkse, Prebisch and Singer, Indian 
policy makers did little to encourage exports .^ Export pessimism dominated 
the mood of the early planners as it was rightly assumed than that until India's 
manufactures began to be diversified, there was little possibility of exporting 
manufactures, particularly as primary products and traditional manufactured 
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goods had poor demand prospects in the world market . Hence, the attention 
was focused instead on setting up a policy regime that discouraged imports and 
encouraged domestic production for the home market. 
Imports were controlled through an extensive import licensing system 
and extremely high levels of tariffs. Consumer goods imports were more or less 
banned while in the case of capital and intemiediate goods, quantitative 
restrictions were used to ensure that goods available domestically were not 
imported. Wlien, in case of shortages, these goods were imported, tariffs were 
used to ensure that their landed prices were higher than domestic producer's 
prices. Capital goods and intemiediates not indigenously produced were placed 
on the 'Open General License' (OGL) list, which itemized commodities not 
requiring on import license. However, even here, several restrictions were 
enforced. Thus, OGL imports of capital and intennediate goods were subject to 
the 'Actual User' criterion, i.e., the importing finn had to be an 'actual user' 
and could not sell the imported item, for five years without the approval of the 
licensing authorities. OGL imports of capital goods were subject to the 
additional caveat that the resulting increase in productive capacity be 
compatible with the capacity approved by the domestic industrial licensing 
authorities. Furthemiore, the imports of second hand machinery and equipment, 
even if was on the OGL list, were restricted. 
The protection provided to domestic industry, the iniporl licensing 
system was further intensified by extremely high levels of tariffs across the 
board. 
The protectionist regime, apart from encouraging wasteful rent-seeking 
activities, by virtually eliminating all external competition, encouraged 
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indiscriminate and inefficient import-substitution. At the same time, the 
domestic industrial licensing system put severe limits on internal competition. 
The net result was the growth of high-cost, capital-intensive domestic industry 
that was by and large incapable of withstanding international competition. 
Exports had no major role to play in India's development strategy in the 
early years and were generally treated as a marginal activity, to be actively 
promoted only in periods of slack domestic demand, or where there were 
balance of payments pressures. The export of a large number of commodities 
was subject to quantitative restrictions via an elaborate export licensing system. 
Thus, there were goods whose export was not allowed, goods whose export was 
considered 'on merits', i.e., on a case by case basis, exports allowed under 
'limited ceilings', i.e., export quotas which were announced and allocated each 
year; goods whose export was canalized i.e., could only be undertaken by 
public sector trading agencies; and goods on an OGL list that could be exported 
subject to prescribed conditions. The aim of this licensing system was 
essentially threefold: first, to ensure that an 'essential' commodity was not 
exported when domestic supply was less than domestic demand (in effect, to 
ensure domestic price stability); second, to guard against adverse price 
movements in those international markets in which India was a large player; 
and third, to ban the export of certain products so as to promote exports of 
'higher value added' downstream products which use them as inputs. Given the 
restrictive import regime, however, these bans, rather than encouraging exports, 
served more to promote production for the domestic market. 
Hand in hand with these quantitative restrictions went a system of export 
incentives, the earliest being the Duty Drawback Scheme introduced in 1954, 
which reimbursed exporters for tariffs paid on import of raw materials and 
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intermediates used in export production. Further incentives were introduced 
between 1959 and 1966, a period of intense balance of payments pressures. 
These included the Cash Compensatory Support (CCS) Scheme and 
Replenishment (REP) license. The CCS was designed to compensate exporters 
for unrebated indirect taxes paid on inputs that entered export production. It 
involved the largest single direct budgetary outlay in support of exports and 
was phased out in 1991-92. REP licenses were essentially tradable import 
entitlements awarded to exporters on a product-specific basis. They allowed the 
exporters to import, either for own use or for resale, raw materials and 
components not on the OGL list. REP licenses attracted considerably high 
Premia in the domestic market throughout the 1960s and 1970s; they 
constituted a substantial export incentive. But, even when taken togeth'^ r, these 
export incentives were evidently too small to counter the bias against exports 
generated by a restrictive import regime. 
Quite clearly, currency depreciation could have been used to increase the 
profitability of exports vis-a-vis domestic sales. However, in India, it was only 
in the 1980s that the exchange rate was used deliberately and consistently as an 
instrument to promote exports. In fact, through most of her post-independence 
years, India has had a grossly overvalued currency and an extremely restrictive 
exchange rate regime in place. Until very recently, the Indian rupee was not 
convertible, either on the capital account or on the current and trade accounts. 
Foreign (private) capital inflows were restricted, and domestic residents 
(including exporters) were not allowed to either hold or deal in foreign 
currencies. The Government, through the RBI, was the sole foreign exchange 
dealer in the country and it generally set the nominal exchange rate for below 
market-clearing levels. The resulting excess demand for foreign exchange was 
dealt with via rationing. Scarce foreign exchange was first allocated to priority 
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items that only the Government could import - food, fertilizers, petroleum and 
defence equipment. Only after these were funded, was foreign exchange 
released, through the import licensing system for other imports. 
Thus, through most of the 1960s and 1970s India's trade and exchange 
rate policies were severely biased against exports. And it paid dearly for this 
bias, both in temis of lost employment opportunities, as India's comparative 
advantage lay in labour intensive exports, and in ternis of lost growth 
opportunities, as she failed to exploit the rapidly expending world markets 
during this period while the East Asian countries switched to Outward-Oriented 
strategies, and rode the crest of this expansion, Indian economic policies 
remained resolutely 'Inward-Looking' and her share in world exports declined 
steadily from 1.03 per cent in 1960 to 0.43 per cent in 1980 .^ 
Beginning with the export-import policy of 1977-78, there was slow but 
sustained relaxation of import controls. Several capital goods that could not be 
imported without an import license were steadily shifted to the OGL category. 
The number of capital goods on the OGL list increased from 79 in 1976 to 
1170 in April 1988. These changes were made with the intention of allowing 
domestic industries to modernize. Moreover, during the 1980s the import 
licensing of capital goods in the restricted list was administered with less 
stringency. As a consequence, the import penetration ratio in the capital goods 
sector increased from 11 per cent in 1976-77 to 18 per cent in 1985-86. In the 
case of intemiediate goods too, there was a steady shift of items from the 
restricted and limited permissible categories to the OGL category. However, in 
practice, a capital or an intermediate good was placed in the OGL list only if it 
was not being domestically produced. Thus, import liberalization during this 
period may not have led to immediate direct competition to established 
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producers of immediate and capital goods in India (though in several instances, 
the goods that were allowed to be imported were imperfect substitutes of 
domestically produced goods). Furthemiore, the average effective tariff rate for 
capital goods increased from 37 per cent in 1973-74 to 63 per cent in 1988-89. 
Thus, the liberalization of the 1980s through expanding the OGL list merely 
freed the importer from the bureaucratic hassle of obtaining an import license 
in advance. That itself was a big gain. 
The pace of trade reforms - in particular, the shift from quantitative 
import controls to a protective system based on tariff - initiated in the mid-
1970s was considerably quickened by the new. Government (Led by Rajiv 
Gandhi) that came into power in November 1985. Restrictions on the import of 
capital goods were fiirther eased to encourage technological modernization. 
Also, beginning in the mid-1980s, there was renewed emphasis b}' the new 
administration on export promotion. The number and value of mcentives 
offered to exporters were increased and there administration streamlined. The 
allotment of REP licenses - tradable import entitlements awarded to exporters 
on product specific basis - became increasingly generous. Finally, the duty 
exemption scheme for imported inputs was extended to cover all imported 
inputs for both direct and indirect exporters. 
The 1990s have witnessed momentous change in Indian trade Policy. 
India launched a macro-economic stabilization programme in 1991 to 
overcome the immediate balance of payments crises. This stabilization 
programme was supplemented by a major structural refonns exercise 
encompassing the industrial, trade, fiscal, financial and external sectors of the 
economy. '" 
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Trade policy occupies a central place in our economic restructuring. 
Trade Policy is not merely a matter of exports and imports, but is essential for 
realizing our true potential in the global market place. After four decades of 
planned development which led to the creation of a sound infrastructural and 
industrial base our trade and industry are now ready to go global. They have the 
capacity and the confidence to take up the challenge of the international market 
place. A policy framework oriented towards imparting an export culture and 
making our economy open, efficient and competitive is thus being created. 
The accent of the trade refonns initiated since July 1991 is to move 
gradually towards the market mechanism by removal of administrative controls 
so that exporters can respond with speed and flexibility to changing 
international conditions. The basic intention has been to liberalise gradually the 
tightly controlled and complex trade regime with high nominal tariffs, 
quantitative restrictions on imports and exports, public sector canalization, 
phased manufacturing programme (PMP) for attaining import substitution and 
Government purchase preference for domestic producers. 
On 4''^  July 1991, the then Commerce Minister, Mr. P. Chidambaram, 
announced a major overhaul of trade policy '^  entailing, (i) Suspension of Cash 
Compensatory Support (CCS); (ii) an enlarged and unifomi REP rate of 30 per 
cent of FOB value; (iii) abolition of all supplementary licenses except in the 
case of small scale sector and producers of life-saving drugs/ equipment; (iv) 
abolition of unlisted OGL and (v) removal of all import licensing for capital 
goods and raw-materials, except for a small negative list in 3 years. 
The major trade refonns under taken are as follows: 
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REP will become the principal instrument for export related imports. To 
describe REP as a license is a misnomer. Hence, it will now be called 
EXIM scrips and can be freely traded. 
All exports will now have a unifonn REP rate 30 per cent of the FOB 
value. This is a substantial increase from the present RE? rates, which 
vary between 5 per cent to 20 per cent of FOB value. Special rates for 
gems & jewellery, certain metal based handicrafts and books and 
magazine will, however, continue 
The new REP scheme gives maximum incentive to exporters whose 
import intensity is low. For example, agricultural exports, which earlier 
had very low replenishment rates of 5 per cent or 10 per cent, will now 
gain considerably. 
All supplementary licenses shall stand abolished except in the case of the 
small-scale sector and for producers of life saving drugs/equipment. 
These two categories will be entitled to import both under OGL or 
through supplementary licenses. 
All additional licenses granted to export houses shall stand abolished. 
However, export house will enjoy a REP rate of 30 per cent of FOB 
value and will be granted an additional REP of 5 per cent of FOB value. 
All items now listed in the limited pennissible Hst (Appendix 3A and 
3B) OGL items imported by PMP units (Appendix 6), all items now 
listed in Appendix 4 and Appendix 9, will hereafter be imported through 
the REP route 
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7. The EXIM policy contains a category known as unlisted OGL. This 
category stand abolished and all items falling under this category may be 
imported only through the REP scheme. 
8. Advance licensing has been an alternative to the REP route for obtaining 
imports for exports. It is expected that many exporters will find the REP 
route more attractive now. However, for exporters who wish to go 
through advance licensing, this route will remain open. The REP rate for 
advance license exports is being increasea from 10 per cent of NFE (Net 
Foreign Exchange Earnings) to 20 per cent of NFE. 
9. In three years time, our objective will be to remove all import licensing 
for capital goods and raw materials, except for a small negative list. 
10. The goal of the Government is to decanalized all items except those that 
are essential. For this purpose, the entire canalization policy will be 
reviewed. 
11. In the light of the substantial liberalisation of the trade regime, and also 
the recent changes in exchange rates (after devaluation), CCS has 
become redundant. It no longer serves any purpose. Hence CCS has been 
suspended with effect from 3.7.91 
12. In order to make this system more transparent and free, it is proposed 
that financial institutions may also be allowed to try trade in EXIM 
scrips. In due course, the Government intends to replace the EXIM 
scrips with Foreign Exchange Certificates (FECs) which will be more 
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easily tradable. FECs will also be more effective in the area of export of 
services. 
13. In 3 to 5 years, the Commerce Minister hoped that the rupee will become 
fiilly convertible on the trade account. 
So, new trade policy has ushered in sweeping changes in the existing 
trade scenario of the country. It embodies elements that are working to alter the 
very functioning of the economy for good. 
The far-reaching changes incorporated in the trade policy aim at 
strengthening the export-profile of the country. It makes a radical departure 
from the past system of controlled-trade by giving a strong market-or entation 
to the trading in imports and exports. Even the task of equating the out go of 
foreign exchange for imports and incoming of foreign exchange on account of 
exports has been left to be accomplished by a market-based self balancing 
mechanism. 
The policy is all set for making exports a kingpin in the new strategy of 
managing balance of payments and through it influencing the growth of the 
economy. This is in total contrast to the strategy of import-substitution, which 
has so far dominated the science. The need for increasing exports has never 
been in doubt. However, it has received the highest priority in the new trade 
policy. 
As far imports, the new trade policy aims at limiting them to the 
availability of foreign exchange earned largely through exports. For example, 
all imports have to be financed through the purchase of foreign exchange at the 
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market rate. The imports have thus been linked with and hmited to the 
availability of foreign exchange at the market rate . 
In the pre-refomi period, India's trade policy regime was cmplex and 
cumbersome. There were different categories of imports, different types of 
import licenses, alternate ways of importing, etc. The importers were broadly 
grouped into three categories (I) Actual Users for industrial products and non-
industrial products; (ii) Exporters, and (iii) others. Different types of licenses, 
that used to be issued in pre-refonn period, were categorized as (I) Open 
General License (OGL), (ii) Automatic license, (iii) Supplementary Import 
License and (iv) imports through Government-owned Canalized agencies. 
In the post-refonn period, the coverage of Open General License has 
been enhanced and the restricted list too has been cut drastically. In fact the 
new policy now publishes the negative list of items which dose not fall under 
Open General License. Thus, all the goods and commodities, which are not 
published in this negative list, can be imported. The negetive list of imports 
consists of (I) prohibited items, (ii) restricted items and (iii) canalized items. 
The Prohibited items are tallow, fat, and/or oils of any animal origin, wild 
animals and ivory ^^ . Almost all consumer goods (except specially permitted) 
are restricted and their importation is allowed against a license. 
A number of controls on imports have been waived for exporters during 
the pre-refonn period. The licenses were issued to certain registered exporters 
to facilitate imports of raw materials by export oriented-companies. These 
exporters were earlier entitled to special import license based on the actual 
perfonnance of their exports which was known as Replenishment license 
(REP), subjected to certain nonns, like specific item of import or percentage of 
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total exports, etc. In this new policy regime, the REP has been abolished and a 
new category called 'Special Import license' (SIL), has been introduced for 
exporters which has no restriction of 'actual user' and can be traded in open 
market. This license can be used for imports of commodities (Like consumer 
goods) listed under 'restricted items'. Once an exporter acquires the SIL, he can 
get a premium of 8-10 per cent in the open market. The number of items in the 
restricted and canalized Hsts has been continuously reduced over the years so 
that more and more goods can now be freely imported. Under its commitment 
to the World Trade Organization (WTO), India, in November 1997, agreed to 
phase out all curbs on 2, 714 tariff lines over a six year phase out period 
starting April 1, 1997. A number of items have consequently been shifted from 
the restricted list to the OGL and special import license. After the latest set of 
modification and amendments to the 1997-2002 EXIM policy announced on 
March 31. 1999, only 667 items now remain on the restricted list. 
In the new regime, the number of commodities under state monopoly 
trade enterprise has been cut substantially. Most of the items which were earlier 
imported through these canalized houses, can now be imported directly. At 
present certain specified types of petroleum products, fertilizers, oils, seeds and 
cereals have been canalized through the state trading agencies '"*. 
The 992-97 policy conferred higher benefit to 100 per cent export 
oriented units (EQUs) and units in Export Processing Zones (EPZs) over those 
exporting from the Domestic Tariff Area (DTA). The EQU and the EPZ 
schemes have now been extended to newer activities and services. By a 
separate notification, such units dealing with broad agro-based products can 
sell 50 per cent (twice the nornial) output in the DTA. This can prove to be a 
powerful initiative for boosting exports. 
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The 1991 policy allowed export houses and trading houses to import a 
wide range of items. The Government also permitted the setting up of trading 
house with 51 per cent foreign equity for the purpose of promoting exports. 
Under the 1992-97, trade policy export houses and trading houses were 
provided the benefit of self-certification under the advance license system, 
which pennits duty fi'ee imports for exports. 
The 1994-95 policy introduced a new category of trading houses to be 
called Super Star Trading Houses. To attain the status of a Super Star Trading 
House, an exporter must have registered an average FOB value of exports of 
Rs. 925 crore during the preceding three years or Rs. 1,387.50 crore during the 
preceding year. On the basis of NFE criterion, an exporter must have registered 
an average net foreign exchange (NFE) value of exports of Rs. 740 crore 
during the preceding three years or Rs. 1,100 crore during the preceding year. 
These houses will be entitled to membership of apex consultative bodies 
concerned with trade policy and promotion, representation in important 
business delegation, special permission for overseas trading and special import 
licenses at enhanced rate. 
The Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) scheme has been 
revamped by having only one window with a concessional customs duty rate of 
15 per cent with export obligation (earlier there were two windows -15 per cent 
and 25 per cent). The 1994-95 policy simplified the EPCG schemes and third 
party exports were permitted for purposes of fulfillment of export obligations. 
The 1995-96 policy placed the service sector at par with the supply of goods 
under the Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) scheme. This ensures rich 
dividends for several companies in wide ranging sectors like financial services, 
banking, hotels and airlines, advertising, software and legal firms. In March 
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1996, the EPCG scheme was enhanced by inclusion of 'mining' in the 
definition of manufacture face for the purpose of export-imports policy. 
Since trade in services is becoming increasingly important for our 
economy a new scheme called the "Export Scheme for the Services Sector" has 
been introduced. Under the scheme, persons who render professional services 
have been allowed to import capital equipment at a concessional rate of duty of 
15 per cent. The export obligation to be achieved by them will be in the forni of 
the foreign exchange earned by them, regardless of whether the services are 
rendered in India or abroad. An amendment to the 1997-2002 EXIM Policy in 
the new policy measures announced on March 31, 1999 has pegged the 
threshold for foreign exchange limit for conferring Export House status to 
service providers at one-third the level prescribed for merchandise exports. 
The duty exemption scheme has been strengthened under which imports 
are provided at two concessional rates of 15 per cent and 25 per cent subject to 
appropriate export obligations. The exporters have been given a choice to opt 
for advance import licenses under the duty exemption scheme either under 
quantity based or (for the first time introduced) value based nomis. This will 
give greater flexibility to the exporter to import and export goods within the 
overall value limits and without any quantitative restrictions except in the case 
of sensitive goods. 
The 1992-97 policy gave a number of benefits in the case of deemed 
exports. The benefits include duty exemption schemes. Duty Draw Back 
schemes, exemption from temiinal excise duty and special import licenses for 
such value or bearing such proportion to the value of the deemed exports. The 
1995-96 policy extended the deemed exporter status to suppliers in key 
197 
infrastructural sectors (such as projects in the power, oil and gas sectors). 
Deemed exporter status has also been granted to local manufacturers supplying 
to duty free license holders. 
Acting on the recommendations of the Chelliah Committee, the Finance 
Minsiter announced substantial cuts in import duties in the 1993-94, 1994-95 
and 1995-96 Budgets. The 1993-94 budget reduced the maximum rate of duty 
on all goods from 110 per cent to 85 per cent except for a few items including 
passenger luggage and alcoholic beverages. The 1994-95 budget further 
brought down the maximum rate of duty from 85 per cent to 65 per cent. This 
was brought down to 50 per cent in the 1995-96 budget and fiirther to 40 per 
cent in the 1997-98 budget.' ^  
The new policy like other decisions of the Government in respect of 
foreign exchange provide an equilibrating system whereby trade in 
merchandised and invisible (i.e. services) got equated. To an extent this help in 
the avoidance of balance of payments difficulties. 
The self-balancing mechanism, where by imports and exports get 
balanced automatically, has been provided in three stages. The underlying 
principle is that imports should be allowed to the extent foreign exchange, 
earned through exports, is available at the market rate of exchange. Before the 
liberalized trade policy was announced with interim budget of July 1991, 
Indian exporters were entitled to make imports of raw materials and accessories 
against their export-earnings, through the system of replenishment (REP) 
licenses. The REP system was tagged to a policy, which heavily subsidies 
exporters. This system was found to be cumbersome and in the July 1991 trade 
policy, it was replaced by a new instrument called 'EXIM Scrips' under the 
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new system, an exporter was entitled to receive EXIM scrip to the extent of 30 
per cent (in some selected cases even 40 per cent) of the value of his exports. 
Under the new policy, the exporter could use this to make imports. He was also 
allowed to sell his EXIM scrips freely in the market to others who requires 
them. In other words, the exporters were entitled to sell 30 per cent (and in 
some cases even 40 per cent) the foreign exchange earned by them in the free 
market. The objective here was to provide exporters with an incentive to 
increase their exports and earn more. EXIM scrips, while at the same time, by 
making it freely tradable, the importers were made to pay a somewhat higher 
price for the some EXIM scrips thereby bringing about import compression ^^ . 
The importers were buying this foreign exchange at the market rate to finance 
those imports which were pennitted (i.e., delicensed imports) by the 
Government. The 70 per cent of the foreign exchange acquired by the 
Government at the official exchange rate was made use of for meeting the 
Government's needs as also those of licensed imports. This way the imports got 
linked to and were limited by the foreign exchange made available in the 
market. The EXIM scrips policy also proved to be cumbersome and could not 
yield positive results. Thus, it was abolished in early 1992. 
On March I, 1992 the Liberalized Exchange Rate Management System 
(LERMS) was introduced by replacing "EXIM scrips", with the aim of 
providing a powerfiil boost to exports and invisible receipts. Under the 
LERMS, the Reserve Bank retains the regime of partial convertibility on the 
60-40 fonnula for exports and for special category of imports like crude oil, 
diesel, kerosene, fertilizers and life saving drugs and equipment, in this system, 
40 per cent of the foreign exchange, which came through remittances and 
export earnings, became convertible into rupees at the official exchange rate 
(determined by the RBI), while the remaining 60 per cent became convertible 
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at a market determined-rate. The foreign exchange surrendered at official 
exchange rate became available for meeting the foreign exchange requirements 
for procuring essential imports such as petroleum products, fertilizers, defence 
equipments and life saving drugs. All other imports of capital goods, raw 
materials, intermediates and components (most of which were fi-eed from 
import licensing requirements) became freely importable against foreign 
exchange which could be purchased in market at market-detennined rates. 
This system of partial convertibility based on the dual exchange rate 
system, was the first move towards the full convertibility of rupee. The 
exporters became unhappy because they had surrender 40 per cent of their 
earnings at the official rate and getting the benefit of higher market rats on only 
60 per cent. The exporters also complained that these amounted to a tax on 
exporters of goods and services. 
Therefore, rupee was made fially convertible on trade account in 1993-
94. All exporters and foreign exchange earners (such as Indian workers abroad) 
were allowed to convert their entire foreign exchange at the market rate. 
Further, rupee was made ftilly convertible on current account on August 19, 
1994. 
However, this system of unified exchange rate mechanism is not to be 
applicable to capital account transactions as Government borrowings, lending 
and resource mobilization, and strict controls over the capital account, 
especially capital outflows, remain. This substantially mutes the influence of 
movements in the capital account on the exchange rate. Further, even on the 
current account, the 'market-detennined' exchange rate is not completely free 
of intervention by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). But the nature of RBI 
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intervention has undergone a qualitative difference. Unlike in the past when the 
RBI used to 'announce' the official exchange rate, it now influences to a great 
extent the 'market-determined' exchange rate through direct market operations 
as seller or buyer of foreign exchange and also through other policy instruments 
such as a interest rate. Indeed, it may be argued that in the recent past the RBI 
has been protecting the rupee through a combination of market operations and 
interest rate changes.'^ 
Thus, the trade policy refomis initiated in 1991 have drastically changed 
the foreign trade scenario and have resulted in the shift from Inward-Oriented 
to Outward-Oriented policy. With the sweeping liberalization process that is 
currently underway in the foreign trade sector, the level of protection to Indian 
Industry has declined significantly as the Government has resorted to a massive 
cutting down of import tariffs and allowing more liberal imports of a number of 
goods whose imports were earlier either totally banned or severally restricted 
Export-Import (EXIM) Policy, 1997-2002 
The export-import policy 1997-2002 was announced on March 31, 1997 
and came into effect from April 1,1997. The important schemes/measures 
contained in the policy were as under: 
1. The restricted list of imports was substantially pruned. Import of 542 
items was liberalized which included about 150 items that could now be 
imported against Special Import License (SIL). About 60 items were 
moved from SIL to the Open General License (OGL) list. Restrictions 
were placed on five items on the grounds of environmental safety, 
strategic importance, public health and security. 
201 
2. The Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) schemes was streamHned. 
The tariff rates for the import of capital goods were reduced from 15 per 
cent to 10 per cent. Zero-duty imports under EPCG schemes were 
allowed in those cases where the CIF value of imports was Rs. 20 crore 
or more subject to export obligations. This threshold limit was brought 
down to Rs. 5 crore for Zero-duty import of capital goods for exports in 
agriculture, acquaculture, animal husbandry, floriculture, horticulture, 
pisciculture, viticulture, poultry and sericulture. This measure is 
expected to boost agro-exports. The EXIM policy also extended the Zero-
duty EPCG concession to the service industry, including hospitals, air 
cargo, hotel and other tourist related services. 
3. Under the Duty Exemption Scheme, the Value Based Advance License 
(VABAL) Scheme and the Pass Book Scheme were discontinued and a 
new Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB) scheme was introduced. The 
trend all the world over is to relieve the export products of all indirect 
taxes leviable on them in the country of origin. DEPW is an effort in that 
direction as it seeks to neutralize the basic customs duty. Under the 
DEPB scheme, an exporter is eligible to claim credit as a specified per 
centage of FOB value of exports made in freely convertible currency. 
DEPB may be issued on post-export basis and pre-export basis. On pre-
export basis, the scheme provided for adhoc duty entitlement at 5 per 
cent of the average FOB value of exports in the preceding three years. 
This entitlement aimed at enabling exporters to import duty free. On post 
shipment basis, exporters were to be entitled for duty free credits at 
notified rates. The schemes converse both manufacturer exporters as 
well as merchant exporters. 
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4. Deemed export benefits were extended to oil and gas sectors in addition 
to power sector. This measure is aimed to promote and facilitate 
indigenization. To encourage domestic sourcing of inputs, domestic 
manufacturers supplying against EPCG licenses were made entitled to 
deemed export drawback. 
5. Nonns for domestic sales by EQUs and EPZs units in agriculture, 
acquaculture, animal husbandry, floriculture, horticulture, pisciculture, 
poultry, viriculture and sericulture were liberalized and were pemiitted 
to sell 50 per cent of their production in value tenns in the Domestic 
Tariff Area (DTA) without any stipulation for value addition and had 
only to ensure positive net foreign exchange earnings. 
6. The 1997-2002 EXIM policy proposed to give double weightage for 
agro-exports in calculating eligibility of export houses and trading 
houses. It also announced a 1 per cent SIL on total value of exports for 
export of fruit, vegetables, floriculture and horticulture produce if such 
exports constitute 10 per cent of the total exports. 
7. With a view to give a renewed thrust to exports of gems and jewelry, the 
EXIM policy proposed to increase the number of nominated agencies 
permitted to stock gold. The exporters could either take gold on a 
replenishment basis or purchase it outright from these designated 
agencies. 
8. The new policy aims to give a boost to the software industry. Software 
exporters were allowed to undertake exports using data communications 
links or in the from of physical exports through courier service, imports 
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of goods from clients on loan for a specified period was also permitted; 
on-line data communication for DTA sales was pennitted. 
9. Electronic hardware units were allowed to sell up to 50 per cent DTA on 
an annual basis while exporting 50 per cent. 
10. Special depreciation norms were provided for electronic goods up to 70 
per cent in three years. 
11. Recognizing that procedures need to be considerably simplified, the new 
policy focuses on making the procedures transparent and less 
discretionary. Considerable automaticity has also been introduced in the 
procedures. For example, the export obligation period under advance 
license and the validity of the license has been increased from the earlier 
12 months to 18 months. 
Modifications in EXIM Policy: 
In the Export and Import (EXIM) policy 1997-2002, certain 
modifications were made by the Commerce Minister on April 13, 1998 and 
March 31,1999. The modifications in the trade policy were set in the direction 
of frirther liberalization, simplification and decentralization, while seeking to 
address some of the difficulties faced by the exporters and enhancing the 
competitiveness of India's exports. 
After a long dispute under the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism, 
India in November 1997 agreed to phase out all curbs - on 2,714 items - over a 
six-year phase-out period beginning with April 1, 1997. As a part of the efforts 
towards fiarther integration with the word, the amendment announced on April 
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13, 1998. Shifted nearly 340 items from the Restricted List to the Open General 
List (OGL). Various quantitative restrictions on export items have also been 
removed. Modification announced on March 31, 1999, freed imports of another 
894 import items mostly consumer and agriculture goods and shifted to OGL. 
Another 414 import items were partially liberalized by putting them on SIL list. 
Now only 667 items remain in the restricted list of imports. 
A new chapter has been added by March 31, 1999 amendment 
recognizing the importance of exports of services and the potential in the 
services sector. Importantly, the threshold foreign exchange earnings limit for 
conferring Export House Status to service providers has been pegged at one-
third the level prescribed for merchandise exports. Also, the service providers 
shall be entitled to import certain restricted items up to 10 per cent of foreign 
exchange earned by them during the preceding licensing year. 
The March 1999 modification to the EXIM Policy has decanalized as 
many as 116 items, including crude and its variants. 
According to the March 31, 1999 modification, the Duty Entitlement 
Pass Book (DEPB) scheme would neutralize not only the basic customs duty 
but also the special customs duty of 5 per cent as well (this would give 
exporters an additional 2 to 4 per cent of DEPB credit). 
The March 1999 amendment has also raised the pre-export credit 
eligibility under the DEPB scheme from 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the 
previous year's export perfonnance. This has been done for greater flexibility 
of operations. Under the DEPB scheme, exporters can import inputs required 
for production purposes. 
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Provision has been made for recognizing the national service rendered 
by exporters in the March 1999 amendment to the EXIM Policy by issuing 
green cards to exporters exporting 50 per cent of their production with a 
minimum of Rs. 1 crore per year entitling them to various facilities. Similarly, 
exporters who have attained Export House/Trading House/Star Trading 
House/Super Star Trading House status for three successive ternis shall be 
given gold status certificates, which would entitle them to all the benefits 
accruing from such status in perpetuity regardless of variations in their 
perfonnance in the subsequent years thus obviating the need for them to apply 
for such status from time to time. 
The March 1999 amendment makes a provision for issue of an annual 
Advance License to status holders and manufacture exports with a turnover of 
over Rs 1 crore to reduce the available interface between the exporters and 
DGFT. The exporter would now be able to import any prescribed inputs as per 
input-output norms right throughout the year without approaching DGFT. 
The threshold limit under the Export Promotion Capital Goods (EPCG) 
schemes was reduced to Rs 1 crore from Rs. 20 crore for textiles, chemicals 
and plastics. 
Phannaceuticals have been included in the Zero-duty provision under the 
EPCG Scheme. 
Duty free import of consumables up to certain limit has been allowed for 
the gems and Jewellery, handicraft and leather sectors to enable the exporters to 
achieve higher unit value realization. 
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With the objective of solving all disputes of exporters with the customs 
and the DGFT, the March 1999 amendment to the EXIM Policy has proposed 
the setting up of the institution of Ombudsman. This institution would be set up 
for 'on the spot' solution to problems faced by the exporters. The first one 
would be set up in Mumbai. The Government <vould have to accept the verdict 
of the ombudsman on such disputes immediately, but could go on appeal later. 
The minimum performance requirement for export promotion zones and 
export oriented units has been reduced. Besides, they have been offered certain 
other concessions. These include an increase in the entitlement for sales of 
imported goods within the domestic tariff area (DTA) from 25 to 50 per cent of 
the fi*ee on board (FOB) value of the preceding year. Net foreign exchange 
earnings as a percentage of exports (NFEP) requirements for the units operating 
in EPZ and EQUs has been made unifonn at 20 per cent. However, for 
hardware units, biotechnology and toys sectors, the net foreign exchange 
requirement has been reduced to positive NFEP. 
The March 1999 amendment to the EXIM Policy states that all Export 
Processing Zones (EPZs) will be converted to Free Trade Zones from July 1, 
1999. The idea is to insulate the Zones from bureaucratic interference and 
exports restrictions. Units in these Zones will be allowed to do any 
manufacturing or trading activities. They would not be subjected to any 
predetennined value addition, export obligation, input-output or wastage 
nonns. The only criterion in the Zones will be to become a net foreign 
exchange earner. 
For the benefit of trade and industry, the Government proposes to 
introduce Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) in DGFT, the Customs 
207 
Department, banks, including the Reserve Bank of India Export Promotion 
1 Q 
Councils and the ports 
Foreign Investment Policy 
Prior to l991, soon after independence, the attitude towards FDI was 
increasingly receptive. FDI was sought on mutually advantageous terms though 
the majority local ownership was preferred. Foreign Investors were assured of 
no restrictions on the remittances of profits and dividends, fair compensation in 
the event of acquisition and were promised a 'national treatment'. The foreign 
exchange crisis of 1957-58 led to further liberalization in the Government's 
attitude towards FDI. In a bid to attract foreign investment to finance foreign 
exchange component of projects, a host of incentives and concessions were 
extended. The protection accorded to local manufacture acted as an important 
locational advantage encouraging market seeking FDI. A large number of 
foreign enterprises serving Indian market through exports started establishing 
manufacturing affiliates in the country. This (viz, late 1950s and early 1960s) 
was the period when Western Multinational Enterprises started showing real 
interest in India. 
However, from 1968 to 1979, the Government adopted a more restrictive 
attitude towards FDI. Restrictions were put on proposals of foreign direct 
investments unaccompanied by technology transfer and those seeking more 
than 40 per cent foreign ownership. The Government listed industries in which 
FDI was not considered in view of local capabilities. The pennissible range of 
royalty payments and duration of technology transfer agreements with parent 
companies were also specified for different items. The guidelines evolved for 
foreign collaborations required exclusive use of Indian consultancy services 
wherever available. The renewals of foreign collaboration agreements were 
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restricted. From 1973 onwards the further activities of foreign companies 
(along with those of local large industrial houses) were restricted to a select 
group of core or high priority industries. In the same year a new Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) came into force which required all foreign 
companies operating in India to register unaer Indian Corporate Legislation 
with up to 40 per cent foreign equity. Exceptions from the general limit of 40 
per cent were made only for companies operating in high priority or high 
technology sectors, tea plantations, or those producing predominantly for 
exports ^ .^ 
Nineteen Eighties witness the down of Foreign investment reforms. In 
1980s, the Government released the policy in respect of investors from Oil 
Exporting Developing (OED) countries with the well-defined package of 
exemptions. Investment up to 40 per cent in the equity of new venture could be 
made by investors from OED countries in specified segments without being 
linked to technology transfer. Investment by Non Resident Indians (NRIs) were 
allowed in Industrial Units Under the defined scheme subject to spell-out 
conditions . 
Since 1991, afler four decades of cautious, if not always restrictive, 
attitude, India has sought to increase inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
with a much liberal policy. Substantial liberalization was announced in the New 
Industrial Policy declared by the Government in July 1991 and doors of several 
industries have been opened up for foreign investment. Three tiers for 
approving proposals for foreign direct investment in the country were 
introduced: (i) The Reserve Bank's automatic approval system; (ii) Secretariat 
for Industrial Approvals for considering proposals within the genera! policy 
framework, but outside the powers delegated to Reserve Bank; and (iii) Foreign 
209 
Investment Promotion Board, specially created to invite, negotiate and facilitate 
substantial investment by international companies that would provide access to 
high technology and world market ^\ The salient features of the new policy are 
summarized below: 
In order to invite foreign investment in high priority industries, requiring 
large investment and advance technology, in 1991 it has been decided to 
provide for automatic permission for direct investment upto 51 per cent foreign 
equity in high priority industries (listed in Annexure III). When the new policy 
encouraging FDIs flow was announced in 1991, foreign equity participation up 
to 51 per cent on automatic basis was pennitted in 35 industries. Over the 
years, it was observed that the automatic rout, which has been unique, has 
accounted for less than 10 per cent of FDl approvals. A need was, therefore, 
felt for enlarging the list of industries under this automatic rout and also for 
allowing greater equity participation to make the approvals system simple, 
transparent and fair. The Government has accordingly expanded the list ^^ . 
With effective January 17, 1997, the Government announced the inclusion in 
Annexure III of the statement of industrial policy 1991, (I) 3 categories of 
industries/items relating to mining activities for foreign equity up to 50 per 
cent, (ii) 13 additional categories of industries/items for foreign equity up to 51 
per cent and (iii) 9 categories of industries/items for foreign equity up to 74 per 
cent . Thus 48 industries were made eligible for automatic approval up to 51 
per cent, 3 industries up to 50 per cent and 9 industries up to 74 per cent foreign 
equity. 
The statement of industrial policy 1991 lays down that majority of 
foreign equity holding up to 51 per cent will i'lso be allowed for (I) Trading 
Companies (ii) Hotels and Tourism related industries prior to 1991, the 
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Government generally discouraged foreign equity holdings in service areas 
except for hotels. 
A special Empowered Board has been constituted to negotiate with a 
large number of international finns and approve direct foreign investment in 
select areas. 
Liberal policy now exist in respect of (I) extension of Foreign 
Technology Agreements (ii) Hiring of Foreign Technicians (iii) Deputation of 
Indian Technicians Abroad (iv) Foreign Testing of Indigenous Raw Materials 
and Products and Indigenously Developed Technology (v) use of Foreign 
Brand Names/Trade Marks. 
Besides the scheme of 100 per cent NRI investment in 100 per cent 
export oriented units and also for the revival of sick units, 100 per cent NRI 
participation in power generation has also been permitted. 
The RBI accords automatic approval to all proposals from NRIs and 
Overseas Corporate Bodies (OCBs) predominantly owned by them. It permits 
100 per cent equity on higher priority industries listed in Annexure III to the 
statement on Industrial Policy 1991. The approval includes full benefits of 
repatriation of capital invested and income accruing thereon. These include 9 
high priority industries in metallurgic and infrastructure sectors and 13 other 
high priority industries, hitherto eligible for 74 per cent and 51 per cent equity 
investment respectively. Foreign investment in mining (3 categories of 
industrires) has also been allowed up to 100 per cent for NRI/OCBs. NRIs 
investment upto 100 per cent of equity is also allowed in export houses, trading 
houses, star trading houses, hospitals, EQUs, sick industries, hotels, etc. 
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Foreign citizens of Indian origin are now pennitted to acquire house property 
without the permission of the Reserve Bank of India. 
Disinvestment nonus for equity holding by foreign investors were 
liberalized considerably. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) now pennits on a 
near-automatic basis, proposals for transfer/sale of share for the purpose of 
Disinvestment. The sale of shares, however, has to be effected in a stock 
exchange in India through a registered merchant banker and a stock broker. 
Pemiission is also given by the RBI for Disinvestment proposals where the 
foreign investor wishes to sell his/her shares not through a stock exchange but 
on a private basis to another non-resident, including one of the co-
promoters/residents. As regard pricing. Disinvestment of equity by foreign 
investors no longer needs to be at prices detennined by the Reserve Bank. It 
has been allowed at market rates on stock exchanges from September ] 5, 1992 
with pennission to repatriate the proceeds of such Disinvestment. 
Provisions of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) have been 
liberalized through an ordinance dated January 9, 1993 as a result of which 
companies with more than 40 per cent of foreign equity are also now treated on 
par with fully Indian owned companies. 
Foreign companies have been granted permission to use their trade 
marks for selling their commodities in India since May 14, 1992. 
The Government has allowed reputed Foreign Institutional Investors 
(FIIs) including pension funds, mutual funds, asset management companies, 
investment trust, nominee companies and incoi oorated or institutional portfolio 
managers to invest in Indian capital market. This pemiission will be applicable 
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only if they are registered with SEBI and get approval under FERA from RBI. 
FIIs can invest in all the listed and unlisted securities traded on the primary and 
secondary markets, including the equity and other securities/instruments of 
companies. These would include shares, debentures, warrants and scheme 
floated by domestic mutual funds. There are no restrictions on the volume of 
investment - minimum or maximum - for the purpose of entry of FIIs in the 
primary/secondary market. However, total holdings by FIT, OCBs and NRIs in 
a company must not exceed 24 per cent after the allotment and the total 
holding of a single FIT or FIIs of the same group are subject to a ceiling of 10 
per cent. In budget proposals of 1997-98, this limit, only for FIIs was raised to 
30 per cent subject to the approval of the Board of Directors of the concerned 
company. FIIs have been directed to allocate their total investments between 
equity and debentures in the ratio of 70:30. 
Foreign investors can invest in Indian companies through the Global 
Depository Receipts (GDR) route without any lock-in period. These receipts 
can be listed on any of the overseas stock exchanges and denominated in 
convertible foreign currency. 
From February 28, 1996, NRIs (and not OCBs) were pemiitted to invest 
funds on non-repatriation basis in Money Market Mutual Funds floated by 
Commercial Banks and Public/Private Sector Financial Institutions. 
In January 1997, the Government announced the first ever guidelines for 
foreign direct investment for expeditious approval of foreign investment in 
areas not covered under automatic approval. Priority areas for foreign direct 
investment proposals as mentioned in the guidelines include infrastructure, 
export potential, large scale employment potential particularly for rural areas, 
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items with linkages with the fann sector, social sector projects like hospital, 
health care and medicine, and proposals that lead to induction of technology 
and infusion of capital. Foreign direct investment approvals will, however, be 
subject to sectoral caps: 20 per cent (40 per cent for NRIs) in the banking 
sector; 51 per cent in non-banking financial companies; 100 per cent in power, 
roads, ports, tourism and venture capital funds; 49 per cent in 
telecommunications; 40 per cent (100 per cent for NRIs) in domestic air taxi 
operations/airlines; 24 per cent in small scale industries; 51 per cent in 
drugs/phamia industry for bulk drugs; 100 per cent in Petroleum; and 50 per 
cent in mining except for gold, silver, diamonds and precious stones. 
The new guidelines also allow foreign companies to set up 100 per cent 
companies on the basis of the following criteria: (I) where only holding 
operation is involved and all downstream investments to be carried out need 
prior approvals; (ii) where proprietary technology is sought to be protected or 
sophisticated technology is proposed to be brought in; (iii) Wliere at least 50 
per cent of production is exported; (iv) consultancy proposals and (v) projects 
in power, roads, ports and industrial towns and estates '^*. 
Several measures to boost FDI were announced in 1998-99. Foreign 
equity up to 100 per cent in the power sector for electric generation, 
transmission and distribution as also roads and highways, ports and harbours 
and vehicular tunnels and bridges were made eligible for automatic approval 
(barring atomic-reactor plants) provided foreign equity does not exceeds Rs. 
1500 crore. FDI pemiissible under non-banking Financial services now 
includes "Credit Card Business" and "Money Changing Business". Regarding 
equity participation in private sector banks, multilateral financial institutions 
were allowed to contribute equity to the extent of the shortfall in NRI holdings 
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within the overall pennissible limit of 40 per cent. The Government has also 
decided to permit FDI up to 49 per cent of the total equity, subject to license, in 
companies providing Global Mobile Personal Communication by Satellite 
(GMPCS) services. A number of liberalization measures were also taken in 
1998-99 to promote portfolio foreign investment. In order to avoid NRIs being 
crowded out by FIIs, the aggregate ceiling for investment in a company by all 
NRIs/PIOs (Persons of Indian Origin)/OCBs through stock exchange has been 
made separate and exclusive of the investment ceiling available for FIIs. In 
addition, the aggregate investment ceiUng for NRIs/PIOs/OCBs has been raised 
from 5 per cent to 10 per cent of the paid up capital of a company. In the case 
of listed Indian companies, the ceiling can be raised to 24 per cent of the paid 
up capital under a General Body Resolution. Also the investment limit by a 
single NRIs/PIOs/OCB has been enhanced from 1 per cent to 5 per cent of the 
paid up capital. Policy pertaining to investment in unlisted companies has also 
been liberalized. NRIs/PIOs/OCBs are now pemiitted to invest in unUsted 
companies. Under certain conditions, FIIs can purchase and sell Government 
Securities and Treasury Bills within overall approved debt ceiling. Also 100 per 
cent FII debt fimds have been pennitted to invest in unlisted debt securities of 
Indian companies. 
Tims, all these development in foreign investment policy during the 
period of 1990s shows the marked shift in the foreign investment policy from 
the policy followed during earlier periods. The policy adopted during nineties 
has been very much liberal towards non-debt creating investment policy. This 
policy helped in increasing flow of foreign investment and intensified the 
process of integration of India with global economy. These investment will 
help India in expanding manufactured exports by using her as an export 
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platfonn. The increase in non-debt inflows will also strengthen the country's 
capacity to cope with the development in the external sector of the economy. 
Foreign Trade 
After independence, Indian foreign trade has made cumulative progress 
both qualitatively and quantitatively. Though the size of foreign trade and its 
value both have increased during post independence era, this increase in foreign 
trade can not be said satisfactory because Indian share in total foreign trade of 
the world has remained remarkable low. Indian share in the total world trade 
was only 0.57 per cent in 1980, which came down to 0.53 per cent in 1991. 
However, from 1992, it started picking up and became 0.60 per cent in 1995 
(Table 4.1) The share of exports in the total world export was 0.42 per cent in 
1980, it increased to 0.50 per cent in 1991 and remained 0.60 per cent from 
1994 to 1997. The improvement in Indian exports share came up with the rise 
in value of export, especially after 1991 following the liberal policy of export 
boosting through a number of export promotion schemes. India's trade links 
with all the region of the world have increased over the years. In view of the 
current wave of worldwide globalization, India has taken major initiatives to 
diversify its exports as also their destination. 
Our balance of trade has remained unfavourable since we started 
planning with the exception of two years i.e., 1972-73 and 1976-77 when we 
had favourable balance of trade worth US$ 134 million and US $ 77 million 
respectively (Statement 7.1 (B). Economic Survey, 1999-2000, P.S.-82). The 
deficit in balance of trade in our country has been generally increasing, even 
though our foreign trade has been getting much more broad based. 
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Table 4.1 
India's Share in World Trade 
Year 
1980 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
Export 
0.42 
0.52 
0.50 
0.53 
0.58 
0.60 
0.60 
0.60 
0.60 
Import 
0.72 
0.66 
0.56 
0.61 
0.60 
0.63 
0.60 
N.A. 
N.A. 
Trade 
0.57 
0.59 
0.53 
0.57 
0.59 
0.61 
0.60 
N.A. 
N.A. 
Note: N.A.: Not Available 
Source: Economic Survey 1996-97 and 1999-2000, Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India. 
As is clear from Table4.2, the average annual trade deficit during 1980s 
(from 1980-81 to 1989-90) was $ 5827 million. This much average annual 
trade deficit was due to large gap between average annual exports and imports. 
Which were $ 10695 million and $ 16522 million respectively. 
The year 1990-91 saw a trade deficit of $ 5927 million as imports rose 
by 13.4 per cent against a rise of 9.2 per cent registered by exports. The trade 
deficit in 1990-91 shot up to a high level on account of Gulf war. The 
immediate impact was the rise in the oil import bill. As a consequence of the 
217 
increase in the price of oil as well as certain other oil-related imports, the trade 
deficit for the year deteriorated. In response to the ongoing crisis during 1990-
91, the Government had taken several measures to compress the imports 
through various non-discretionary fiscal and monetary measures as also 
through fiscal controls. However, strict import restrictions in 1991-92 led to a 
sharp reduction in the value of imports in dollar tenns (fi-om $24073 million in 
1990-91 to $19,411 million in 1991-92 - a fall of 19.4 per cent). Exports also 
fell fi-om $ 18,145 million in 1990-91 to $ 17865 million in 1991-92 (a fall of 
1.5 per cent). Since imports fell by a far greater extent as compared with 
exports, the trade deficit declined drastically fi-om $ 5927 million in 1990-91 to 
only $ 1545 million in 1991-92. However, this sharp cut back in imports had a 
decelerating effect on industrial growth and to reverse this trend, massive 
import liberalization measures were undertaken in 1992-93. As a result, imports 
in this year rose by 12.7 per cent against an increase in exports by 3.8 per cent. 
Consequently, trade deficit touched $ 3344 million. The next tliree years (1993-
94 to 1995-96) saw strong resurgence in export earnings and as can be seen 
from the table 4.2, the rate of growth of exports was as high as 20.0 per cent in 
1993-94, 18.4 per cent in 1994-95 and 20.8 per cent in 1995-96. As against, the 
imports due to liberal policy also increased from 6.5 per cent in 1993-94 to 22.9 
per cent in 1994-95 and 28.0 per cent in 1995-96. Therefore, although imports 
also increased considerable in these three years (as the Government has been 
opening up the economy more and more in the recent years). The trade deficit 
during these three years was of order $ 1068 million in 1993-94, $ 2324 million 
in 1994-95 and $ 4880 million in 1995-96. 
The year of 1996-97 saw a relatively smaller increase of 5.3 per cent in 
exports and 6.7 per cent in imports. The trade deficit again increased from $ 
4880 million in 1995-96 to $ 5663 million in 1996-97. 
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The trade deficit in the year 1997-98 and 1998-99 was far greater than 
the year of crisis, 1990-91. The year 1998-99 recorded a first ever a large 
deficit in foreign trade during the decades of 1980s and 1990s. The exports fell 
by 3.9 per cent as against a modest import growth of 0.9 per cent. The negative 
export growth caused the trade deficit soar up to $ 8199 million. Several factors 
were advanced for unimpressive export perfonnance. Both global and domestic 
factors have contributed to the slow down in export growth since 1996-97. A 
noticeable decline in the growth of world trade since the second half of 1997, a 
decline in export prices of some major items of manufactured goods, jp'owing 
infi-astructure bottlenecks and appreciation of the rupee in real effective 
exchange rate terms were contributory factors. The last was partly due to an 
appreciation of the US dollar against other major currencies in the international 
markets and the resultant large cross-currency variations. 
Howex'er, when we compare the average annual trade deficit during 
1990s (from 1990-91 to 1998-99) with that of during 1980s (fi-om 1980-81 to 
1989-90), the trade deficit is lower during 1990s. During 1990s, the average 
annual trade deficit has been $ 4381 million as against $ 5827 million during 
1980s, a 25 per cent decline. This improvement was mainly because of increase 
in an annual exports fi"om $ 10695 million during 1980s to $ 26338 million 
during 1990s, 146.3 per cent growth. As against, the average annual imports 
registered only 85.9 per cent growth fi-om $ 16522 million during 1980s to $ 
3072 million during 1990s 
Composition of Foreign Trade 
The composition of foreign trade is an important indicator of the pattern 
of trade developed by a country. By the tenn composition of trade, we mean the 
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structural analysis involving the various types and the volume of various items 
of exports and imports of the country. The composition of foreign trade of a 
country reflects on the diversification and specialization attained in its 
productive structure along with its rate of progress and structural changes. The 
country exporting more of primary products, viz, raw materials and importing 
finished manufacturing goods and capital goods can be branded as an 
underdeveloped country. With the passage of time, a country attempts to 
change the pattern of trade in such a manner so that it can attain a better terni of 
trade for its products by transfomiing a country fi"om a primary producing one 
to a producer of finished manufactured products . Thus, the composition of 
trade can enable one to know the level of development of a country and its 
economic structure. 
In order to study the composition or structure of India's foreign trade, it 
is necessary to analyze the changing pattern of imports and exports. 
Composition of Imports 
Table No. 4.3 gives the data regarding composition of Indian imports 
fi-om 1980-81 to 1998-99. For convenience, imports of the country have been 
divided into four broad groups: (I) Food and live animals chiefly for food; (ii) 
Raw materials and intemiediate manufactures; (iii) Capital goods and (iv) 
Other goods. The table shows that in 1980-81, total value of imports was $ 
15869 million. It increased to $ 24075 million in 1998-99 
A look at the share of various groups'in total imports reveal that the 
share of capital goods declined fi-om 24.2 per cent in 1990-91 to 16.6 per cent 
in 1998-99. This is an important change in the composition of imports since 
1990-91. 
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It will be interesting to look at the trend of the share of different items in 
total import. Table 4.3 shows that the share of POL declined from 41.9 per cent 
in 1980-81 to 25.0 per cent in 1990-91 and further to 15.1 per cent in 1998-99. 
The decline has primarily been because of the substantial increase in domestic 
oil production and softening of international oil prices. 
The second most important item in 1998-99 was pearls and precious 
stones. The share of this item increased to 9.0 per cent in 1998-99 from 8.7 per 
cent in 1990-91. Due to the increasing demand of the gemes and jewellery 
industry (which has recently emerged as an important export earning industry) 
the imports of 'pearls, precious and semi precious stones' have increased 
significantly. 
The third spot in 1998-99 was occupied by non-electrical machinery 
apparatus and appliances. Expenditure on this item increased from 8.7 per cent 
in 1980-81 to 9.8 per cent in 1990-91 and again to 11.7 per cent in 1995. It 
declined to 8.2 per cent in 1998-99. 
The chemical elements and components which was occupying third 
position in total imports expenditure in 1990-91 reached to ninth position in 
1998-99. 
The iron and steel has shown continuously decelerating trend. Its share 
declined from 6.8 per cent in 1980-81 to 4.9 per cent in 1990-91 and to 2.8 per 
cent in 1998-99. 
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Because of increasing domestic demand, edible oils also had to be 
imported on a considerable scale in recent years. The edible oils claimed 
fourth position in terms of its share in total import bill in 1998-99 
Fertilizers, electrical machinery and transport equipment shed its share in 
1998-99, 2.2 per cent, 1.1 per cent and 1.5 per cent from 4.1 per cent, 3.9 per 
cent and 3.9 per cent in 1990-91 respectively. However the Share of cereals and 
cereal preparations has shown upward movement from 0.4 per cent in 1990-91 
to 0.6 per cent in 1998-99. 
The change in the structure of India's imports during nineties are 
reflective of the influence of three factors (I) movement of international prices 
2) change in the trade policy 3) pattern of domestic demand. Among these three 
factors the contribution of the second factor does not seems to be major and 
significant as we do not see any major change in the composition of imports 
during nineties This view is also supported by Rajesh Mehta. who found that 
the impact of trade policy refonns on the composition of imports in the post 
reforni period has been negligible. Whereas, the index of structural change in 
imports over the period 1980-81 to 1990-91 had declined by 27 per cent 
showing a significant change in India's import basket by commodity groups 
the index declined by only 1.6 per cent over the period 1990-91 to 1996-97. 
Thus while the 1980s registered a significant change in composition of imports, 
the post reforni period does not register any such change. This result seems 
puzzling as it was expected that the drastic change in India's import regime will 
lead to a change in the composition of India's import basket. A possible 
explanation of this is the fact that there has beeii no change in the dispersion of 
tariff rates among industries during the post reforni period.^ ^ 
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Composition of Exports 
Exports of India are broadly classified into four categories: (1) Agriculture 
and allied products which include coffee, tea, oil cakes, tobacco, cashew kernels, 
spices, sugar, raw cotton, rice, fish and fish preparation, meat and meat 
preparations, vegetable oils, fruits, vegetables and pulses (2) Ores and minerals 
inside magnese ore, mica and Iron ore; (3) Manufactured goods indude textiles 
and ready made garments, jute manufactures, leather and footwear, handicrafts 
including pearls and precious stones, chemicals, engineering goods and iron steel, 
and (4) Mineral fuels and lubricants. Mineral fuels and lubricants has been 
included in others. 
Composition of Indian exports from 1980-81 to 1998-99 is presented in 
Table 4.4. A clear trend over the years has been a decline in importance of 
agriculture and allied products (30.6 per cent in 1980-81 to 18.5 per cent in 1998-
99) and a substantial increase in the importance of manufactured products (55.8 
per cent in 1980-81 to 78.7 per cent in 1998-99) in total exports. This shows the 
changing production stnicture of the economy and the march from 
underdeveloped, backward, primary goods dependent economy to a more vibrant 
industrial economy. 
A look at the share of various items in Indian exports reveal that the 
handicrafts with a share of 14.2 per cent occupied first place in 1980-81, but its 
share declined over times and became 3.1 per cent in 1998-99. However, 
despite the decline in total share of handicrafts, the share of gems and 
jewellery increased fi*om 9.2 per cent in 1980-81 to 17.5 per cent in 1998-99 
and became first export item to earn maximum foreign exchange. 
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The second most important item of exports in 1980-81 was engineering 
goods, but its share also declined from 28.4 per cent in 1990-91 to 13.0 per cent 
in 1998-99. 
Now the readymade gannents have became second most important item 
of export next to gems and jewellery. Its share was 8.2 per cent in 1980-81, 
which increased to 13.2 per cent in 1998-99. Export of readymade garments has 
emerged as an important foreign exchange earner in recent years. 
In 1998-99, chemicals and allied products has emerged as a fourth 
important item of export. Its share was 3.3 per cent in 1980-81 and 6.5 per cent 
in 1990-91. It in became 10.0 per cent in 1998-99. 
Among the manufacturing items of exports, jute has shown major set 
back. Its share was 4.9 per cent in 1980-81, dechned to 0.9 per cent in 1990-91 
and further dropped to 0.4 per cent in 1998-99. 
As far agricuhure and allied products. Fish and Fish preparation 
occupied 3.1 per cent share in 1998-99, which improved from 2.9 per cent in 
1990-91. But in 1980-81 its share was 3.2 per cent. 
The second most important export item of agriculture and allied products 
in 1998-99 was tea with a share of 1.6 per cent. In 1980-81 its share was 6.3 
per cent. 
Similarly, the share of raw cotton and cashew kernels were 2.5 per cent 
and 2.1 per cent in 1980-81, which declined to 0.2 per cent and 1.0 per cent in 
1998-99 respectively. 
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Likewise, iron ore's shares in total exports earning also declined 
considerably from 4.5 per cent in 1980-81 to 3.2 per cent in 1990-91 and 
further to 1.1 per cent in 1998-99. 
So, India has gradually transfomied itself from a predominantly primary 
products' exporting country into an exporter of manufactured goods. There 
were significant compositional shifts within the major manufactured product 
groups such as engineering goods, chemical and allied products, etc., as 
between eighties and nineties. For instance, among the components of 
engineering goods, the average share of machinery and equipment in total 
engineering exports declined forni 30.6 per ceni to 21.7 per cent while that of 
primary and semi-finished iron and steel increased from 2.9 per cent to 11.9 per 
cent as between the two periods. Within the chemicals and allied group, while 
the share of basic chemicals, pharmaceuticals and cosmetics declined that of 
plastics and linoleum increased. Among the textile products, while the 
importance of man-made yam, fabrics, made-ups increased as between the two 
periods that of jute textile declined. 
India's manufacturing exports are showing tendencies of shifting away 
from traditional exports towards relatively new manufactured products. 
Another important point about the compositional change in the manufactured 
exports is that, by and large, those manufactured groups perfomied relatively 
poorly on the export front whose internal composition remained unchanged 
whereas those groups whose internal composition changed (like chemicals and 
allied products and engineering goods) perfomied better. This indicates the 
existence of a close link between export perfonnance and structural change in 
the case of India's manufactured exports. 
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Balance of Payments 
India has, in the past, witnessed episodes of balance of payments 
difficulties. The period of 1980s was marked by severe balance of payment 
difficulties and the issues relating to the balance of payments came to occupy 
centrestage. The second half of the 1980s witnessed the building up of strains 
on the balance of payments, which culminated into severe balance of payments 
crisis during 1990-91. 
Table 4.5 shows the balance of payments position from 1980-81 to 1998-
99. As is clear that since 1980-81 large deficit in trade balance were 
experienced year after year. During the Sixth Plan (1980-81 to 1984-85), the 
deficit in the balance of trade was around $ 6898 million per annum. During 
the same period, current account deficit was $ 3004.6 million per annum. As a 
percentage of GDP, the average trade deficit during the sixth plan was -3.4 per 
cent, as a result of only 5 per cent export to GDP ratio falling short oi' 8.4 per 
cent import-GDP ratio. The current account deficit remained only -1.3 per cent 
of GDP as a result of 2.1 per cent net invisibles to GDP ratio (Table 4.6) 
During the very first year of Seventh Plan period (1985-86 to 1989-90) 
that is in 1985-86, the total trade deficit shot up to $ 7834 million compared 
with only $ 5654 million during 1984-85. This was primarily due to the 
liberalization of imports by the newly fonned Congress (I) Government. The 
imports rose by 10 per cent as against the exports fell down by 6 per cent. 
Similarly, the current account deficit also soared up from $ 2417 million in 
1984-85 to $ 4867 million in 1985-86 because of the fall in net earnings from 
invisible from $ 3238 million in 1984-85 to $ 2967 million in 1985-86. During 
the whole Seventh Plan period, the current account deficit was $ 5823.4 
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million, trade deficit was $ 7827 million and net earnings from invisibles was $ 
2003.6 million per annmn. Both, the trade and current account deficits per 
annum during the Seventh Plan were higher than that of Sixth Plan. The current 
account deficits acquired a structural character. A large trade deficit occurred 
year after year despite a robust growth in export An important set back during 
the seventh plan was large decline in the net invisible earnings. 
Gulf crisis during the year 1990-91 further worsened the balance of 
payments problem. The continuing deficits became massive around the second 
half of 1990. Because of the Gulf crisis, the oil prices rose very sharply, 
resulting in an equality steep rise in the value of imports of oil, which in turn 
greatly expanded the size of deficit. The situation was further aggrevated by the 
events that followed Indian workers employed in Kuwait had to be airlifted 
back to India. As a result, their remittances ceased to flow. Further, the UN 
trade embargo on Iraq led to the cessation of exports to Iraq and Kuwait A 
rapid depletion of reserves took place on account of rapidly rising balance of 
payment deficits. Faced with this situation. Government took several measures 
to compress imports. These efforts did succeed and the deficit got reduced to 
some extent. During the year 1990-91, in addition to massive trade deficit of $ 
9437 million, there was a deterioration in the invisible account ($ -243 million) 
as well because of lower remittance and higher interest payments. 
Consequently, the current accounts deficit soared to $ 9680 million, which was 
higher than the Sixth and Seventh Plan current accounts deficit per annum. The 
Government had to impose a strict import squeeze. As a result, the value of 
imports declined by 24.5 per cent in 1991-92 in dollar tenns as compared with 
1990-91 while exports declined by only 1.1 per cent. Consequently the trade 
deficit came down to $ 2798 million in 1991-92. In addition, the Government 
also received $ 1620 million fi-om net invisible earnings which financed the 
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trade deficit by 57.9 per cent leading to just $ 1178 million current account 
deficit, first ever since 1980-81. In terms of GDP, the current account deficit 
was only 0.3 per cent in 1991-92 as compared to 3.3 per cent in 1990-91. The 
foreign exchange reserves were sufficient to meet more than five months 
imports. 
Imports as a percentage of GDP came down to 7.7 per cent in 1991-92 as 
compared to 9.4 per cent in 1990-91. This had a strong decelerating effect on 
Industrial activity and the Government was obliged to open up the imports of a 
number of capital goods, raw materials and intemiediates and other goods 
required by industries. Import liberalization was also a follow up of the new 
industrial and trade policies adopted by the Government. Thus, the year 1992-
93 again saw a rapid increase in imports fi"om 7.7 per cent of GDP to 9.4 per 
cent (15.4 per cent growth) fi-om 1991-92 to 1992-93. While the export had 
grown only by 3.3 per cent. As a result, trade deficit went up to -2.2 per cent of 
GDP ($ 5447 million). The Current account deficit increased fi-om -0.3 per cent 
of GDP to -1.7 per cent and the foreign exchange reserves fell down to 4.9 
months imports cover. The current account deficit in 1992-93 was higher than 
the safe limit of 1 per cent presented by Jalan. The condition after 1992-93 
became distinctly different. During 1993-94, the current account deficit was 
only $ 1158 million, accounted for -0.4 per cent of GDP. Foreign exchange 
reserves were available to finance imports of 8.6 months - a highly satisfactory 
situation. Net invisible account balance was $ 2898 million, which financed 
71.4 per cent of trade deficit. The decline in international interest rates has 
provided a measure of saving in the invisible account. Strong growth in 
remittances, in response to the introduction of the market-detennined exchange 
rate, has helped to counteract the deceleration in earning from tourism ^^ . 
External assistance (net) in this year stood at $ 1901 million while current 
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account deficit was only $ 1158 million. Thus, the external assistance was 
substantially higher than the current account deficit. This condition was the 
result of exceptionally good perfonnance on export front. Exports recorded a 
gro\vth of 20.2 per cent in dollar terms against a modest increase of 10 per cent 
in imports. As a result, trade deficit accounted for only $ 4056 million as 
compared with $ 5447 million in 1992-93. The current account deficit fell 
down to $ 1158 million in 1993-94 from $ 3526 million in 1992-93. 
The situation in 1994-95 was also satisfactory. The current account 
deficit remained only 1.0 per cent of GDP. During 1995-96, the current account 
deficit became 1.7 per cent of GDP. This rise in current account deficit was due 
to higher trade deficit of $ 11359 million and falling net invisible receipts. The 
net invisible receipts fell down from $ 5680 million in 1994-95 to $ 5460 
miUion in 1995-96, which financed only 4.8 per cent of trade deficit. 
In the year 1996-97, the condition to some extent improved as a result of 
improvement in current account balance. Although the trade deficit again 
increased, but the situation could not be very worst. The improvement in 
current account balance was due to increase in net invisibles earnings from $ 
5460 million in 1995-96 to $ 10196 milHon in 1996-97. It financed 68.8 per 
cent of trade deficit. 
When we consider the period of Eight Plan (1992-97) as a whole, the 
current account deficit was $ 3689 million per annum which was much lower 
than that of during the Seventh Plan. However, the trade deficit was around $ 
8945 million per annum which was much higher than that of during Seventh 
Plan. 
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Table 4.6 
India's Balance of Payments: Key Indicators 
(As per cent of GDP) 
Item 
Exports 
Imports 
Trade Balance 
Invisibles 
Balance 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
Sixth Plan 
(1980-85) 
Average 
50 
84 
-3 4 
21 
-13 
Seventh Plan 
(1985-90) 
Average 
5 1 
82 
-3 1 
10 
-2 1 
1990-91 
62 
94 
-3 2 
-0 1 
-3 3 
1991-92 
67 
77 
-10 
06 
-0 3 
Eight Plan 
(1992-97) 
69 
118 
-2 9 
16 
-12 
1997-98 
88 
126 
-3 8 
24 
-14 
1998-99 
82 
113 
-3 1 
22 
-10 
Source Economic Sui^ 'ey, 1989-90, 1998-99 and 1999-2000, Ministi7 of Finance, 
Government of India 
The condition of balance of payments again deteriorated during 1997-98. 
An important factor responsible for the said deterioration was decline in the net 
invisible earnings from $ 10196 million in 1996-97 to $ 10007 million in 
1997-98. 
However, the situation once again iifiproved during 1998-99 when 
current account deficit came down to 1.0 per cent of GDP. Also, the number of 
month's imports covered by foreign exchange reserves improved substantially 
from 6.9 months to 8.2 months. The current account deficit was lower than 
previous '^ear due to the fall in trade deficit from $ 15507 million to $ 9208 
million. 
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A noteworthy feature in the country's balance of payments in recent 
years has been the improvement in the invisible account. Invisibles surplus has 
been a durable source of support to the balance of payments; for instance, the 
invisible surplus financed almost 65 per cent in 1997-98, although down from 
69 per cent in 1996-97, reflecting the widening of the trade deficit. In 1990-91, 
there was a net outflow of $ 242 million on this account. The net inflow on 
invisible account was $ 1620 miUion in 1991-92. It rose to $ 9208 million in 
1998-99. On an average, invisible receipts have grown at the rate of about 20 
per cent per annum from $ 9334 million in 1992-93 to $ 23040 million in 1997-
98. The upsurge in invisible receipts has been led by the inflow of private 
29 transfer receipts 
Table 4.8 
Foreign Exchange Reserve 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
Gold 
(1) 
3496 
3499 
3380 
4078 
4370 
4561 
4054 
3391 
2960 
Reserves 
SDRs 
(2) 
102 
90 
18 J 
108 
7 
82 
2 
1 
8 
Foreign 
Currency 
(3) 
2236 
5631 
6434 
15068 
20809 
17044 
22367 
25975 
29522 
(US 
Total 
(1+2+3) 
5834 
9220 
9832 
19254 
25186 
21687 
26423 
29367 
32490 
$ Million) 
Import cover 
of Reserves 
(no of 
months 
2.5 
5.3 
4.9 
8.6 
8.4 
6.0 
6.5 
6.9 
8.2 
Source: Fconomic Survey, 1999-2000, Ministry of Finance, Government of India and 
Report on Currency and Finance, 1998-99, RBI. 
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Dr. C. Rangarajan has suggested that balance of payments should be 
managed with two parameters. First, the current account deficit should stay at 
around 2 per cent of GDP and secondly there should be no further drop in the 
foreign currency reserves from the level reached at the beginning of current 
financial year (1996-97) i.e., $ 17 billion. It may be noted that foreign exchange 
reserves stood at $ 29.37 billion in 1997-98 and $ 32.49 billion in 1998-99. On 
the other hand, other indicator, current account deficit, was also less than 2 per 
cent of GDP, 1.4 per cent and 1.0 per cent of GDP in 1997-98 and 1998-99 
respectively. Thus, we can say on the basis of the criteria given by 
C. Rangarajan that there has been healthy trend of foreign exchange and current 
account deficit management in external sector. 
Capital Account 
For any developing economy, the capital account of the balance of 
payments has essentially a financing ftinction. Until recently, the capital 
account did not receive much attention because of the limited avenues of 
financing. Until almost the beginning of the 1980s nearly 80 per cent of the 
financing requirement was met through external assistance, a concessional 
method of financing. In the late 1980s, external assistance, commercial 
borrowing and non-resident deposits had almost an equal share in the financing 
requirements ""*. The structure of capital account in India has changed 
considerably over time. The Eighties were marked by a reduction in inilows of 
concessional assistance to India, principally fi-om the World Bank Group. The 
large current account deficit, particularly after 1984-85, was financed by 
substantial inflows of capital by way of commercial borrowings and deposits 
by non-resident Indians •". For example, the share of external assistance in total 
capital inflows was 70.4 per cent in 1980-81 came down to 31.9 per cent in 
1985-86 and further to 26.3 per cent in 1990-91. This shows that in the later 
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half of 1980s, the financing through external assistance had gone down 
substantially. The share of external commercial borrowing in total capital 
borrowing in total capital increased from 12.6 per cent in 1980-81 to 26.8 per 
cent in 1990-91. Similarly, the share of non-resident Indians (NRIs) increased 
to 33.7 per cent in 1985-86 from just 11.3 per cent in 1980-81. But it declined 
to 18.3 per cent in 1990-91. Both the external commercial borrowings and non-
resident Indian deposits are a costly method of financing the current account 
deficits because they are obtained at a market rate of interest which is higher 
than the concessional rate of interest for external assistance. It increases the 
debt-service payments of the country and raises the cost of external debt 
considerably over time. The deficits financed by commercial borrowings or 
other borrowings on hard terms, as noted by Bimal Jalan, could be sustained 
only as long as such loans were available. The economy was plunged into a 
crisis as soon as these sources of financing dried up during 1990-91. Following 
the Gulf crisis and deteriorating balance of payments situation, the Government 
of India resorted to substantial withdrawals from the IMF from 1990-91 
onwards under one or other facility. 
The decade of 1990s was marked by structural changes relating to 
financing the deficits in the balance of payments. The dependence on external 
assistance and external commercial borrowing has come down markedly. The 
role of external assistance has been steadily declining in its importance because 
of subdued disbursements and the large repayments of loan contracted in the 
previous years. The net inflow under coirunercial borrowings is also coming 
down because of the large repayments ^^ . The total external assistance share in 
total capital inflows came down substantially from 66.6 per cent in 1991-92 to 
10.4 per cent in 1998-99. The external commercial borrowings also declined 
from 31.9 per cent in 1991-92 to 27.3 per cent in 1996-97, but again increased 
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to 55.4 per cent in 1998-99. With the shaqj reduction in external assistance and 
external borrowings, the debt-service ratio declined continuously from 35.3 per 
cent in 1990-91 to 18 per cent in 1998-99. 
One healthy development is that a strong effort has been made in recent 
years to attract non-debt-creating funds either in the fonn of foreign direct 
investment or portfolio investment. Portfolio investments are, by their very 
nature, more volatile than foreign direct investment (FDl). However, they do 
contribute in a significant way to the availability of funds. As is clear from the 
Table no 4.5 there has been a substantial surplus on capital account in recent 
years (particularly since 1993-94) except 1995-96. This is due to substantial 
buoyancy in foreign investment following the policy of economic liberalization 
since 1991. The Government has given a number of incentives to foreign 
investors with the result that foreign investment has risen considerably from $ 
557 million in 1992-93 to $ 4235 million in 1993-94 and $ 6153 million in 
1996-97. However, during 1997-98 and 1998-99 it declined to $ 5390 and $ 
2412 million respectively. All these developments resulted in surplus in capital 
account of $ 9882 million in 1993-94, $ 10437 million in 1996-97 and $7867 
million in 1998-99. These surpluses on capital account for exceeded the deficit 
on current account of the balance of payments with the result that there was a 
substantial build up of foreign reserves. 
External Debt 
Foreign capital, mostly from the developed countries, has been playing 
an important role in the development of the Indian economy. It has entered the 
country in various forms, both on Government account and private account. It 
has given rise to number of problems, the most serious being that of debt 
servicing. 
2 4 1 
Foreign capital has been both for long-tenn purposes and short-tenn 
needs. Long-temi capital refers to capital that has maturity of more than a year; 
short-term capital has a maturity of one year or less. 
There is no doubt that foreign capital has been of great help to the 
country's development. However, it has also given rise to the difficult problem 
of debt-servicing. Foreign debt servicing involves payment of interest on the 
loans contracted and the repayment of the principal or amortization when it 
falls due. The payments have grown rapidly particularly in recent years with 
the rise in the non-concessional or commercial loan component of the total 
debt. These foreshadow some serious consequences for the country. The debt-
servicing charges have become very large indeed. So much so that it is 
becoming increasingly difficult for the economy to cope with them '' 
Recently, the level of external debt and problems of debt-servicing have 
been intensively discussed in India. Till the early 1980s external debt was not a 
major problem, primarily because India had not resorted to much of market and 
market related external borrowings. These, however, increased in the second 
half of the 1980s and the balance of payments crisis that the country faced in 
1990-91 was to some extent due to an external debt problem. In a country 
where there is a gap between domestic savings and investments and where 
foreign direct investment are still not significant, some reliance on external 
borrowing is unavoidable. 
Such borrowings, however, must be kept within prudent limits so that 
the country does not get into a debt trap. The level of India's external debt is a 
matter of concern to the Government. 
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When a country runs a current account deficit on its balance of 
payments, it has to finance the deficit through net flows of external capital 
which may take the form of debt creating flows such as commercial and official 
loans and credits as well as non-debt creating flows such as foreign investment. 
These external flows augment the supply of a developing country's domestic 
savings and facilitate higher levels of investment and growth in the economy. It 
is nonnal for developing countries to run current account deficits, which lead to 
some build up of external debt. Traditionally, India's reliance on external 
capital for economic development has been quite modest. As a proportion of 
GDP, net inflows of foreign savings amounted to about 2 per cent of GDP 
during 1980s and such savings financed broadly 10 per cent of the country's 
total investment. However, India's reliance on external borrowing increased in 
the latter half of the 1980s and at the same time the concessional components in 
the overall external borrowings showed a declining trend. As a result, India's 
overall debt and debt-servicing burden increased over the 1980s and the 
proportion of short-tenn commercial borrowing also increased. 
The deterioration in external indebtedness and especially the increased 
proportion of short-tenn borrowings, was one of the factors, which led up to the 
crisis of 1991. As part of its programme of economic stabilization and refonn, 
the Government has sought to: reduce the rate of growth of external debt, 
reduce the proportion of short-tenn debt in total debt, increase recourse to non 
debt creating foreign investment flows, and increase the rate of growth of 
exports and other current receipts which provide means for financing import as 
well as debt-service and underpin the long-run health of the balance of 
payments. 
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The high level of external debt is a matter of continuous concern for the 
Government and the policy for the management of external sector is 
consciously directed to keep the debt burden within prudent levels '^'. 
Table 4.9 provides data pertaining to external debt and debt servicing. 
However, it is very difficult to know the actual position of external debt burden 
prior to 1988-89 due to differences in publications of data by different 
agencies. Hitherto there used to be significant differences in debt statistics 
published by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) and the Government of India. 
There were also differences between the estimates released by the Indian 
authorities and those of international agencies, namely, the World Bank, the 
IMF, the Institute of International Finance (IIF), the Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Bank for International 
Settlements (BIS). Until now the debt figures released by the Indian authorities 
(RBI) and (GOl) have invariably been significantly lower than those published 
by the international agencies. The quality of official statistics on India's 
external debt has shown a noticeable improvement recently. The differences 
between debt data put out by the RBI and those published by the Government 
have been essentially due to differences in data sources. The variations in the 
estimates of the different international agencies have been due to differences in 
sources of data coverage and valuation of debt ^^. 
To rationalize the external debt statistics, Reserve Bank of India 
appointed a Task Force on External Debt Statistics of India, which was later 
followed by the Report of the Policy Group. The Group submitted its report on 
March 31, 1992. The Government also published a status report on external 
debt in October 1993. The RBI's Policy Group and Task Force on External 
Debt Statistics of India (1992) tried to reconcile these differences and 
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suggested that while it was not possible to always accept the procedures of the 
international agencies nor hope to change them, the aim should be to ensure 
that the data put out by the RBI and the Government of India are generally 
consistent and uniform and that debt statistics are presented in such a detailed 
and transparent manner that users are able to identify the sources of divergence 
of data from different agencies 
Thus, the data prior to 1988-89 is not strictly comparable with the period 
after 1988-89. The data prior to 1988-89 took into account only medium and 
long-term loans and excluded short-temi loans. But the Task Force has decided 
to include short-tenn debt in the estimation of total external debt. Secondly, 
deposits of non-resident Indians were also excluded. 
The revised estimates of external debt have included the estimates of 
NRI & F.C. (B & O) Deposits, which were not included in the earlier estimates. 
Since these deposits are quite substantial, they account for about 12 to 13 per 
cent of the total debt. 
Secondly in the earlier estimates, defence debt was not included since 
these figures were not made available by the Governments. In the revised 
estimates, defence debt figures have been included. Besides this, the civilian 
debt-owed to the USSR has also been included. These figures of external debt 
have been grouped under rupee debt. 
RBI has also revised the data of short-tenn debt by including NRI 
deposits up to one-year maturity and Foreign Currency Deposits also up to one-
year maturity and other trade related short-tenn debt of 6 months. As a result of 
the revision made in the classification of debt, as also by including NRI and 
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F.C. deposits, the debt estimates have become more comprehensive. This has 
also implications in tenns of the growmg burden of external debt 
However, the external debt position of the country has been taking a 
serious turn with the growing increase in the volume of debt particularly during 
eighties. It is clear from the data given in table 4.9 that although India's total 
external debt is large and is a cause for concern, we are not in danger of falling 
into a debt trap, and ftirthermore the total debt-service burden as measured by 
debt service payments expressed as a percentage of current receipts component 
of the balance of payments, which is the critical indicator, is declining 
India's external debt rose from $ 83.80 billion in 1991 to $ 97.67 billion 
in 1999. In the Year of 1995, India's external debt in dollar tenn was $ 99.01 
billion, which was the first ever-highest external debt after post liberalization 
period. From 1991 to 1999, total external debt has increased by about 1.2 times. 
But figures of external debt in dollar tenn really conceal the burden of debt, 
since the exchange rate between US dollar and rupee had also deteriorated from 
1991 to 1999. Consequently, in rupee tenns, India's external debt rose from Rs. 
163001 crores in 1991 to Rs. 414910 crores in 1999, indicating about 2.5 times 
increase. In tenns of percentage whereas India's external debt rose by 16.6 per 
cent in dollar tenns between 1991-99, it rose by 154.5 per cent in rupee tenns 
during the same period. This wide difference between the growth rate of India's 
external debt in dollar and nipee tenns highlights the actual burden of debt. 
However, the debt indicators have shown steadily improvements over the last 
few years. 
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India's external debt, as a percentage of gross domestic products (GDP) 
at current market prices, rose sharply from 30.4 per cent in 1990-91 to 37.7 per 
cent in 1991-92. But the ratio steadily declined to 23.5 per cent in 1998-99. 
However, the nominal stock of debt is not a good measure of the debt 
burden especially when a large part of debt is of very long-temi and also at 
concessional rates of interest. The best measure of the burden of external debt 
is the flow of debt-service payments (i.e. interest and principal repayments) 
expressed as a percentage of current receipts component of the balance of 
payments (i.e., debt-service ratio). This ratio peaked at 35.3 per cent in 1990-
91. There was a significant reduction to 25.6 per cent in 1993-94, followed by 
an increase in the ratio to 26.2 per cent as repayments of the IMF loan began. 
This ratio again started falling every year and reached to 18 per cent in 
1998-99. 
Similarly, other indicators of external debt have also shown significant 
improvements. Debt-service payments as per cent of GDP at market prices also 
declined from 3.0 per cent in 1990-91, to 2.6 per cent in 1998-99. 
Likewise, India's short-tenn debt which was 10.2 per cent of total 
external debt in 1990-91 declined to 3.9 per cent in 1993-94. However, it again 
rose to 7.2 per cent in 1996-97. This short-tenn debts have an inbuilt element of 
volatility. But India's short-term debt was only 4.5 per cent of total debt in 
1998-99. 
Also the current account deficit as a percentage of GDP (i.e. CAD/GDP 
ratio) has declined from 3.2 per cent in 1990-91 to 1.0 per cent in 1998-99 
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which is lower than the safe limit of 1.6 per cent. But the CAD/GDP ratio from 
1990-91 to 1998-99 has been fluctuating. 
Thus, we can say that India has been successful to some extent to control 
the growing burden of external debt during post liberalization period. However, 
despite improvements in recent years and other redeeming features, India's 
external debt may still be considered to be relatively high by international 
standards. 
Private Foreign Investment 
In the aftennath of the debt crisis of the early 1980s, the view that 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has a more salutary effect on the balance of 
payments (BOP) of developing countries than debt finance has become 
widespread. This is quite apart from the other benefits of FDI, such as greater 
productivity, better quality, lower costs, etc., which are taken to be axiomatic. 
The obvious outcome of such a perception has been a sustained pressure by the 
multilateral aid agencies and OECD Governments on developing countries to 
actively encourage FDI as an integral part of their BOP management 
Strategy . 
Across the world. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been increasing 
dramatically since the beginning of the nineties. Foreign Direct Investment 
plays an important role in the development process of the country. It has the 
potential for making a contribution to the development through the transfer of 
financial resources, technology and innovative and improved management 
techniques. Developing countries like India need substantial foreign inflows to 
achieve the required investment to accelerate economic growth and overall 
development ^^. Given our present balance of payment difficulties, obsolete 
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technology and inadequacy of internal savings, there may be some justification 
for relying on foreign investment to bring about a change in economic 
environment '*°. In recent years, the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
stimulating growth process has increasingly been emphasized. Two main 
arguments have been advanced in support of this view. The first, essentially a 
short-tenn view, maintains that FDI can help mitigate problems encountered in 
external debt management by providing an alternative source of long-tenn 
finance. 
The long-temi view of benefits arising out of FDI is based on the 
perception that such inflows of capital act as 'Engine of Growth' in developing 
countries (UN 1992). It has been argued that FDI, by raising the levels of 
capital fonuation in host countries, significantly contributes to the countries' 
growth process. FDI, according to this view, is seen as an important source of 
foreign savings for the host countries, which augment their domestic resource 
available fo*- investment"". 
India has sought to increase inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
with a much liberal policy since 1991 after four decades of cautious, if not 
always restrictive, attitude to it. The year 1991 saw a paradigm shift in Indian 
economic planning. One of the concomitants of the structural refomis 
introduced during that year was the opening up of the economy for foreign 
investment. In pursuit of policy of liberalization, the Government has recently 
taken a series of measures relating to areas of trade, industry and foreign 
investment. Keeping in view the advantages attendant with foreign investment 
such as technology transfer, marketing expertise, introduction of modem 
managerial techniques and new possibilities for promotion of exports, the 
Govermnent have made significant changes in foreign investment to play a 
250 
wider role in industrial development of India. Since July 1991, as a part of the 
new economic policy, the Government of India has embarked on a policy of 
attracting more and more foreign investment in the country to augment the 
resource availability in infrastructural and other critical areas of economy. 
As we know that the era of concessional development assistance is 
coming to an end. And yet our needs for external capital to fuel rapid economic 
development remain substantial. Greater access to and more use of foreign 
investment is necessary for promoting higher growth of output, exports and 
empolyment. Fifteen years ago when the East Asian Tigers (Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore and Hong Kong) were beginning to be recognized as successful 
cases of rapid economic development, there were few convincing examples of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) leading to or being associated with rapid 
economic growth. Today, this is one of the more important ingredients of the 
Asian Miracle in Malaysia, Thailand, china and Indonesia. FDI has proved to 
be the most effective and rapid method of technology transfer (in the fonn of 
knowledge, technical and marketing skills, organization and management 
systems, new materials and products) and effective promotion of comparative 
advantage through exports. Even when it forms a small fraction of the total 
domestic investment, its catalystic role is out of proportion, to its size. For India 
to aspire to a sustained growth of 7 to 10 per cent over the next decade, we 
have to be prepared to encourage a rapid increase in FDI to levels comparable 
to china's 30 billion or more per year. This requires confidence in our own 
knowledge and capabilities, an open and competitive economy and public 
confidence in procedures for leasing out publicly owned resources such as land, 
mines, electricity distribution networks, ports, etc. 
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Fears of foreign investment swamping our domestic industry are grossly 
exaggerated. The experience of high growth East Asian Economies highlights 
the potential of foreign investment for accelerating the growth of output, 
employment and exports. If China can absorb $ 30 billion a year of foreign 
investment and became a powerful and independent-minded nation, we should 
not feel insecure about using foreign investment to augment the growth of 
output and jobs in our country. 
The political parties in India continue to resist foreign direct investment, 
despite the fact that greater foreign investment is critical for India's rapid 
grovrth, and despite the clear evidence from East Asia that even substantial 
flows of foreign direct investment do not threaten national sovereignty. 
However, a striking aspect of India's recent experience has been a 
remarkable surge in foreign investment. The recent surge of foreign investment 
substantially increased the availability of funding to the Indian private sector. 
Table Nos. from 4.10 to 4.16 give detail infomiations regarding foreign 
investment. Nineteen Eighties witnessed the down of foreign investment related 
refomis. In 1980, the Government released the policy in respect of investors 
from Oil Exporting Developing (OED) countries with the well-defined package 
of exemptions. This had the desired impact. The data set out in Table no. 4.10 
reveals that there has been impressive increase in number of foreign 
collaborations. The number of approvals in the decade (1981-90) was the 
highest and excelled the aggregate number of the previous three decades. Out 
of the total number of foreign collaborations, cases involving financial 
investment were 1842 showing an overall increase of 340.7 per cent during 
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1981-90 than previous decade. The total investment approvals during 1981-91 
was Rs. 1274.02 crores (Table 4.11). 
The eighties, being relatively growth-oriented, deserve to be taken for 
deeper analysis for comparison with the perfomiance of post liberalization 
period. The country-wise foreign collaboration approvals (Table 4.11) during 
the period (1981-90), puts USA at the top with an investment of Rs. 322.71 
crores representing one-fourth (25.33 per cent) followed by Federal Republic of 
Germany (17.15 per cent). Japan, UK, France, Switzerland, Italy and NRI were 
in the race with share in the approvals being 8.4 per cent, 7.09 per cent, 3.46 
per cent, 3.17 per cent, 4.69 per cent and 8.9 per cent respectively. Five 
countries i.e., USA, West Gemiany, Japan, UK and Italy accounted for nearly 
63 per cent of total approved foreign investment. The remarkable feature of the 
decade was the emergence of NRIs as a big player in the total investment 
amounting to Rs. 113.37 crores. 
Table 4.10 
Foreign Collaborations (FC) Approvals (1948 to 1990) 
Decade Period 
1948-60 
1961-70 
1971-80 
1981-90 
Total No. of Foreign 
Collaborations 
1080 
2475 
3041 
7436 
Cases Involving 
Financial Investment 
~ 
800 
418 
1842 
Source: Published Data. 
1. Ministry of Science and Technology, 2. Ministry of Industry. 
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Table 4.11 
Country-wise Break-up of Foreign Investment Approvals 
During 1981-90 By Principal Countries. 
Country 
USA 
West Germany 
Japan 
U.K. 
Italy 
France 
Switzerland 
NRIs 
Others 
Total 
Investment Approvals 
(Rs. Crores) 
322.71 
218.51 
107.39 
90.29 
59.80 
44.09 
40.33 
113.37 
227.53 
1274.02 
Share in Total Investment 
25.33 
17.15 
8.43 
7.05 
4.69 
3.46 
3.17 
8.90 
21.78 
100.00 
Source: Published Data. 
1. Ministry of Science and Technology 
2. Ministry of Industry. 
Foreign Collaboration and Investment: Actual Vs Approval 
After the announcement of new industrial policy (1991), there has been 
acceleration in the flow of foreign capital in India. As per the data given in 
table 4.12, the total foreign investment flows during 1991-92 to 1998-99, were 
of the order of US $ 28.79 billion, out of which about 13.33 billion (46.3 per 
cent) were in the forni of foreign Direct Investment and the remaining $ 15.47 
billion (53.7 per cent) were in the form of portfolio investment. This clearly 
shows that the preference of foreign finns was more in favour of portfolio 
investment and much less in the fonn of direct investment. 
The point, which needs to be emphasised is that foreign direct 
investment was 46.3 per cent of total investment and even out of it 11.6 per 
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cent was contributed by non-resident Indians. Thus, the net contribution of 
foreign finns in direct investment was merely 34.7 per cent of total foreign 
investment flows. 
Table 4.12 
Foreign Investment Flows By Category 
(US $ Million) 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
1997-98 
1998-99 
Total 
(1991-92 to 
1998-99) 
Direct Investment 
Foreigners' 
(1) 
66 
264 
369 
872 
1418 
2057 
2956 
2000 
10002 
(34.74) 
NRIs' 
(2) 
63 
51 
217 
442 
726 
764 
601 
462 
3326 
(11.55) 
Sub Total 
(3=1+2) 
129 
315 
586 
1314 
2144 
2821 
3557 
2462 
13328 
(46.29) 
Portfolio Invest 
FIIs 
(4) 
1 
1665 
1503 
2009 
1926 
979 
-390 
7693 
(26.72) 
Others^ 
(5) 
4 
243 
1902 
2321 
739 
1386 
849 
329 
7773 
(27.0) 
ment 
Sub-Total 
(6= 4+5) 
4 
244 
3567 
3824 
2748 
3312 
1828 
-61 
15466 
(53.71) 
Grand Total 
(7=3+6) 
133 
559 
4153 
5138 
4892 
6133 
5385 
2401 
28794 
(100.0) 
Note: 1. Foreigners Include Investment Flows By RBI Automatic Route And 
SIA/FIPB Route 
2. NRIs Includes Acquisition Of Shares Of Indian Companies Under Section 
29 Of FERA 
3. Others Include Euro-Equities (GDR Amounts Raised By Indian 
Corporats) And Offshore Funds And Others. 
4. Figures In Brackets Are Percentage Of Total Investment. 
Source: Compiled From Economic Survey, 1990-2000, Ministry of Finance, 
Government Of India 
In response to the policies of liberalization, the foreign investors were 
very keen to undertake portfolio investment, including GDR (Global 
Depository Receipts) and investment by Foreign Institutional Investors, Euro 
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equities and others. However, the portfolio investment is of a speculative nature 
and is hot money, which can take to flight in a period of political and economic 
uncertainty. It was not wise on the part of India to perniit portfolio investment 
because this has only strengthened the foreign business fimis to control the 
share market. Such a course is not beneficial to the country. 
It is clear from Table 4.13 that out of the total 15163 foreign 
collaborations, 9077 (59.9 per cent) involved financial collaborations. This is a 
commendable achievement of 'Post-Policy Period'. This is what the policy 
Table 4.13 
Total Foreign Technology Agreements and Foreign Direct Investment 
Approvals Vs Actual Inflows. 
Year 
1981-85 
1986-90 
1991 
1992 
199.^  
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999' 
No of Approved Collaboration 
Technical 
2740 
28^1 
661 
828 
691 
792 
982 
744 
660 
595 
133 
Total 
1991-1999 
6086 
Financial 
688 
1154 
289 
692 
785 
1062 
1355 
1559 
1665 
1191 
479 
9077 
Total 
3428 
4007 
950 
1520 
1476 
1854 
2337 
2303 
2325 
1786 
612 
15163 
•"o Share of 
Financial 
Collaboration 
20 1 
28 8 
30 4 
45 5 
53 2 
57 3 
58 0 
67.7 
71.6 
66 7 
78 3 
59 9 
Amount 
Approved 
(Rs Crore) 
375 
899 
534 
3888 
8859 
14190 
32070 
36150 
54891 
30810 
13180 
194572 
Acutal Inflow 
(Rs Crore) 
" 
-
351 
675 
1787 
3289 
6820 
10389 
16425 
13340 
6826 
59902 
Actual/Approved 
-
" 
65 7 
174 
20 2 
23 2 
213 
28 7 
29 9 
43 3 
518 
30 8 
Note: Figures In Brackets Are Growth Rates 
* Figures for 1999 is up to 30-4-99 
Source 1 SI A Newsletter, May 1999, Ministry of Industry, Government of India 
2 Economic Survey, 1999-2000, Ministry Of Finance, Government Of India 
Hand Book of Industrial Statistics, Ministry of Industry, Government of 
India. 
aspired for. The financial collaborations has shown increasing trend. It was just 
30.4 per cent in 1991 but increased to 78.3 per cent in 1999. However, the 
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scene of actual flow of FDI has been different. Out of the total amount Rs. 
194572 crores approved for Foreign Direct Investment from 1991 to 1999, 
India could actually received only Rs. 59902 crores which account for just 30.8 
per cent. However, the ratio of actual inflow to approved amount increased 
from 17.4 per cent in 1992 to 43.3 per cent in 1998 and 51.8 per cent in 1999. 
This shows the remarkable improvement in the actual inflow of FDI. 
Industry-wise pattern of Approvals 
Table 4.14 shows the shares of different sectors in approved Foreign Direct 
Investment during 1991 to 1999. The table reveals that nearly 75 per cent of the 
FDI approvals were made in priority sectors like power, friels. 
Table 4.14 
Shares of Different Sectors in Approved Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
(1991 to 1999*) 
Industry/Sector 
A. Pnority Sector 
Power and Fuel 
Telecommunications 
Chemicals (other than fertilizers) 
Metallurgical Industries 
Transport Sectpr 
Electrical Equipments 
(Including software) 
Industrial Machinery 
Sub-Total 
B Non-priority Sector 
Sector Service sector 
Food Processing Industries 
Hotels & Tourism 
fcxlilcs (including dyed Printed) 
Paper & Pulp (including paper products) 
Fermcnialion Industries 
Sugar 
Others 
Sub-Total 
Grand Total 
No of 
Approvals 
394 
395 
695 
256 
504 
1526 
451 
4221 
6I() 
579 
231 
446 
97 
42 
6 
2758 
4769 
8990 
Investments Approved 
(Rs Crores) 
61271 
35819 
11403 
11303 
13324 
10316 
2093 
145529 
11758 
8415 
4109 
2877 
2491 
1128 
1001 
17175 
48954 
194483 
Share in Total 
Investment (%) 
3150 
1814 
5 86 
5 82 
6 86 
5 30 
108 
74 83 
614 
4 34 
211 
148 
128 
0 58 
OM 
8 73 
25 17 
100 0 
Notes * Figures For 1999 Is up to 30/04/99 
Source Based On The Data Provided In Ministry Of Industry, SIA Newsletter, May 
1999 
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metallurgical industries, electrical equipment and software, chemicals, 
transportation, industrial machinery and telecommunications. Power and fuels 
has occupied the highest share of FDI approvals not only in priority sectors but 
also in non-priority sectors followed by Telecommunications. The third 
important industry in priority sectors to attract more foreign investment during 
the period under review is the transport sector. The share of non-priority sector 
in total foreign direct investment approved during 1991 to 1999 was 25.17 per 
cent. Of these, food-processing industry (4.34 per cent) occupied second 
highest share just after service sector (6.14 per cent). 
Country-wise Distribution of Approvals 
There has been a significant shift in the sources of FDI compared to the 
pre-liberalization period. The country-wise break-up of foreign investment 
approvals during 1991-99 shows that the USA is the top investor followed by 
Mauritius, UK, NRIs, Japan, Gemiany and South Korea (Table 4.15). USA has 
been the single largest investing country in the pre-and post-refonn period. It 
has maintained its top position throughout. USA alone contributed 22.3 per 
cent (Rs. 43347 crores) followed by Mauritius 10.6 per cent (Rs 20674 crores) 
and UK 7.2 per cent (Rs. 14024 crores). In fact, Mauritius, being a tax shelter, 
is a conduit for investors fi-om other developed countries so that they can save 
some tax. Therefore, much of the investment routed through Mauritius can be 
traced to US companies. Some of the investments from Mauritius as also 
Switzerland have NRI association. If these factors are taken into account, the 
share of USA and NRIs would turn out to be more substantial. 
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Table 4.15 
Country-wise Break-up of FDI Approved During 1991 to 1999' 
Country 
l.USA 
2. Mauritius 
3. U.K. 
4. Korea (South) 
5. Japan 
6. Germany 
7. NRIs 
8. Australia 
9. Malaysia 
10. France 
11. Israel 
12. Netherlands 
13. Belgium 
14. Singapore 
15. Italy 
Others 
Total 
1 
Amount (Rs. Crore) 
43347 
20674 
14024 
9143 
7940 
7598 
7534 
5920 
5454 
4390 
4227 
4108 
3910 
3594 
3292 
49423 
194578 
Percent of Total 
22.3 
10.6 
7.2 
4.7 
4.1 
3.9 
3.8 
3.0 
2.8 
2.3 
2.2 
2.1 
2.0 
1.8 
1.7 
25.4 
100.0 
Note: Others Include Euro Issues (GDRs)/FCCBs 
* Figures for 1999 is up to 30. 4. 99. 
Source: Based on Data Provided by Ministry of Industry, SIA Newsletter, May 
1999. 
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A look at NRIs investment proposals shows that there has been 
considerable interest on their part to invest in India. NRIs investment proposals 
totalled Rs. 7534 crores (3.8 per cent) during 1991 to 1999, which ranked 
seventh in the list of country-wise break-up of foreign investment approvals. 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Host Region: 
Table 4.16 shows that the foreign Direct Investment flows for all 
developing countries have increased from $ 51.1 billion US dollar in 1992 to 
about US $ 165.9 billion by 1998. Of the total FDI flows for all developing 
countries, India could manage 0.4 per cent (US $ 0.2 billion) share in 1992 
which increased to 1.4 per cent (US $ 2.3 billion) in 1998. While China 
received US $ 11.2 billion (21.8 per cent share) in 1992 which increased to US 
$ 35.8 billion (33.7 per cent) in 1995 and then its share declined to 27.4 per 
cent in 1998. Similarly India's share also declined from 2.0 per cent in 1995 to 
1.4 per cent in 1998. Obviously, India could not attract much Foreign Direct 
Investment as compared with other developing countries. Thus, India has not 
been able to benefit much from Foreign Direct Investment in the world despite 
the red carpet spread by it for the foreign investors. 
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INVESTING IN PEOPLE 
Human Resource Development (HRD) deals with creating conditions 
that enable people to get the best out of themselves and their lives. 
Development is a never-ending process. As people develop themselves in new 
directions, new problems and issues arise, requiring them to develop new 
competencies to meet the changing requirements, aspirations and problems. 
There are, however, some universal goals towards which all human resource 
development efforts should aim to achieve. 
The most important and common objective of human resource 
development at all levels is competence (capacity) building for a healthy and 
happy living competencies help people to bring happiness to their lives. They 
are the best possible means to achieve a variety of goals. They are also a 
powerful means for income generation and upgradation of quality of life in the 
family, organisation or country. The only exception where such competency-
building is not needed is perhaps for those who are bom rich and have an 
access to all comforts and happiness through their economic situation. 
However, individuals, organisations and countries with good economic base 
seem to have become even richer through investments on human resources and 
continue to spend a considerable part of their other resource on developing new 
competencies.' 
The world has progressed in many unique ways and directions in the last 
tliree decades. It has developed technologically, economically and industrially. 
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It is also richer in ternis of human capabilities, facilities and quality of 
living. Improvements in education, communications, technology and markets 
have made the world a global village. People live longer today, are better 
infonned, can communicate with one another across the world and therefore 
carry on economic, professional, educational, social and other activities with 
ease. These decades of development indicate the vast potential for creating a 
world of order, security and well-being. 
The developments of the last tliree decades also indicate that while 
remarkable progress has been made in a number of directions, the fruits of 
development have not benefited the world's growing number of poor people. 
And where some benefits have reached the poor, new problems are appearing 
in the fonn of deteriorating social fabric and environmental degradation. 
The world faces two major developmental challenges. The first is to 
ensure that the fi'uits of development reach the most needy through equitable 
distribution of resources, opportunities and benefits. The second is to develop 
human capabilities and address the challenges of development - political, 
economic and social. The few countries that have been able to meet both these 
challenges have demonstrated the importance of investing in developing people 
and improving the quality of their life tlirough the adoption of human resource 
development strategies. 
Today., there is practically no Government or international agency that 
does not see the importance of human resource development i.e., investing in 
people. The World Bank; The United Nations and its constituent bodies 
including UNDP, UNIDO, WHO, ILO, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNFPA, 
UNESCAP; regional bodies like ASEAN and SAARC; the South Commission; 
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the common wealth secretariat; international Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs); and bilateral aid agencies, all recognise the need for, 
and the importance of human resource development. The components and 
dimensions of human resources development which they perceive as being of 
strategic importance at a given point of time, for a given country or group of 
countries, may vary, but the focus is unifonn. 
The context for the renewed emphasis on human resource development 
is significant. The structural adjustment programmes adopted in a number of 
countries have brought home the vulnerability of human development 
variables. The linkages between investments in human development 
programmes and economic development have become sharper. There have 
been major international devlopments - such as the opening of global markets, 
the increased market orientation of economies and the restructuring in socialist 
countries - which have given rise to an increased competition, forcing 
developing countries to produce and market quality products at competitive 
prices. At the same time a range of concerns, including environmental issues, 
the changing role of women, the new information culture and demands for 
liberalisation and democracy, are influencing policy and practice. 
The knowledge base surrounding human resource development is 
increasing rapidly, within Governments and agencies. It is an area where there 
are many pressing demands. These demands have to be balanced. Resources 
have to be found, frontiers agreed upon and strategies fomiulated. These are 
issues with which policy-makers, planners, decision-makers, sectoral planners 
and Government managers have to contend.^  
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The national Governments and inter-governmental and international 
agencies have a responsibility to ensure that a certain minimum level of 
development takes place for all people and all societies. Thus, the first goal of 
any Government is to ensure that basic minimum capabilities of people that are 
required for survival and healthy living are developed. This is the reason for 
considering programmes that ensure the availability of food and basic nutrition, 
water, sanitation and other health facilities as the first-level, basic HRD 
programmes. They ensure that people survive to develop themselves further. 
Also included in this basic list are the basic education programmes for literacy 
and primary education and income / employinent - generation programmes for 
the poor. These are considered basic because in the modem world basic literacy 
and education are expected to equip the individual with instruments for an 
infomied and self-sustaining living, although in exceptional cases and in some 
it is possible to have such an infomied and self-sustaining living without 
literacy and wilh some other fonns of education. However, this situation is 
changing fast, with the world moving towards a global village. Such societies 
and groups may not last much longer or may be exploited by others in the 
changed scenario. At least to escape such changes, it is necessary to equip 
people with literacy, basic education and income generation skills. It is, 
therefore, the responsibility of national Governments to provide these basic 
HRD facilities to all people. National development policies and prograirunes 
should take care of this need. Public policy interventions through resource 
allocation and programme formation try to achieve these goals. In the past 
some countries have : (a) either neglected this and therefore allocated very few 
resources without realising the long term effects of such lopsided policies, (b) 
or have implemented such programmes very ineffectively, and as a result the 
benefits did not reach those for whom they were meant and benefited those 
who were already part of a better group. In the changing world, Governments 
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can no longer be blind to this with international pressure and the work of 
some NGOs and missionaries, even reluctant Governments are being required 
to formulate HRD policies and programmes to meet the basic HRD needs. 
In the past, mistakes were made by Governments and international 
agencies even with good intentions or out of a lack of understanding and 
knowledge. With the increasing knowledge base, national Governments and 
international agencies are becoming wiser and are trying to give the right kind 
of emphasis to HRD policies and programme. For example, until a few years 
ago, the consequences of neglecting the human dimensions of development had 
not been recognised. The structural adjustment programmes of some countries 
brought out the vulnerability of HRD policies and programmes, and the 
consequential fall in human development variables and their impact on the 
economic well-being of countries. Also, the linkages between investments in 
human development programmes and economic development variables have 
become more sharper. At the same time, another development that has taken 
place internationally is the opening of global markets and increased market 
orientation of economies. Competitiveness has gone up globally, forcing 
developing countries to produce and market quality products at competitive 
prices. Even knowledge has become a highly priced commodity. With these 
changes cutting into the economy of developing countries which enjoyed 
certain market share in past, such countries are required to change their 
strategies and improve their technologies to compete in the global market. This 
required them to pay attention to another level of human resource development 
that provides quick results and protects the economy."^  
Some writers have gone to the extent of defining under-development as 
failure to make use of human resources. Therefore, it has been realised that a 
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country, which commits itself to accelerated growth, must invest wisely in 
both things and people. And, in doing so, it must develop a sense of priority, so 
that savings and human resources are directed in most productive channels. 
The economic return from public and private investments in people are 
often extremely high. Markets in developing countries can not generally be 
relied upon to provide people - especially the poorest - with adequate education 
(especially primary education), health care, nutrition, and family planning 
services. However, the Governments are investing far too little in human 
development. 
In addition to increasing the quantity of human investment, Governments 
must improve its quality. Too often, capital investments go forward with 
inadequate provision for the recurrent expenditures they entail, which results in 
wastefiil under-utilization. And expenditures are frequently poorly targeted and 
involve a great deal of leakages. There is need to reduce heavy subsidies for 
higher education and to spend much more on primary education, from which 
the returns are relatively higher. The case for a similar switch in spending from 
expensive curative health care systems to primary system is also strong.^ 
Health 
In 1890, Alfred Marshall wrote that " health and strength, physical, 
mental, and moral are the basis of industrial wealth; while conversely 
the chief importance of material wealth lies in the fact that when wisely used, it 
increases the wealth and strength, physical, mental, and moral, of the human 
race". The historical experience of nations bears witness to this statement. 
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Better diets, housing and control of communicable diseases have 
raised the quality of life everywhere. By reducing illness, these improvements 
have increased people's alertness, capacity for leaving and ability to cope with 
and enjoy life. By prolonging life, they have made investments in knowledge 
and skills even more worth while. And the benefits of good health flow well 
into the feature: a mother's good health strongly influences the early physical 
and mental development of her children. 
Better health is desirable as an end in itself But it also brings substantial 
economic benefits - releasing resources that can then be used to achieve other 
development goals. Better health and nutrition raise worker's productivity, 
decrease the number of days they are ill, and prolong their potential working 
lives. 
Health and nutrition also have long-run effects on productivity and 
output because they influence a child's ability and motivation to learn. Disease 
and malnutrition in infancy may retard mental development and illness and 
temporary hunger may reduce children's ability to concentrate and keep them 
away from school.^ 
Since, the health sector is very important for investing in people, thus, 
the Government must give proper attention to this sector. However, the 
activities of Government in health sector are numerous - ranging from cradle to 
grave. Broadly speaking, they fall into curative, preventive, administrative and 
miscellaneous services which again fall into several programmes and sub-
programmes. Under curative services, there are activities like medical relief. 
Employee's State Insurance Scheme (ESIS), Central Government Health 
Scheme (CGHS), medical education, training and research, etc. Under 
272 
preventive services there are prevention and control of diseases, prevention 
of food adulterations, drug control, health education and publicity, minimum 
needs programme, etc. Under direction and administration and miscellaneous 
there are rest of activities. 
According to market - friendly approach, the Governments in developing 
countries should spend far less than they now do on less cost-effective 
interventions and instead double or triple spending on basic public health 
programmes such as immunizations and AIDS prevention and on essential 
clinical services. A minimum package of essential clinical services would 
include sick child care, family plarming, prenatal and delivery care, and 
treatment for tuberculosis, STDs and care for the common serious illnesses of 
young clildren - diarrhoeal disease, acute respiratory infection, measles, malaria 
and acute malnutrition. These clinical interventions are all lightly cost-
effective. 
Thus, India must redirect current public spending for health and increase 
expenditures to meet needs for public health and the minimum package of 
essential clinical services for her populations. 
Many health services have such low cost-effectiveness that Governments 
need to consider excluding them from the essential clinical package. In low 
income countries, these might include heart surgery; treatment (other than pain 
relief) of highly fatal cancers of the lungs, liver and stomach; expensive drug 
therapies for HIV infection; and intensive care for severely premature babies. It 
is hard to justify using Government funds for these medical treatments at the 
same time that much more cost-effective services which benefit mainly the 
poor are not adequately financed. 
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Ensuring basic public health services and essential clinical care while the 
rest of the health system becomes self-financed require substantial health 
system refonns and reallocation of public spending. Only by reducing or 
eliminating spending on discretionary clinical services can Governments 
concentiate on ensuring cost-effective clinical care for the poor. 
Greater reliance on the private sector to deliver clinical services, both 
those are included by a country in its essential package and those that are 
discretionary can help raise efficincy.^  
Impact of Reform on Health Sector 
Health is a state subject in the Indian constitution. The promotive, 
preventive, curative and rehabilitative services are the responsibility o^the state 
Governments. Central Government can only intervene to assist and it has done 
so in many areas such as control / eradication of major communicable and non-
communicable diseases through various National Health Programmes, broad 
policy fonnulations, international health, medical and para medical education 
along with regulatory measures, drug control and prevention of food 
adulteration and family welfare (a euphemism for family planning). 
The expenditure incurred by the central Government is routed through 
the State Governments under various centrally sponsored programmes. Since 
India is committed under the Alma Ala declaration to provide health for all 
through the primary health care approach, a huge network of rural health 
infrastructure have been set up throughout the country to provide 
comprehensive health care in the rural areas.'^  
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The pattern of expenditure incurred by the states and the Union 
Government is shown in Table 5.1. The immediate fallout of the new polices 
was a cut in budgetary support to the health sector. The cuts were severe in the 
Table No. 5.1 
Ratio of Plan Investments in Health to Plan Investments in All Sectors 
(Rs. Crore) 
Period 
1985-86 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1988-89 
1989-90 
VII Plan 
(1985-90) 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
1996-97 
VIII Plan 
(1992-97) 
Total Plan 
Investment (Actual) 
33059.9 
39149.1 
42920.6 
48069.8 
55530.2 
218729.6 
58369.3 
64751.2 
72852.4 
88080.7 
98167.3 
107380.4 
118976.4 
485457.2 
Health (Actual) 
579.9 
641.8 
724.3 
831.0 
911.6 
3688.6 
1040.8 
924.8 
1213.9 
1300.4 
1625.9 
1929.1 
2068.3 
8137.6 
% of Col. 3 
to Col. 2 
1.8 
1.6 
1.7 
1.7 
1.6 
1.7 
1.8 
1.4 
1.7 
1.5 
1.7 
1.8 
1.7 
1.7 
Source : Economic Survey, 1999-2000, Ministry of Finance, India. 
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first and third years of the refonn process, followed by some restoration in 
the later years. The combined expenditure of the centre and state Governments 
on the health sector was 1.8 per cent of the total plan investments (actuals) in 
1990-91, it declined to 1.4 per cent in 1991-92 and 1.5 per cent in 1993-94. But 
it increased in the year 1995-96 and again became 1.8 per cent of the total plan 
investment. However, the same percentage could not be maintained in the latter 
years. A notable feature of the expenditure on health is that the expenditure on 
health as percentage of total plan investment remained same (1.7%) during the 
VII plan (1985-90) and VIII plan (1992-97.) 
Similarly, some interesting facts emerge from the figures given in Table 
5.2. While between 1990-91 and 1993-94, there was a fall, in real terms, of 
expenditure on health care both for the centre and the state, it was much more 
pronounced in the case of the states. Expenditure for states, in 199?-94 was 
lower that that in 1990-91, though it had risen in the case ol' central 
Govermnent expenditure. Moreover, the expenditure incurred by the ;>tates on 
health care, as a percentage of total developmental expenditure incurred by 
them, remained fairly constant. Wliat, however, did happen in this period was a 
compression of total developmental expenditure of State Governments. Thus, 
expenditure, in real terms, for state Governments plummeted in 1991-92 and 
1992-93, and just about touched the level of 1990-91 in 1993-94. But by 1993-
94 central Government expenditure had increased by almost 20 per cent 
over the level achieved in 1990-91. 
The fall in expenditure by State Governments is a direct consequence of 
refonns. States in this period, were starved of funds due to lower transfers as 
well as due to the yield from shareable taxes (i.e. taxes in which states get a 
share) falling from 5.6 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 5.1 per cent in 1993-94. 
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Table No. 5.2 
Real Expenditure / Allocation in The Health Sector in Annual Plans 
(1990-91 to 1995-96) 
(At Constant 1990-91 Prices in Rs. Crore) 
Year 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
(RE) 
1995-96 
(RE) 
Total Development 
Centre 
+ States 
40062.79 
39074.95 
39946.00 
44573.00 
48482.00 
54662.00 
Centre 
23511.51 
22839.33 
23958.00 
27942.00 
31186.00 
33518.00 
States 
16551.15 
16235.62 
15988.00 
16631.00 
17296.00 
21144.00 
Health 
Centre 
+ States 
659.53 
(1.65) 
628.99 
(1.61) 
665.00 
(1.67) 
658.00 
(1.48) 
780.00 
(1.61) 
924.00 
(1.69) 
Centre 
188.75 
(0.80) 
182.25 
(0.80) 
210.00 
(0.88) 
203.00 
(0.73) 
273.00 
(0.88) 
285.00 
(0.85) 
States 
470.80 
(2.84) 
446.74 
(2.75) 
455.00 
(2.85) 
454.00 
(2.73) 
507.00 
(2.93) 
639.00 
(3.02) 
Note: Figures in Parenthesis denote percentage over total 
developmental expenditure. 
Source: Amit Sen Gupta, " Economic Reforms, Health and 
Phamiaceuticals", Economic and Political Weekly, November 30, 
1996. 
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This squeeze on the resources of State was distributed in a fairly 
secular fashion over the expenditures incurred under all development heads. 
Health care was a major casualty, as the share of states constitutes a major 
(approximately 75 per cent) portion of expenditure. A similar kind of squeeze 
in resource allocation was felt in all programmes, largely financed by the states, 
including water supply and sanitation. In contrast, even in the worst 'resource 
crunch' years, the almost exclusively centrally funded family planning 
programme fared much better. 
Health Status 
India is already a signatory of the Alma Ata declaration of 1978 and is 
committed to attaining 'Health For All'. At Alma Ata the WHO and the 
UNICEF had presented a radical new strategy based on primary Health care for 
achieving health for all. The National Health Policy which was adopttid by the 
parliament in 1983 reiterated India's commitment to attain the goal of 'Health 
For Air by 2000 A.D. to ensure improved quality of life. Some of the targets 
set out in these policy objectives and the corresponding achievement are shown 
in Table 5.3 and 5.4. These tables show how far the Government has been 
successful to accelerate the improvement in all these health indicators after 
refonns. The two most widely used indicators of health status, life expectancy 
at birth and infant mortality, has improved. Life expectancy at birth increased 
from 59.4 years in 1991 to 62.4 years in 1996 and the infant mortality rate 
declined from 80 per thousand to 72 during the same period. In 1997 the infant 
mortality rate declined to 71. But the urban areas show more declines than the 
rural areas. In urban areas, it declined by 15.1 per cent and in rural areas by 
11.5 per cent from 1991 to 1997. The decline in infant mortality in urban areas 
more than rural areas reveals the inadequacy of medical facilities available in 
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Table No. 5.3 
Basic Indicators of Human Development 
Indicator 
1. Crude Death Rate (per 
1000) 
2. Crude Birth Rate (per 
1000) 
3. Life Expectancy (Years) 
4. Infant Mortality Rate (per 
1000 Birth) 
Target 
2000 
9 
21 
64 
Below 60 
1991 
9.8 
29.5 
59.4 
80 
1995 
10 
29 
62 
69 
1996 
9.0 
27.5 
62.4 
72 
1997 
8.9 
27.2 
NA 
71 
1998* 
9.0 
1 
26.4 
NA 
72 
Note: * Provisional. 
Source: An Alternative Economic Survey, 1991-98, Pub. By Delhi 
Science Forum, New Delhi and Economic Survey, 1999-2000, 
Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, India. 
rural areas. Therefore, the Government must give more attention towards rural 
areas where the private sectors are not available / ready to provide medical 
facilities / or inadequate. In India, majority of the people lives in rural areas, 
where facilities are lacking, while private sectors are mostly concentrated in 
urban areas. However, both the life expectancy and infant mortality are below 
the targets to be achieved by 2000. India could achieve only the target of crude 
death rate of 9 per thousand population before the year 2000. 
279 
Table No. 5.4 
Infant Mortality Rates By Rural and Urban Areas in India. 
Year 
1981 
1985 
1990 
1991* 
1992* 
1993* 
1994* 
1995* 
1996 
1997 
Rural 
119 
107 
86 
87 
85 
82 
80 
80 
77 
77 
Urban 
62 
59 
50 
53 
53 
45 . 
52 
48 
46 
45 
Combined 
110 
97 
80 
80 
79 
74 
74 
74 
72 
71 
Note: Excludes Jammu & Kashmir and Mizoram 
Source : Selected Socio-Economic Statistics, India, 1998, CSO, New 
Delhi. 
When we compare the life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rate 
in 1997 from other Asian countries, the improvements are not impressive. It 
can be seen from Table 5.5 that life expectancy at birth in India in 1997 is only 
62.4 years while Korea (Republic), Malaysia, China, Thailand, Philippines, 
Indonesia and Pakistan have 72.4, 72.0, 69.8, 68.8, 68.3, 65.1 and 64.0 years 
respectively. Similarly in case of infant mortality rate, India is having the third 
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Table No. 5.5 
Indicators of Human Development For Some Asian Countries - 1997. 
Country 
India 
Bangladesh 
China 
Indonesia 
Korea, Republic 
Malaysia 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Thailand 
Life Expectancy at 
Birth (Years) 
62.4 
58.1 
69.8 
65.1 
72.4 
72.0 
64.0 
68.3 
68.8 
Infant Mortality Rate 
(per 1000 Births) 
71 
81 
38 
45 
06 
10 
95 
32 
31 
Source : Economic Survey, 1999-2000, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, 
India. 
highest infant mortality rate among all the Asian countries mentioned in Table 
5.5. when we compare to Korea (Republic), Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines 
and China, it is higher by 11.8, 7.1, 2.3, 2.2 and 1.9 times respectively. 
Health Infrastructure 
The expansion of health infrastructure over the years is depicted in the 
Table 5.6 and 5.7. The health services, as of today, still suffer from a lot of 
inadequacies. There are disparities in urban-rural health infrastructure, backlogs 
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in provision of buildings for Primary Health Centres (PHCs) and sub-
centres, inappropriate location / inadequate maintenance of existing buildings, 
non-availability of essential drugs, secondary Health Care Centres (Hosptals) 
discharging the functions of PHCs as well and over crowding of tertiary health 
care facilities in urban areas. As per 1991 census, 134108 sub-centres, 22349 
Primary Health Centres (PHCs) and 5587 Community Health Centres (CHCs ) 
were required. In 1995, 132730 sub-centres and 21854 Primary Health Centres 
and 2424 Community Health Centres were functioning, making the gap of 
10081, 2003 and 3183 of sub-centres, PHCs and CHCs respectively. This gap 
Table No. 5.6 
Gaps in Primary Health Care Infrastructure. 
Category of 
Infrastructure 
Sub - Centre 
Primary Health 
Centre 
Community Health 
Centre 
Require-
ment as 
per 1991 
census 
134,108 
22,349 
5,587 
Function 
-ing 
Centres 
1995 
132,730 
21,854 
2,424 
Functo 
n-ing 
Centres 
1997 
136,815 
22,962 
2,708 
Gap* 
Between 
1991 and 
1995 
10,081 
2,003 
3,183 
Gap 
Between 
1991 and 
1997 
7,686 
1,521 
2,903 
Note Ignoring the states with Surplus Infrastructure 
Source: Fifty years of Indian Parliamentry Democracy, Lok Sabha 
Secreteriat, New Delhi, August, 1997 and Annual Report - 1998-
99, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare, Government of India. 
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Table No. 5.7 
Manpower Gaps in Primary Health Care Institutions 
Category of Manpower 
Specialists 
Doctors at PHCs 
Block Extension Educator / Health 
Educator 
Phamiacist 
Lab Technician 
X-ray Technician / Radiographer 
Nurse Midwife 
Health Assistant (M) 
Health Assistant (F) 
Health Worker (M) 
Health Worker (F)(Sub-centre + 
PHC) 
Requiremen 
t as per 1991 
census 
22,348 
22,349 
27,936 
33,523 
33,523 
5,587 
61,458 
22,349 
22,349 
134,108 
156,457 
In Position 
as on 
30.6.96 
2,751 
26,930 
5,621 
20,022 
9,711 
1,288 
12,683 
15,745 
18,904 
62,229 
133,773 
Gap (2-3) 
19,597 
-4,481 
22,315 
13,501 
23,812 
4,299 
48,775 
6,604 
3,445 
71,879 
22,684 
Source: Fifty years of Indian parliamentary Democracy, Lok Sabha 
Secretariat, New Delhi, August 1997, Table 7.4. 
reduced to 7686, 1521 and 2903 of sub-centres, PHCs and CHCs respectively 
in 1997 (Table 5.6). This shows that although the gap declined, but still there is 
large gap. There is also a significant gap between need and availability of 
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medical staff. As against the national nonn of one male and one female 
multipurpose worker per health sub-centre to service a population of 3000 to 
5000, only half the number of posts stand sanctioned. Nearly, 100,000 health 
workers are short in availability. Para medical staff-phannacists, lab-
technicians, X-ray technicians, nurse, midwives etc. seriously fall short of 
needs. Even 10 per cent of the PHCs are being run without doctors. The 
universal norm of ratio between doctors and nurses is 1:3. The actual ratio 
obtaining in the country is 1:0.9. We are short of nearly a million nurses. 
Indeed, health manpower planning needs significant improvement. 
Education 
Investing in education seems to be an important strategic intervention 
that Governments can make. Education seems to have the capability to 
influence many other variables. Orchestrating the investments in education in 
such a way that they can yield the maximum possible returns is an issue that 
deserves considerable attention. 
Educators, policy makers and more recently economists have stressed 
the importance of primary education. The world conference on education for all 
listed some consequences of investments in basic education. Primary education 
is known: 
1. To improve productivity of factor workers. 
2. To help people in the field by providing necessary skills for self-
employment and entrepreneurship. 
3. To help people to earn higher incomes through informed 
consumption choices and improved household management. 
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4. To contribute to increase in fanner productivity through 
adoption of technology, use of credit, infonnation and marketing 
systems. 
5. To lead to higher earnings by workers and entrepreneurs. 
6. To yield higher rates of both private and social returns than other 
levels of schooling. 
In Addition: 
1. Increase in literacy was found to contribute to increase in 
investment and in output per worker. They were also correlated 
with increased life expectancy and reduced infant and maternal 
mortality. 
2. Overall differences in patterns of educational investment at 
national level were found significant in explaining national rates 
of economic growth and other indicators of development. 
3. The possession of knowledge and reasoning ability is increasingly 
defining the individual and national efficacy. To be deprived of 
basic education is to be deprived of the essential tools of modem 
living. 
4. With increased global interdependencies, education becomes an 
important tool to reduce disparities and build common cultural 
understanding within and between nations. 
5. Effective education is a unique means to promote participation of 
individuals in local communities and in the global society. 
6. Marginalised populations depend on their knowledge and 
problem- solving skills to deal with the hardships created by war, 
civil strife and crime as well as discrimination. 
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7. Increased level of basic learning helps alleviate condition of 
disadvantage and thus contribute to reduction of social disparities. 
8. Marginalised populations need basic education to prepare them 
for effective migration, social and occupational mobility, access to 
new infonnation and markets and adaptation to new environment. 
9. Increased knowledge helps to inforni the individual of the real 
costs of environment, damage and to promote ecologically sound 
development and laud replenishment. 
10. Education, particularly of girls and women, does a great deal to 
control population growth.'° 
The world conference on Education For All expanded the vision of basic 
education for all. It emphasised: 
1. Universalising Access and promoting Equity: Basic education 
should be provided to all children, youth and adults. To this end, 
basic education services of quality should be expanded and 
consistent measures must be taken to reduce disparities. 
2. Focus on learning: The focus must be on actual learning, 
acquisition and outcomes rather than upon enrolment, continued 
participation in organised programmes and completion of 
certification requirements. Efforts should be made to maintain 
basic learning skills once they are acquired. 
3. Broadening the Means and Scope of Basic Education: The 
broadening should include four elements. 
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• As learning begins at birth, this calls for early 
childhood care and initial education. These can be provided 
through arrangements involving families, communities or 
institutional programmes as appropriate. 
• The main delivery system for the basic education of 
children outside the family is primary schooling. 
• Basic learning needs of youth and adults are diverse and be 
met through a variety of delivery systems. Literacy 
programmes are indispensable. 
• Available instruments and channels of infomiation, 
communication and social action should be used to convey 
essential knowledge and inforni and educate people on 
social issues. 
4. Enhancing the Environment for Learning: The environment 
for learning should be enhanced at the family level, individual 
level (through nutrition and health) and school level (teachers, 
facilities etc.). 
5. Strengthening Partnerships: Partnerships among all sub-sectors 
and fonns of education, between education and Government 
departments including planning, finance, labour, agriculture, 
communications, health, social welfare, etc., should be 
strengthened. 
The major impediments to the universalization of primary education or 
provision of basic education for all are: 
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1. Lack of infrastructure, physical and human (particularly, schools 
and teachers), and lake of resources to create such infrastructure. 
2. Inadequate allocation of resources which are linked with lack of 
appreciation for the critical importance of primary education. 
3. Inability to balance resource allocation within the primary 
education sector between infrastructure, building, teachers, 
curricular development, management and quality improvements. 
4. Lack of links between education and productive work resulting in 
Jack of appreciation of the education system by the parents and 
adults who matters in educating children. 
5. Poor quality of education characterised by lack of innovations in 
teaching methods, organisation and management of primary 
education, including school hours, curricula, etc.. 
6. Over-centralisation and low involvement of local communities in 
designing and managing primary education. 
The goal of education far all can be achieved soon if resources can be 
found, curricula improved so as to help in productive work, teachers are 
motivated and developed through a variety of means and interventions, and 
management of school education improved through appropriate refonns." 
India's Educational Policy: 
In the pre-independence era, development of education was guided by 
the Acts, Despatches (wood's despacth). Reports of commission and 
committee. In the post-independence era, the framers of the constitution 
accorded due importance to education and Article 45 of the constitution 
enjoined that " the state shall endeavor to provide, within a period of 10 years 
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from the commencement of the constitution, for free and compulsory 
education for children until they complete the age of 14 years". The 
constitution, thus, placed an obligation on the state to provide free and 
compulsory education. The constitution also enjoined educational rights for 
minorities and for the educational development of weaker sections of society. 
The subject of education continued to be on the state list till 1976 v/hen, 
through the 42"'^  Amendment of the constitution, it was brought to the 
concurrent list in the constitution for fulfillment of nationally accepted goals. 
The TS*^^ and 74"' Constitutional Amendments fiirther contributed to educational 
development. Panchayati Raj institutions were strengthened by these 
amendments which opened a new era for development of education at the grass 
roots level. In 1997, the central Government has introduced a Fundamental 
Right Bill for making elementary education into a Fundamental Right and 
making it obligatory for parents to educate their children in the age group 6-14 
years. 
When in 1951, India took to the nation rebuilding process through Five-
Year Plans, educational development efforts were also regulated through the 
plan mechanism. On the basis of the Kothari Commission Report as well as the 
report of the committees of the Members of Parliament, a resolution on 
National Policy on Education was issued by the Government on July 24, 1968, 
which came to be regarded as the first national policy on education in free 
India. 
In the evaluation of educational policy, the year 1985 is another 
landmark as in that year the Ministry of Human Resource Development was set 
up which marked institutionalization of the idea i.e., to build the country's 
human resource holistically which should be looked upon as the most valuable 
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resource and that development should look beyond economic growth with 
its calculus of the Gross National Product (GNP). 
Subsequently, the Govemment reviewed the education system and 
initiated a national debate on education. Based on the suggestions received, a 
new National Policy on Education (NPE), 1986 and its Programme of Action, 
1992 were prepared in consultation with the State Governments and adopted by 
the parliament. The NPE, 1986 operationalised the meaning of concurrency and 
reflected in true spirit a meaningful partnership between the Centre and the 
States and at the same time placed on the Union Govemment the responsibility 
of ensuring the national and integrated character of education, maintaining 
quality and standards, requirements for advanced study, international aspects of 
education, cultural and human resource development. This policy document 
was reviewed by a committee under the chaimianship of shri Acharya 
Ramamurti, which submitted its report in December 1990 on alternative 
modalities of implementation. The N. Janardhana Reddy Committee set up by 
the CABE again reviewed the Policy in 1992. The committee recommended a 
revision of the Programine Of Action (POA) and laid special emphasis on 
education for women's equality, education for SCs/STs, and educationally 
backward minorities. The NPE and its POA were adopted in 1992. Over the 
year, a number of programmes have been taken up in the true spirit 
concurrently between the Union Govemment and the states. Mention may be 
made of programmes like Operational Blackboard, Non-Formal Education, 
establishment of District Institutes of Education and Training (DIETs), 
National Literacy Mission, Scheme of Nutritional Support to Primary 
Education (Mid-day Meals), District Primary Education Programme (DPEP), 
Vocational Education, Cultural and Value Education, Environmental 
Education, Improvement of Science Education in Schools, Educational 
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Technology, Computer Literacy and Studies in Schools, Community 
Polytechnics and such like. 
Impact of Adjustment on Financing of Education 
The main impact of structural adjustment on education is in the form of 
restructuring the financing of education. There are some notable general 
features of education expenditure in India. Since education is on the concurrent 
list, both central and state Governments are responsible for education. 
However, the centre accounts for only a small proportion of total expenditure. 
Although the centre accounts for only a small share of the total expenditure on 
education, around 12 per cent, it can be important in influencing the pattern of 
total expenditure and trends in expenditure. One of the major problems in 
examining expenditure on education is that there is no regular integrated 
account of expenditure by centre and state Government. 
Table 5.8 gives the infonnation on total spending by the central and state 
Governments on education. Since education expenditure is predominantly on 
the revenue account, that is, the main component is recurrent expenditure, we 
examine the combined revenue budget of the state and the central Government. 
In the combined revenue budget of the state and the central Governments, 
expenditure on education by education departments had a share of 11.27 per 
cent of total resources in 1987-88. This share fell in the early 1990s, reaching a 
low of 10.71 per cent in 1993-94. From 1993-94, it again started increasing and 
reached to 11.23 per cent in 1996-97, but remained lower than 1987-88. When 
expenditure by all departments is examined, the share of education declined 
from 12.75 per cent in 1987-88 to 12.58 per cent in 1991-92. But in 1992-93, it 
increased to 13.15 per cent and further to 13.35 per cent in 1996-97. 
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Table No. 5.8 
Total Expenditure of Central and State Governments on Education. 
Year 
1981-82 
1986-87 
1987-88 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 
1994-95 
1995-96 
(R.E.) 
1996-97 
(B.E.) 
Expenditure on 
Education by 
Education Deptts. 
InRs. 
Million 
37,901 
84,503 
104,302 
187,576 
209,530 
234,131 
272,301 
324,587 
365,293 
As % of 
Budget 
9.09 
10.5 
11.27 
11.01 
11.01 
10.71 
10.82 
11.07 
11.23 
Expenditure on Education By All Deptts. 
InRs. 
Million 
42,990 
94,790 
117,980 
214,340 
250,300 
282,800 
326,060 
390,180 
434,120 
As % of 
Budget 
10.31 
11.78 
12.75 
12.58 
13.15 
12.94 
12.95 
13.3 
13.35 
As% 
of GDP 
2.69 
3.24 
3.54 
3.48 
3.55 
3.49 
3.42 
3.55 
3.40 
In 
Constant 
1980-81 
prices 
38,991 
59,942 
68,772 
83,837 
90,265 
93,125 
115,475 
125,953 
131,142 
Source India Development Report, 1999-2000, 
Total expenditure of central and state Governments on education as 
parentage of GDP was 3.54 in 1987-88. It fell down to 3.48 per cent in 1991-
92. But it recovered in the next year and become 3.55 per cent in 1992-93, 
which is, in fact, higher than that of in 1987-88. However, it did not remain 
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same in the subsequent years and fell down to 3.49 per cent in 1993-94 and 
3.42 per cent in 1994-95. It again improved in 1995-96 but only to fall again in 
the year 1996-97. 
Table No. 5.9 
Percentage Allocation of Total (Centre + State) Budget for Education 
By sub-sectors of Education (Revenue Account) 
Year 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94 (RE) 
1994-95 (BE) 
1995-96 (BE) 
1996-97 (BE) 
Percentage of Total Budget Allocated for 
Elementary Education 
45.5 
46.2 
46.3 
46.3 
45.2 
46.9 
46.3 
47.3 
50.1 
Secondary Education 
30.7 
30.8 
32.2 
33.1 
34.3 
32.9 
31.4 
31.7 
30.7 
Note: 
Source 
BE 
RE 
Budget Estimates 
Revised Estimates 
Selected Socio-Economic Statistics, India, 1998, CSO, New 
Delhi. 
It is interesting to look at the share of primary education in the 
total expenditure on education. However, due to lack of data on combined 
expenditure (centre and states) on primary education, we can give only share 
pattern of expenditure on primary education in total budget for education. Table 
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5.9 shows percentage allocation of total (centre + states) budget for 
education by sub-sectors of education. It is clear from the table that percentage 
allocation of total budget for primary education increased from 46.3 in 1990-91 
to 50.1 in 1996-97, while that of secondary education declined from 32.2 in 
1990-91 to 30.7 in 1996-97. 
The financial problems of primary education can not be solved merely 
by redirecting resources from other educational sectors. First, overall public 
expenditure on education will have to increase. And secondly, both the centre 
and states need to increase significantly their allocation to the primary 
education if universal primary education is to be achieved. 
Progress in Primary Education 
The Indian population is characterised by a low overall rate of literacy -
52 per cent in 1991 (64 per cent for males and 39 per cent for females). Newly 
available data forni the fifty-third round of the National Sample Survey (NSS) 
indicate that the overall rate of literacy has risen to 62 per cent (73 per cent for 
males and 50 per cent for females) in 1997. There are, however, wide variations 
across regions, states, castes, classes, and sexes.'^ 
The problem is not one of adult illiteracy alone. Among children too, 
there are large number who do not attend school. Table 5.10 presents sex-wise 
enrolment at school level. An interesting fact emerges from the table that 
although the enrolment of the children (Boys and Girls) increased in absolute 
numbers since 1990-91, the percentage increase in enrolments are not very 
impressive. The enrolment in lower primary schools increased from 1985-86 to 
1990-91 by 24.5 per cent. Wliile it increased by 20.6 per cent from 1990-91 to 
1995-96. However, the situation was different in case of upper primary school 
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enrolment which increased by 12.3 per cent from 1990-91 to 1995-96 as 
compared to 11.4 per cent increase during the period 1985-86. Another 
important fact is that girls enrolment in both lower primary and upper primary 
schools have increased at a faster rate than that of boys. In lower primary 
schools, the girls enrolment increased by 28 per cent from 1990-91 to 1995-
96. while that of boys increased by 16.3 percent during the same period. 
Table 5.10 
Sex-wise Enrolment By Stages / Classes (School Level) 
(In Million) 
Year 
1980-81 
1985-86 
1990-91 
1991-92 
1992-93 
1993-94* 
1994-95* 
199596* 
Primary 
Boys 
45.3 
52.2 
57.0 
59.6 
57.9 
61.8 
62.3 
62.4 
Girls 
28.5 
35.2 
40.4 
42.3 
41.7 
46.4 
46.8 
47.4 
Total 
73.8 
87.4 
97.4 
100.9 
99.6 
108.6 
109.1 
109.8 
Upper Primary 
Boys 
13.9 
17.7 
21.5 
22.0 
21.2 
24.2 
24.5 
25.0 
Girls 
6.8 
9.6 
12.5 
13.6 
12.9 
15.7 
15.8 
16.0 
Tota 
1 
20.7 
27.3 
34.0 
35.6 
34.1 
39.2 
40.3 
41.0 
High / Hr. Sec. 
Boys 
7.6 
11.5 
12.8 
13.5 
13.6 
15.3 
16.0 
16.1 
Girls 
3.4 
5.0 
6.3 
6.9 
6.9 
8.0 
8.4 
8.8 
Total 
11.0 
16.5 
19.1 
20.4 
20.5 
23.7 
24.4 
24.9 
Note: * Provisional 
Source : Spreading the light of Education, Department of Education, 
Ministry of HRD, New Delhi, India. 
295 
Similarly, girls enrolment in upper primary school increased by 17.3 per 
cent from 1990-91 to 1995-96 and that of boys by 9.5 per cent during the same 
period. 
Further, although the enrolment rate in Primary Schools has increased, 
the drop out rate are still quite high in India. In other words, there is a 
Table No. 5.11 
Percentage Drop out in Different Stages of School Education. 
Year 
1980-81 
1990-91 
1992-93 P 
1993-94 
1994-95 P 
1995-96 P 
1996-97 P 
1997-98 P 
Boys 
Primar 
y 
56.2 
40.10 
40.07 
36.07 
35.18 
37.92 
39.37 
38.23 
Middle 
68.00 
59.12 
53.99 
49.55 
50.02 
54.99 
51.89 
50.72 
H. School 
79.80 
67.50 
68.15 
68.41 
67.15 
66.36 
66.82 
67.65 
Girls 
Primar 
y 
62.50 
45.97 
43.02 
39.05 
37.80 
41.31 
38.35 
41.34 
Middle 
79.40 
65.13 
60.06 
56.78 
56.53 
61.70 
52.77 
58.61 
H. School 
86.63 
','6.96 
''4.69 
''4.54 
'/3.38 
74.07 
73.04 
72.65 
Note:(l) P: Provisional 
(2) Total dropout during a course stage has been taken as per 
cent of intake in the first year of the course stage primary. 
Middle and High (H) School stages consist of classes I-V, 
VI-VIIl and IX-X. 
Source :- Selected Socio-Economic statistics, India, 1998, CSO, New Delhi. 
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large gap between children who enroll in school, or who have ever 
attended, and the number who actually complete schooling. The low retention 
is reflected by high drop out rates which in turns reflects of wastage of 
resources. In 1990-91, the average drop out of boys and girls was 43 per cent. 
The drop out rate of girls (45.97 per cent) was more than the boys (40.10 per 
cent). The good sign is that this drop out rate has been declining. The 
percentage drop out at primary level declined from 40.10 to 38.23 in case of 
boys and from 45.97 to 41.34 in case of girls over the period 1990-91 to 1998-
99. (Table 5.11). The decline in the drop out rate has been more in case of girl 
as compared to boys. 
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CONCLUSION 
The market-friendly economy is the market-oriented economy. The 
market-fiiendly shows the extent/degree of Government intervention. In 
market-fiiendly approach, the Governments allow the markets to function well 
and concentrate their intervention on areas in which markets prove inadequate. 
Put simply, the Governments need to do less in those areas where market work, 
or can be made to work, reasonably well. This approach to development that 
seems to have worked most reliably and which seems to offer most promise, 
suggests a re-appraisal of the respective roles for the market and the state. 
In the wake of severe economic crisis of 1990-91, it became necessary 
for India to approach IMF and World Bank to get loans under structural 
adjustment loans facility to overcome the balance of Payments difficulties and 
increase credit worthiness on the condition of adopting the structural 
adjustment programme. India, therefore, started series of economic refomis 
using market-friendly approach to fulfil the conditions laid down by 
IMF/World Bank. The Congress (I) Government headed by P.V. Narsimha Rao 
and then Finance Minister, Mamnohan Singh, undertook a package of Policy 
refonns for the Indian economy with the declared objectives of bringing about 
Macro-economic Stabilisation and Structural Adjustments which came 
accompanied by the 'catch-words' of liberalisation and Globalisation. 
These reforms in various sectors of the economy have made its impact 
during the years of 1990s. First, as a macro-economic stabilisation programme, 
India started Fiscal Policy refomis. Fiscal sector reforni has been carried out in 
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two major interrelated areas. The first consisted of the restoration of fiscal 
imbalance meaning thereby a drastic reduction in the fiscal deficits, elimination 
of the revenue deficit within a short period and limiting the monetized deficit. 
All this required a reduction in the growth of Government expenditure, 
especially subsidies, interest payments and defence expenditure and steps to 
raise the growth of revenues. 
The Government has been successfiil in checking the mounting pressure 
of deteriorating fiscal situation in 1990-91 which was the result of the past 
Government's cavalier management of expenditure more than the revenue 
during eighties. All the indicators of fiscal imbalances namely fiscal deficit, 
primary deficit, revenue deficit and budgetary deficit have shown a declining 
trend during 1990s. Decisive action to limit the fiscal deficit reduced the central 
Government's fiscal deficit fi^om 8.3 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 to 5.1 per cent 
in 1998-99. Primary deficit was reduced fi-om 4.4 per cent of GDP in 1990-91 
to 0.9 per cent in 1998-99. Whereas, revenue deficit was reduced to 2.7 per cent 
in 1998-99 fi-om 3.5 per cent in 1990-91. The budget deficit also came down to 
0.1 per cent in 1997-98 fi-om 2.1 per cent of GDP in 1990-91. The substantial 
reduction in the mognetization of the deficits of the central Govermnent has 
also been made. The monetized deficit which was 2.6 per cent of GDP in 1980-
81 rose to 2.8 per cent in 1990-91. It came down to 0.8 per cent in 1997-98. All 
these have been made possible by controlling the growth of total expenditure. 
The total expenditure, which increased by 4.1 times fi-om 1980-81 to 1990-91, 
increased by 2.6 times fi-om 1990-91 to 1998-99. The expenditure as 
percentage of GDP rose fi-om 17.1 per cent to 20.2 per cent fi-om 1980-81 to 
1990-91, but it declined to 15.6 per cent in 1998-99. The interest payment, 
subsidies and defence expenditure has been the major cause of rise in 
expenditure during 1980s. However, interest payment is still having major 
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share in total expenditure. Though both revenue and capital expenditure were 
responsible for checking the growth of total expenditure during nineties, but the 
contribution of capital expenditure had been more than revenue expenditure 
whose share in total expenditure had been rising. 
On the other hand, the revenue receipts of the central Government could 
not improve. The revenue receipts of the central Government registered a 
declining trend during nineties. It was 11.2 per cent of GDP in 1991-92, which 
declined to 9.6 per cent of GDP in 1998-99. The decline in total receipt was 
due to the tax revenue, which declined from a level of 8.1 per cent of GDP in 
1991-92 to 6.6 per cent of GDP in 1998-99. The tax revenue declined due to 
the fall in revenue from customs and excise duties. 
The capital account receipts has also been fluctuating during nineties. 
But one marked change was found that the Government relied more on internal 
market borrowing than external sources. From 1991-92, the Government 
started disinvestment of public sector undertakings, which yielded non-debt 
receipts on capital account. But it has not been very helpful in reducing the debt 
burden. 
The Government started the process of disinvestment from 1991-92 and 
realized the total amount of Rs 11,440 crore till March 1998. It is still going on. 
But, the pace of disinvestment has been very slow due to unfavourable market 
conditions and the shares of PSUs could be sold of only limited profit making 
enterprises. Frequently, the Government has been criticized for underutilization 
of the value of the shares disinvested due to selling the shares not at proper 
time. Most of the time, the Government has failed to achieve the disinvestment 
target. Moreover, the Government is criticized for disinvesting the shares of 
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only top level profit making enterprises and using their proceeds for the fiscal 
requirements. The Government must try to disinvest even the shares of loss 
making enterprises making them profitable by using some part of disinvestment 
proceeds and remaining amount may be used for retiring the old debt of the 
Government. 
The Government has also taken several steps to reforni the public 
sectors. During 1990s, it yielded good results. Our analysis regarding the 
perfomiance of public sector enterprises fi"om 1980-81 to 1997-98, measured in 
tenns of broad financial parameters, reveals that overall returns fi-om PSUs was 
negative during 1980s. In the decade of 1990s, there has been improvement in 
terms of the percentage of net profit to capital employed. The percentage of 
gross profit to capital employed improved fi"om 10.87 per cent in 1990-91 to 
16.2 per cent in 1997-98 and the percentage of net profit to capital employed 
fi"om 2.23 per cent to 6.15 per cent during the same period. The percentage of 
loss making enterprises, which was 42.65 per cent in 1985-86 and 47.03 per 
cent in 1990-91, came down to 42.37 per cent in 1997-98. The reduction in 
overall loss making enterprises was mainly due to improvement in service 
sector enterprises where they went down fi-om 40.84 per cent in 1990-91 to 
29.33 per cent in 1997-98. The reduction in the percentage of loss making units 
in manufacturing sectors was also responsible for the said improvement, but not 
as much as that in service sectors. In 1990-91, out of 13 broad group of 
manufacturing sectors, only 4 were earning net profit. Their number became 7 
in 1997-98. In the service sectors, only 4 out of 18 broad group of industries 
were earning net profit in 1990-91. But in 1997-98, there was only one group 
earning losses. So, there has been remarkable improvement in the financial 
perfomiance of public sector during 1990s. 
303 
The overall perfomiance of industrial sector during nineties was not as 
good as during eighties. The average annual growth rate of general industries 
during eighties (1981-82 to 1990-91), was 7.8 per cent which declined to 6.0 
per cent during 1990s (1991-92 to 1997-98). During the same period, 
manufacturing declined from 7.6 per cent to 6.2 per cent, mining from 8.2 per 
cent to 3.6 per cent and electricity from 8.5 per cent to 6.9 per cent. 
As a use-based classification, only intemiediate goods showed 
improvement during 1990s as compared to 1980s. Its average annual growth 
rate during 1981-82 to 1990-91 was 5.9 per cent. It became 6.7 per cent during 
1990-91 to 1997-98. However, the average annual growth of capital goods 
industries fell down from 11.5 per cent during eighties to 4.6 per cent during 
nineties. 
The overall industrial growth rate during the first three years o f the post 
policy period from 1991-92 to 1993-94, remained moderate. But in 1995-96, it 
attained peak growth rate of 12.1 per cent, the highest growth rate ever 
recorded since 1980-81. During the same year the manufacturing sector also 
recorded first ever increase of 13.6 per cent growth rate since 1981-82. 
However, from 1996-97, the overall industrial growth rate again started 
declining and fell down to 7.1 per cent in 1996-97 and 4.2 per cent in 1997-98. 
The fall in industrial growth was because of manufacturing, mining and 
electricity, which have shown decline in growth rate. 
Thus, after going through a period of transition and restructuring Indian 
industry has responded to the economic refonns with vigour and registered a 
robust growth in 1995-96. However, the decline in growth rate in 1991-92, 
1992-93 and 1994-95 were considered to be transitory phase. Although the 
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industrial growth rate has decelerated in 1996-97 and 1997-98, it is expected 
that under the new policy of promoting market, private sector and foreign direct 
investment, die industrial output would not only pick up its earlier high growth, 
but may remain much above it in future. 
The main emphasis on the financial sector refonn has been on the 
banking system, which constitute a very valuable segment of the financial 
sector. There has been considerable progress in the financial sector in India 
from 1991-92 to 1997-98. The positive trends that have emerged in the process 
are reflected in the financial results of the banks. The banking sector in general 
and public sector banks in particular are showing improvement as a result of 
the wide ranging reform measures. This is evident from their relatively clean 
balance sheets, reduction in non-perfomiing assets, improvement in operating 
profit and considerable progress in attaining capital adequacy ratio and other 
prudential nonns. 
The operating profit of all scheduled commercial banks increased from 
Rs.3, 840 crore in 1990-91 to Rs 13,992 crore (264.4 per cent) in 1998-99. 
During the same period, the profit rose to Rs 4,660 crore from Rs 743 crore 
(500.3 per cent). In case of public sector banks, the operating profit increased 
from Rs 13.161 crore to Rs. 10,577.50 crore (234.6 per cent) and net profit 
from Rs 476 crore to Rs. 3,258.09 crore (584.5 per cent) from 1990-91 to 1998-
99. 
Apart fi-om the magnitude of profit, the level of non-perfonning assets 
(NPAs) have also shown improvement. The most critical area in the 
improvement of profit is reduction in non-perfonning assets (NPAs). The 
NPAs of all public sector banks aggregated Rs 39,253 crore in 1992-93 when 
305 
new nornis were implemented for the first time and they constituted 23.2 per 
cent of the total loan assets. It declined to 14.6 per cent in 1998-99. Gross 
NPAs as percentage to total assets also declined from 11.8 per cent to 6.2 per 
cent from 1992-93 to 1998-99. The net NPAs as percentage of total net 
advances decHned fi-om 10.7 per cent in 1994-95 to 7.5 per cent in 1998-99, 
While the net NPAs as percentage of total assets declined to 2.9 per cent in 
1998-99 fi-om 4.0 per cent in 1994-95. 
Out of the 27 public sector banks only one had net NPAs of more than 
20 per cent of its net advances in 1997-98 as compared to 1993-94, when there 
were 18 such banks. Similarly, there was only one bank having 10 per cent net 
NPAs of its total assets in 1993-94. But in 1997-98, there were 17 such banks. 
Almost all the banks have achieved the capital adequacy norm of 8 per 
cent. In short, reforms have assuredly paved the way for building a banking 
system capable of meeting the requirements of a more open and competitive 
economy. These achievements are laudable especially in the backdrop of the 
happenings in the South-East Asian economies. 
The results of the refomis made in the external sectors have also been 
impressive. India's share in the total world trade was 0.57 per cent in 1980, 
which came down to 0.53 per cent in 1991. However, from 1992, it started 
picking up and became 0.60 per cent in 1995. The share of exports in the total 
world export was 0.42 per cent in 1980, it increased to 0.50 per cent in 1991 
and remained 0.60 per cent from 1994 to 1997. The improvement in Indian 
exports' share came up with the rise in the value of export, especially after 
1991 following the liberal policy of export boosting through a number of export 
promotion schemes. 
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The average annual trade deficit during 1980s (fi-om 1980-81 to 1989-
90) was $ 5827 million. This much average annual trade deficit was due to 
large gap between average annual exports and imports, which were $ 10695 
million and $ 16522 million respectively. The year 1990-91 saw a trade deficit 
of $ 5927 million as import rose by 13.4 per cent against a rise of 9.2 per cent 
registered by exports. Three years (1993-94 to 1995-96) saw a strong 
I esurgence in export earnings. The rate of growth of exports was as high as 
20.0 per cent in 1993-94, 18.4 per cent in 1994-95 and 20.8 per cent in 1995-
96. As against, the imports due to liberal policy also increased from 6.5 per 
cent in 1993-94 to 22.9 per cent in 1994-95 and 28.0 per cent in 1995-96. The 
trade deficit during these three years was of order $ 1068 million in 1993-94, 
$2324 million in 1994-95 and $ 4880 million in 1995-96. The trade deficit in 
the year 1997-98 and 1998-99 was far greater than the year of crisis, 1990-91. 
However, when we compare the average annual trade deficit during 
1980s (from 1980-81 to 1989-90), the trade deficit is lower during 1990s. 
During 1990s, the average annual trade deficit was $ 4381 million as against 
$ 5827 million during 1980s, a 25 per cent decline. This improvement was 
mainly because of increase in an annual exports from $10695 million during 
1980s to $ 26338 million during 1990s, 146.3 per cent growth. As against, the 
average annual imports registered only 85.9 per cent growth from $ 16522 
million during 1980s to $ 3072 million during 1990s. 
The change in the structure of India's imports during nineties are 
reflective of the influences of three factors: 
1. Movement of international prices 
2. Change in the trade policy 
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3. Pattern of domestic demand. 
Among these three factors the contribution of the second factor does not 
seems to be major and significant as we do not see any major change in the 
composition of imports during nineties. 
India has gradually transfomied itself from a predominantly, primary 
products' exporting country into an exporter of manufactured goods. There 
were significant compositional shifts within the major manufactured product 
groups such as engineering goods, chemicals and allied products, etc, as 
between eighties and nineties. 
India's manufacturing exports are showing, tendencies of shifting away 
fiom traditional exports towards relatively new manufactured products. 
Another important point about the compositional change in the manufactured 
exports is that, by and large, those manufactured groups perfonned relatively 
poorly on the export front whose internal composition remained unchanged 
whereas those groups whose internal composition changed (like chemicals and 
allied products, engineering goods) performed better. This indicates the 
existence of a close link between export perfonnance and structural change in 
the case of India's manufactured exports. 
Since 1980-81, large deficit in trade balance were experienced year after 
year. During the Sixth Plan (1980-81 to 1984-85), the deficit in the balance of 
trade was around $ 6898 million per annum. During the same period, current 
account deficit was $ 3004.6 million per annum. As a percentage of GDP, the 
average trade deficit during the Sixth Plan was -3.4 per cent. The current 
account deficit remained only -1.3 per cent of GDP as a result of 2.1 per cent 
net invisibles to GDP ratio. During the whole Seventh Plan period (1985-86 to 
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1989-90), the current account deficit was $ 5823.4 million, trade deficit was $ 
7827 million and net earnings fi-om invisibles was $ 2003.6 million per annum. 
Both the trade and current account deficit per amium during the Seventh Plan 
were higher than that of Sixth Plan. The current account deficits acquired a 
structural character. A large trade deficit occurred year after year despite a 
robust growth in export. An important set back during the Seventh Plan was 
large decline in the net invisible earnings. During the year 1990-91, the current 
account deficit became $ 9680 million which was higher than the Sixth and 
Seventh Plan current account deficit per annum. Due to the efforts of 
Government, the trade deficit came down to $ 2798 million in 1991-92. The 
current account deficit also fell down to $ 1178 million. In ternis of GDP, the 
current account deficit was only 0.3 per cent in 1991-92 as compared to 3.3 per 
cent in 1990-91. The foreign exchange reserves were sufficient to meet more 
than five months imports. The condition in 1992-93 again deteriorated. The 
trade deficit went up to -2.2 per cent of GDP ($ 5447 million). The current 
account deficit increased fi^om -0.3 per cent of GDP to -1.7 per cent and the 
foreign exchange reserves fell down to 4.9 months import cover. The current 
account deficit in 1992-93 was higher than the safe limit of 1 per cent presented 
by Bimal Jalan. The condition after 1992-93 became distinctly different till 
1996-97. The trade deficit, the current accounts deficit and foreign exchange 
reserves improved. When we consider the period of Eight Plan (1992-97) as a 
whole, the current account deficit was $ 3689 million per annum which was 
much lower than that of during the Seventh Plan. However, the trade deficit 
was around $ 8945 million per annum which was much higher than that of 
during the Seventh Plan. 
The condition of balance of payments again deteriorated during 1997-98. 
However, the situation improved during 1998-99. When current account deficit 
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came down to 1.0 per cent of GDP. Also, the number of month's imports 
covered by foreign exchange reserves improved substantially from 6.9 months 
to 8.2 months. 
A noteworthy feature in the country's balance of payments in recent 
years has been the improvement in the invisible account. Invisible surplus has 
been a durable Source of support to the balance of payments. 
On the basis of the criteria given by C Rangarajan, that is, the current 
account deficit should stay at around 2 per cent of GDP and there should be no 
further drop in the foreign exchange reserves from the level reached at the 
beginning of current financial year (1996-97) i.e., $ 17 billion, there has been 
healthy trend of foreign exchange and current account deficit management in 
external sector during 1997-98 and 1998-99. 
Until rscently, the capital account did not receive much attention 
because of the limited avenues of financing. Until almost the beginning of the 
1980s, nearly 80 per cent of the financing requirement was met through 
external assistance, a concessional method of financing. In the late 1980s 
external assistance, commercial borrowing and non-resident deposits had 
almost an equal share in the financing requirement. The structure of capital 
account in India has changed considerably over time. The Eighties were 
marked by a reduction in inflows of concessional assistance to India, 
principally from the World Bank Group. The large current account deficit. 
Particularly after 1984-85, was financed by substantial inflows of capital by 
way of commercial borrowings and deposits by non-resident Indians. The 
decade of 1990s has been marked by structural changes relating to financing 
the deficits in the balance of payments. The dependence on external 
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commercial borrowing has come down markedly. The role oi' external 
assistance has been steadily declining in its importance because of subdued 
disbursements and the large repayments of loan contracted in the Previous year. 
The net inflow under commercial borrowings is also coming down because of 
the large repayments. 
One healthy development is that a strong effort has been made in recent 
years to attract non-debt-creating funds either in the forni of Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) or Portfolio Investment. Portfolio Investments are, by their 
very nature, more volatile than foreign direct investment. However, they 
contributed in a significant way to the availability of funds. 
Foreign capital, mostly from the developed countries, has entered the 
country in various fonns, both on Govemmer.t account and Private account. It 
has given rise to number of problems, the most serious being that of debt 
servicing. Till the early 1980s external debt has not been a major Problem. 
These, however, increased in the second half of the 1980s and the Balance of 
Payment Crisis that the country faced in 1990-91 was to some extent due to an 
external debt problem. India's external debt rose from $ 83.80 billion in 1991 
to $ 97.67 billion in 1999. It has increased by about 1.2 times in dollar tenns 
and by 2.5 times in rupee tenns from 1991 to 1999. 
However, during 1990s the external debt as a percentage of GDP at 
current market prices has declined steadily from 1991-92 to 1998-99. The debt 
service ratio, which peaked at 35.3 per cent in 1990-91 declined to 18 per cent 
in 1998-99. Similarly other indicators of external debt has also shown 
significant improvements. The debt service payments as per cent of GDP at 
market prices, short -terni debt and the current account deficit as a percentage 
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of GDP (i.e. CAD/GDP ratio) have shown significant reduction during 1990s. 
Thus, India has been successful to some extent to control the growing burden of 
external debt during post liberalization period. However, despite improvements 
in recent years and other redeeming features, India's external debt may still be 
considered to be relatively high by international standards. 
In recent years, the role of foreign direct investment (FDl) in stimulating 
growth process has increasingly been emphasized. India has sought to increase 
inflows of foreign direct investment with a much liberal policy since 1991 after 
four decades of cautious, if not always restrictive attitude to it. Since July 
1991,as a part of the New Economic Policy, the Government of India has 
embarked on a Policy of attracting more and more foreign investment in the 
country to augment the resource availability in infrastructural and other critical 
areas of the economy. 
A striking aspect of India's recent experience has been a nnnarkable 
surge in foreign investment. There has been impressive increase in number of 
foreign collaborations. The number of approvals in the decade of 1980s (1981-
90) were 7435, it increased to 15163 in the decade of 1990s (1991-99). Out of 
the total number of foreign collaborations cases involving financial investment 
shot up to 9077 during the decade of 1990s from 1852 during the decade of 
1980s. USA has been the top investor during both the decades. There has been 
wide gap between amount approved and actual inflow in 1992. The ratio has 
improved from 17.4 per cent in 1992 to 51.8 per cent in 1999. One importance 
fact is that out of the total foreign investment, portfolio investment has 
occupied 53.71 percent share during 1991-92 to 1998-99. This clearly shows 
that preference of foreign flows was more in favour of portfolio investment. 
Even the net contribution of foreign firais on direct investment was merely 34.7 
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per cent in total foreign investment flows during the same period. However, out 
of the total foreign collaborations, 59.9 per cent involved financial 
collaborations. This is commendable achievement of'Post-Policy Period'. This 
is what the policy aspired for. Another appreciable improvement is that nearly 
75 per cent of the FDI approvals were made in priority sectors. However, when 
we compare India with other developing countries, we find that India could not 
attract much foreign direct investment. Thus, India has not been able to benefit 
much jfrom foreign direct investment flows in the world despite the red carpet 
spread by it for the foreign investors. 
Refomis have also influenced the Human Resource Development, 
specially Health and Education Sectors. The immediate fall out of the new 
policies on the health sector was a cut in budgetary support. The cuts were 
severe in the first and third years of refoim process, followed by some 
restoration in the later years. A notable feature of the expenditure on health is 
that the expenditure on health as percentage of total plan investment remained 
same (1.7 per cent) during the VII Plan (1985-90) and VIII Plan (1992-97) 
The Government has been successfiil to accelerate the improvement in 
all the health indicators in the post-refonn period. The two most widely used 
indicators of health, life expectancy at birth and infant mortality has improved. 
Life expectancy at birth increased fi-om 59.4 years in 1991 to 62.4 in 1996 and 
the infant mortality rate declined fi-om 80 per thousand to 72 during the same 
period. However, both the life expectancy and infant mortality are below the 
targets to be achieved by 2000. India could achieve only the target of crude 
death rate of 9 per thousand populations before the year 2000. When we 
compare the life expectancy at birth and infant mortality rate in 1997 with other 
Asian countries, the improvements are not impressive. 
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The health services, as of today, still suffer from a lot of inadequacies. 
There are disparities in urban-rural health infrastructures, backlogs in provision 
of buildings for Primary Health Centres (PHCs) and Sub-Centres, inappropriate 
location/inadequate maintenance of existing buildings, non-availability of 
essential drugs, Secondary Health Care Centres (Hospitals) discharging the 
function of PHCs as well and over crowding of tertiary health care facilities in 
urban areas. 
Similarly, the main impact of structural adjustment on education is in the 
forni of restructuring the financing of education. In the initial year of refomis, 
total expenditure fell down. But in the later years, it improved. However, in 
1996-97, it remained lower than that of 1991-92.. The major change was found 
in financing pattern of various sections of education. It is interesting to look at 
the share of primary education in the total expenditure on education. The 
percentage allocation of total budget for primary education increased from 46.3 
per cent in 1990-91 to 50.1 in 1996-97. This shows remarkable shilt towards 
market-friendly goals. 
As interesting fact is that the enrolment of all children (Boys and Girls) 
increased in absolute numbers since 1990-91, though the percentage increase in 
enrolment is not very impressive. Another important fact is that girls enrolment 
in both lower primary and upper primary schools have increased at faster rate 
than that of boys. 
Further, although the enrolment rate in primary schools has increased, 
the drop out rate are still quite high in India. In other words, there is a large gap 
between children who enroll in school, or who have ever attended and the 
number who actually complete schooling. In 1990-91, the average drop out rate 
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of girls was more than boys. The good sign is that this drop out rate has been 
dedining. The dechne in the drop out rate has been more in case of girls as 
compared to boys. 
The process of refonns has yet not been completed. It is still going on 
and we will see more of it in the years to come. We agree that eight or nine 
years are not sufficient to judge the impact of refonns as some of the impacts 
lake time to be clearly visible, yet it can give us some idea as to the direction in 
which we are moving. Our study gives such an idea. The results of our study 
show that we are moving in the right direction. Though the pace of refonn has 
been very slow in India, yet we have made good progress. It is this that lead us 
to believe that market-friendly model is highly relevant and usefiil for a 
democratic country like India. The refonns have brought on surface the hidden 
potential of India. We are now in a good position to make full use of our skilled 
labour. The Government has now more time and energy to build social and 
economic infrastructure, which is checking our growth. The fiindamentals of 
the economy are now very strong and we are in a good position to start second 
generation refonns. 
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